AN UNWELCOME EMPIRE: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM AS THE YELLOW PERIL IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES IN AND AROUND THE SINO-JAPANESE AND RUSSO-JAPANESE WARS. by NELSON, JAMES,EDWYN,LE,MESSURIER
Durham E-Theses
AN UNWELCOME EMPIRE: JAPANESE
IMPERIALISM AS THE YELLOW PERIL IN
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES IN AND
AROUND THE SINO-JAPANESE AND
RUSSO-JAPANESE WARS.
NELSON, JAMES,EDWYN,LE,MESSURIER
How to cite:
NELSON, JAMES,EDWYN,LE,MESSURIER (2016) AN UNWELCOME EMPIRE: JAPANESE
IMPERIALISM AS THE YELLOW PERIL IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES IN AND
AROUND THE SINO-JAPANESE AND RUSSO-JAPANESE WARS., Durham theses, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11389/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
AN UNWELCOME EMPIRE: JAPANESE IMPERIALISM AS 
THE YELLOW PERIL IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED 
STATES IN AND AROUND THE SINO-JAPANESE AND 
RUSSO-JAPANESE WARS. 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
An original thesis following minor corrections presented to 
 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
 
at 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
 
 
 
In complete fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Postgraduate Research Degree 
 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS (MA) 
 
in 
 
HISTORY 
 
 
 
By 
 
MR. JAMES EDWYN LE MESSURIER NELSON 
 
Falling within the specified parameters comprising a word count of 
exactly 
 
49,650 
 
 
 
DECEMBER 2015 
James Nelson 
Department of History  
Durham University 
 
Abstract of Master’s (MA) Thesis, Submitted Following Minor Corrections 
December 2015 
 
An Unwelcome Empire: Japanese Imperialism as the Yellow Peril in Britain 
and the United States In and Around the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese 
Wars 
 
 
This thesis is about Western perceptions of Japan’s early imperialist years and aims to 
address how Britain and America perceived the expansion of Meiji Japan. In doing so the 
period spanning from the Sino-Japanese to the Russo-Japanese War is taken as the core area 
of study, with the victory of Japan in both of these conflicts marking the point in time where 
it emerged as an imperial power. As such anti-Japanese prejudices will be examined to show 
how some in the West regarded this ascendency with contempt as the virtue of being an 
imperial state with the privileges of empire which came something which should be reserved 
for the white, Christian nations who possessed a history of such endeavours. 
 
In order to establish a competent assessment of this I have structured this work in such a way 
which sees two intense chapters being presented focusing on the years surrounding these 
conflicts. In these chapters Japan’s relations with the West, primarily Britain and the United 
States, will be looked at focusing on the differing political and societal opinions as to whether 
or not Japan’s emergence as a global power constituted a legitimate threat. The former of 
these conflicts saw Japan’s emergence as an imperial power whilst the latter saw it burst onto 
the world stage. For this period of study I have used materials from the popular media as well 
as governmental publications so to provide an encompassing image.  
 
Following the defeat of Russia in 1905 the idea of Japan as the epitome of the yellow peril 
was more engrained in western circles. In America especially this is most vociferous with 
ideas of exclusion and anti-Japanese prejudices not being difficult to find. Across this period 
however, Britain was more reserved in their attitudes towards Japan and although similar 
examples can be found they were always the more accepting of Japan which the signing of 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is testament to. By bringing together a number of different 
strands surrounding this topic a range of material is used collating a range of ideas and 
arguments, something where a study with greater parameters than those permitted here would 
be of greater use, providing a more thorough and encompassing investigation. 
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An Introduction to Japanese Imperialism, the Yellow Peril  
and Western Views of East Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
‘For long I looked in vain for Fujisan, and failed to see it, though I heard ecstasies all over the 
deck, till, accidently looking heavenwards instead of earthwards, I saw far above any 
possibility of height, as one would have thought, a huge, truncated cone of snow, 13,080 feet 
above the sea, from which it sweeps upwards in a glorious curve, very wan, against a very 
pale blue sky, with its base and the intervening country veiled in a pale grey mist. It was a 
wonderful vision, and shortly, as a vision, vanished’.1 
 
- Isabella Bird, Unbeaten Tracks In Japan, 1880 
  
‘Many a young man starts life with a natural gift of exaggeration which, if nurtured in a 
congenial and sympathetic surrounds, or by the imitation of the best models, might grow into 
something really great and wonderful. But, as a rule, he comes to nothing. He either falls into 
careless habits of accuracy, or takes to frequenting the society of the aged and well-informed. 
Both things are equally fatal to his imagination….’2 
 
- Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying’, 1889 
 
‘The world is getting so small that the thought and life of one portion can no longer be a 
matter of indifference to the other, even the most remote’.3 
 
- Science, December 1892 
 
 
In 1882 Britain invaded and subsequently occupied Egypt, two years later France went to war 
with China leading to the establishment of Indochina, and soon after that in 1885 the 
                                                          
1 Isabella Bird, Unbeaten Tracks In Japan. An Account of Travels in the Interior Including Visits to the 
Aborigines of Yezo and the Shrine of Nikkô (London, 1905 [1880]), 1-2.  
2 Oscar Wilde, ‘The Decay of Lying: A Dialogue’, The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, 25:143 (1889), 
37-38. 
3 Quoted in Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement. Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge, 
MA.,1972), 27. 
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conclusion of the Berlin Conference sparked the “scramble for Africa,” a colonial occupation 
which witnessed the beginning of a new age of imperialism, the period of colonisation.4 
These events as well as others demonstrate a change in the attitude and approach towards 
imperialism with imperialists both old and new acquiring protectorate states across the globe 
in Africa, Asia and South America. Britain, France, Germany and the United States were 
amongst the most prominent of these nations. With the exception of America this had long 
been regarded as the norm, the natural progression of affairs. This was a unique club which 
was fastidious about its members. By the end of the century the United States had no trouble 
in gaining admittance as the United States expanded across Central America and into the 
Pacific – a white, Western, Christian nation who had proven its superiority over those it had 
conquered, emerging out of the New World with a devout expression of imperial gleam. But 
what if such an act was to happen under the guidance of a non-white, non-Western nation 
who held a seemingly inferior status? What if an East Asian nation was to acclaim such a 
standing in the global hierarchy? In the period stemming from the Sino-Japanese to the 
Russo-Japanese War, Japan celebrated such an achievement, acquiring overseas territory and 
establishing external dominance. How then did the West view these imperialist ventures 
following Japan’s quick and successive victories over China and Russia? And how was this 
development perceived in societal and political circles?  
This was a period of change influencing regional and global affairs with Japan’s 
expansion catching many off guard. Victory over China marked the initial success of the 
Meiji government who since the Restoration of 1868 had embarked on polices of expansion 
with aspirations to develop, extend and assert a deepened and profound Japanese presence. 
Thenceforth Japan sought to emulate the strength of Western imperialism, having realised 
from the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860, and the Perry Expedition of 1852-1854 
that their own tactics, strategies, military and arsenal were outdated, meaning it could not 
compete with those displays of strength. Some form of change was needed in order to cope 
with the demands of a burgeoning new era.5 It was with this new mind-set that Japan 
emulated Western imperialism which developed quicker than any overseer would have been 
willing to guess. Inazo Nitobé stated in 1918 that it was at the commencement of the Meiji 
era where Japan placed themselves ‘under the tutelage of European and American leaders, 
gradually assimilating their thought – so, in the future, when the period of fruition shall have 
come, we should show forth what may be expected of the intellectual wedding of the two 
hemispheres, of the spiritual wedding of the East and the West’.6 In this sense Japanese 
emulation was for the greater good of their advancement toward becoming a modern power, 
as they engaged in an overseas conflict with China where there was a clear and underlined 
                                                          
4 See Stig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommensen, and Ronald E. Robinson, Bismarck, Europe and Africa: the Berlin 
Conference 1884-1885 and the Onset of Partition (Oxford, 1988); R. J. Gavin and J. A. Betley (eds.), The 
Scramble for Africa: Documents on the Berlin and West Africa Conference and Related Subjects, 1884/1885 
(Ibadan, 1973). 
5 William McOmie, The Opening of Japan, 1853-1855. A Comparative Study of the American, British, Dutch, 
and Russian Naval Expeditions to Compel the Tokugawa Shogunate to Conclude Treaties and Open Ports to 
Their Ships (Folkestone, 2006), 55. 
6 Inazo Nitobé, The Japanese Nation. Its Land, Its People and Its Life. With Special Considerations to Its 
Relations with the United States (New York and London, 1918), 202-203. 
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intent of altering the status-quo. On 11 July 1894 one Japanese newspaper article claimed that 
war was anticipated by its warriors as a means of liberation from the feudal and backward 
policies of seclusion, stating that their displeasure would be inconsolable if events in Korea 
were to end without the sounds of cannon fire and of blood spilling. Anything less would 
have been regarded as an utter failure.7 So profound and influential was this victory that 
Premier Itō Hirobumi spoke of it as ‘the greatest event in our history’.8 This approach 
transcended Japanese attitudes towards furthering its influence in East Asia up to the war 
with Russia where victory catapulted Japan onto the global arena of contenders for empire, 
creating a shockwave of far greater magnitude than its victory a decade earlier. For it was this 
‘small island nation of East Asia’ as Ikuhiko Hata writes, who ‘had emerged as an 
imperialistic nation in her own right, on its way towards hegemony in East Asia and the 
Western pacific’.9 Victory over Russia was in many ways the parting of the waves. 
Traditionally a lesser Asiatic power whom Russia had managed to dominate since the times 
of Peter the Great, its defeat showed how times had changed with Japan emerging as a 
competitor in Great Power politics.10 Whereas the year 1895 marked the point where Japan’s 
imperialism began to take shape, it was its victory a decade later which cemented its power as 
being equal to Western imperialists with these victories making up the period of Japan’s early 
imperialism, a time so significant that this decade of the Meiji era warrants special 
acknowledgement.  
But how was Japanese early imperialism and these golden age perceived by these 
Western states? In addressing these questions this thesis will look at the Western perceptions 
of early Japanese imperialism and the influence which this phenomenon as well as the events 
around it had on relations and attitudes between these two worlds. At this point I feel it is 
important that the reader is made clear about what is meant by two things which have thus far 
been mentioned: firstly what is meant by being an imperial power, and secondly what is 
meant by use of the term “West” and who it refers to. Regarding the former empire by 
colonisation had taken shape to become the norm, some labelling it as a characteristic of a 
modern state such as Akira Iriye who believed that imperialism and modernity were linked: 
‘imperialism characterised part of the external behaviour of modern states of the late 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It expressed the energies, orientations, and interests of a 
modern state of that particular period’.11 By the turn of the century it had come to be regarded 
as a key feature of a modern state and a part of global affairs and therefore cannot be 
overlooked as it impacted upon the status-quo in the East and West. Thus the emergence of 
an imperial power in East Asia constituted a significant regional and global event, chastising 
                                                          
7 Stuart Lone, Japan’s First Modern War. Army and Society in the Conflict with China, 1894-95 (Basingstoke, 
1994), 27. 
8 Quoted in Marius B. Jansen, Samuel C. Chu, Shumpei Okamoto and Bonnie B. Oh, ‘The Historiography of the 
Sino-Japanese War’, The International History Review, 1:2 (1979), 191. 
9 Ikuhiko Hata, ‘Continental Expansion, 1905-1941’, in Peter Duus (ed.), The Cambridge History of Japan, 
Volume 6: The Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1988), 271.   
10 John W. Steinberg, All the Tsar’s Men. Russia’s General Staff and the Fate of the Empire, 1898-1914 
(Washington, 2010), 147.   
11 Akira Iriye, ‘Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status’, in Marius B. Jansen (ed.), The Emergence of Meiji Japan 
(Cambridge, 1995), 312-313. 
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the existing state of affairs and challenging the idea of their inferiority. On the second of 
these points when looking at the topic of Western imperialists it is obvious that this study 
does not permit for a detailed study of all of them to take place. Thus I am primarily referring 
to Britain and the United States, the former being the world’s most influential and widespread 
power with an empire that in one way or another touched every corner of the globe, and the 
latter being the new power in the Pacific with ventures that stretched into the Philippines and 
East Asia.12 It is important to underline the fact that these nations had their own individual 
and specific interests and attitudes towards Japan. But both played key roles in Japan’s 
opening and the formulising of its development thereafter and it is for these reasons that 
British and American perceptions of Japan will be addressed first and foremostly, although 
other Western states will at time merit attention.  
Elaborating on this I will highlight the individual and varying attitudes of Britain and 
the United States towards Japan. By possessing a global empire it makes almost a historical 
sense to start with Britain. In 1907 Lord Thomas Sanderson likened the British empire to 
‘some huge giant sprawling all over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every 
direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream’.13 This mind-set mirrored 
attitudes common to Victorians who believed that empire brought with it an aura of 
superiority.14 But the development of Japan added a new dimension to East Asian affairs 
which ultimately affected its position. Thus analysing the British perceptions of this new and 
rising power in an area of the world which had not experienced such displays of dominance 
since the times of Genghis Kahn and the Mongols, in a country which had abandoned any 
vested interest in engaging with overseas states during the Tokugawa era, will show how 
Britain’s presence in East Asia came to be superseded. Britain could not grasp the rapidity of 
change as it became less tenable to continue defending their own interests there, the cost and 
practicalities of which had become burdensome. It was this which partly led to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance of 1902 after Japan convinced Britain of its worthiness as an ally who 
possessed the capacity to defend any and all British interests. What can be seen as a 
negotiation of an alliance to preserve Britain’s interests in the East can also be seen as the 
thing which sparked the catalyst for the declination of its influence in that corner of the globe. 
There is definite truth in this which the subsequent renewals of the alliance in 1905 and 1911 
are testament to, each becoming more favourable towards Japan. Up to the termination of the 
                                                          
12 For a look at Britain’s imperialism I would refer the reader to the following works as excellent points of 
reference: John Darwin, Unfinished Empire. The Global Expansion of Britain (London, 2013) and Niall 
Ferguson, Empire. The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (London, 
2002). 
13 Quoted in Anne Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain. The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-
1956 (Basingstoke and London, 1996), 2. See also Keith Neilson and T. G. Otte, The Permanent Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946 (Abingdon, 2009), 106. 
14 In no sense is this truer than in Victorian attitudes towards India, Britain’s prized possession and the crown 
jewel of its empire. Although this does not merit any length or in-depth analysis, I would recommend the 
following publications as excellent sources of information: Michael S. Dodson, Orientalism, Empire and 
National Culture: India, 1770-1880 (Basingstoke, 2007); Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and 
the Creation of Imperial Britain (Cambridge, MA., and London, 2006); Douglas M. Peers and Nandini Gooptu 
(eds.), India and the British Empire (Oxford, 2012). See also J. Lawson Watson, ‘Imperialism’, The 
Contemporary Review, 75 (1899), 305-310. 
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alliance in 1921 with the Washington Conference the two were on friendly terms having 
collaborated during the First World War, the Siege of Tsingtao against Germany in 1914 a 
high point of their alliance. Having said this, relations became strained as Japan asserted itself 
as the foremost power in the East.15 Suffice to say however, that in this period of study 
relations were on mutually agreeable terms as they possessed similar if not alike interests, 
expressing cordial relations. Some would even go as far to label Japan as the “Britain of the 
East”.16 
In a similar vein to Japan the United States was in the early stages of its imperialism, 
the two emerging almost simultaneously, the former following victory in 1895 and the latter 
out of victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898. This was quickly followed with the 
annexation of Hawaii and the expansion of interests into East Asia where so to ensure the 
security of China with the Open Door Policy as a means of securing a trading partner and of 
keeping Japan in check. Indeed their frequent denial of this policy and desire for expansion 
exists as reasons for American suspicion over Japan’s intentions in Asia-Pacific. Additionally 
the United States was the biggest recipient of Japanese immigration with high levels of 
people migrating to islands in the Pacific such as Hawaii, or to America itself with California 
exhibiting the highest influx of immigrants. It was this which put a great emphasis on the 
yellow peril sentiment as many quickly believed, especially following its swift victories in 
1895 and 1905, that Japan posed a threat to American existence. There was always an 
underlying tension between the two even though it is more apparent at certain times more 
than others; a cautiousness unique in their relationship and something which Britain never 
possessed, or at the very least rarely displayed. The natural proximity between these two 
empires stand as testament to this, as both Japan and the United States became increasingly 
more disillusioned with each other and relations far less affable. All this contributed to an 
antagonistic relationship which would continue to worsen ultimately resulting in the eruption 
of hostilities in the form of Pearl Harbour in December 1941.17 
In spite of the significance of both Britain and the United States it is important to 
emphasise that they were not the only two nations who contributed to Japan’s development or 
who had interests to defend in East Asia. Germany for one with the role of Kaiser Wilhelm II 
and his coining of the term “yellow peril”, a concept which epitomises the fear of oriental 
expansion westwards of which Japan came to epitomise, and Germany’s part in the Triple 
Intervention alongside France and Russia, cannot be overlooked. Furthermore when the time 
comes to address the Russo-Japanese War it will be sheer naiveté to avoid addressing the 
influence of Russia power and ambitions in East Asia with regards to China, Manchuria and 
Korea. With this it is clear that Britain and America are not the only players to hold an 
opinion on Japan’s empire making, but their roles and historical links with Japan in the years 
                                                          
15 For a look at the declination of relations between Britain and Japan there are no better materials than those by 
Ian Nish: Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-23 (London, 1972), and Anglo-
Japanese Alienation, 1919-1952: Papers on the Anglo-Japanese Conference on the History of the Second World 
War (Cambridge, 1982). See also Antony Best, ‘The ‘Ghost’ of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance: An Examination 
into Historical Myth-Making’, The Historical Journal, 49:3 (2006), 811-831. 
16 Henry Dyer, Dai Nippon: The Britain of the East. A Study in National Evolution (London, 1904). 
17 Michael H. Hunt and Steven Levine, Arc of Empire. America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam 
(North Carolina, 2012), 1. 
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which led to the collapse of the Tokugawa hegemony make them unique. Although the 
presence of others are at times unavoidable and will merit attention, Britain and America will 
remain the primary focus in addressing the questions posed in this work. 
One of the key challenges which this thesis will encounter is providing a thorough and 
in-depth breakdown of the events which encompass these significant years. Owing to the 
closeness of events which can be found to be intertwined with one another resulting in their 
fast occurring nature, it would not make any academic or scholastic sense to address a period 
of time smaller than what is presented here. The works of others are testament to this 
statement with those of Ian Nish, William Beasley, Anthony Best, and Richard Storry, being 
forced to write in the context of a larger timeframe for this same reason.18 By addressing the 
question of how early Japanese imperialism was viewed in Western social and political 
circles, and by doing so in a concise, thorough and detailed manner, this work seeks to 
provide a springboard for study into the events of this period. In doing so events surrounding 
the decade of study will be addressed. This in turn will provide an account of the significance 
of these years for Japan as well as their relations with the West, and affairs in East Asia. With 
this themes will emerge in this study which transcended earlier and later years. Immigration 
is one such example with many Japanese wanting the prosperity which Western states 
enjoyed. Their migration stemmed from the years before 1894 and was a part of Japan’s 
Westernisation.19 In the United States this led to crisis with many Japanese occupying areas 
in and around California and the West Coast. Leading to increasing prejudices and 
heightened tensions this issue came to be the leading antagonist in Japanese-American 
relations. Although Britain also experienced Japanese immigration its presence was not as 
profound and prejudices far less intense. Whilst the United States had to cope with higher 
levels of immigration Anglo-Japanese relations strengthened with renewals of the alliance in 
1905 and 1911, and the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910 expressing their friendliness. 
Suffice to say however, that the decade spanning from the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese 
War to that of the Russo-Japanese War, the early years of Japanese imperialism and a time of 
change in the Meiji era, will form the essence of this study and the focus point of emerging 
themes. 
Prior to establishing what the crux of this study will entail I first wish to provide some 
background information on British and American perceptions of Japan prior to the Sino-
Japanese War so as to provide some background knowledge with which to take into this 
study. Typically this was a time where very little was known about Japan. Even Britain’s vast 
empire was unsuccessful in breaking the boundaries of seclusion which the Japanese prided 
themselves on, that honour falling to the United States with the success of the Perry 
Expedition. It was this seemingly natural sense of wellbeing that characterised Japan and 
                                                          
18 See for example Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907  
(London, 1966); William G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945 (Oxford, 1987); Anthony Best, ‘Race, 
Monarchy and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922’, Social Science Japan Journal, 9:2 (2006), 171-186; 
Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (Basingstoke, 1973). 
19 Two excellent studies on Japanese westernisation which merit mention are William G. Beasley, Japan 
Encounters the Barbarian. Japanese Travellers in America and Europe (New Haven, CT., and London, 1995), 
and Donald Keene, The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830 (Stanford, 1969). 
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even East Asia more generally, as a place embedded in traditional manners.20 Travel and 
globetrotting accounts affirm this, identifying Japan as an exotic place with unique customs. 
The opening epigraph to this chapter, the travelling account of Isabella Bird, stands as an 
example of this and shows how she was in awe of Japan when viewing Mount Fuji. 
Furthermore she writes of her first glimpses on land as follows: ‘the coast of Japan is much 
more prepossessing than most coasts’, and that fishing villages are ‘bright with the greenness 
of English lawns’.21 Lafcadio Hearn voices similar experiences writing in 1894 how he 
regretted the fact that he was leaving behind Japan and its unique charm and personality. He 
saw it as being beyond belief, describing it as a place where ‘reality may not be distinguished 
from what is illusion – that all seems a mirage, about to vanish’.22 Other accounts echo 
similar sentiments regarding land, people and customs and it was these views which 
witnessed a change and increasing awareness throughout social circles. As Toshio Yokoyama 
has asserted, British views of Japan has begun to change towards the end of the nineteenth 
century: ‘From about 1880, the image of an unreal Japan became firmly established in Britain 
and began to exert a broader influence. For example, the image of “a civilisation without any 
originality”, which was as romantic an idea as the tourists’ idea of Japan as an elf-land, 
became an element in the way British intellectuals thought about Far Eastern questions in 
general’.23 Britons were now more able to acquire a knowledge of Japan hitherto inaccessible 
to them. They were provided with an acute level of information and awareness hitherto 
unbeknownst to them.  
These materials as well as others could be found across the Atlantic. Generally 
however, the American attitudes towards Japan differed from those of Britain with the notion 
of the yellow peril bearing more validity in social and political circles. Providing a look into 
the origins and significance of such a theme will establish a springboard of information with 
                                                          
20 The opening of Tokugawa Japan brought about its first trade agreements with Western states following the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Kanagawa and the Harris Treaty. Other parts of East Asia, significantly China, were 
not as successful in rebuffing Western encroachment which the Opium Wars are testament to this as they forced 
China to succumb to their power. The influence of Japan’s opening however meant that all of East Asia had in 
one form or another been subjected to Western influences, serving as a catalyst for the Westernisation of these 
states. For the impact of these events see Irokawa Daikichi, The Culture of the Meiji Period (Princeton, 1988); 
Mitani Hiroshi, Escape From Impasse. The Decision to Open Japan (Tokyo, 2006); McOmie, The Opening. 
21 Bird, Unbeaten Tracks, 1-2. See also C. F. F. Woods, ‘An Excursion in Japan’, Belgravia: A London 
Magazine, September 1870; H. F. Abell, ‘Travelling in Japan’, Belgravia: A London Magazine, March 1878;  
L. A. L., ‘Reminiscences of a Visit to Japan’, London Society: A Monthly Magazine of Light and Amusing 
Literature for the Hours of Relaxation, November 1895.  
22 Lafcadio Hearn, Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan. Volume Two (Boston and New York, 1894), 691-692. One of 
the best examples where Japan’s uniqueness is emphasised can be found in another of Hearn’s accounts where 
he speaks of the art of jujitsu. Translated to mean “conquer by yielding” he goes into detail of the discipline 
required to master it, and of the untold knowledge which that person would have over their opponent. But more 
to this is the fact that this discipline teaches victory by using the strength of the enemy, meaning that a mind-set 
is established where no matter how great an enemy, they can be defeated. This attitude can be found in the Sino-
Japanese War and perhaps more significantly in the Russo-Japanese War where as we shall see, many were 
shocked at the collapse of an established Western imperial power. Lafcadio Hearn, Out of the East. Reveries and 
Studies in New Japan (Boston and New York, 1895), 186-187. 
23 Toshio Yokoyama, Japan in the Victorian Mind. A Study of Stereotyped Images of a Nation 1850-80 
(Basingstoke, 1987), 175. 
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which to take into the core analysis of the study, as well as allow parallels of how perceptions 
of Japan changed in a relatively short space of time to be drawn together. With their rapid 
development leading to the recycling of sentiments which had initially been applied to the 
Chinese, Japan quickly became the epitome of the peril. In the United States the term “Jap” 
as an ethnic slur began to appear more consistently throughout the 1890s as a derogatory term 
in publications such as the Coast Seamen’s Journal.24 The Japanese came to be viewed as 
detrimental to society, something which transcended all mediums. Fiction is one such area 
and held great sway in manipulating public opinion and playing an intrinsic part in political 
debates. In both areas fiction provided stock for ideas and assumptions which nourished 
policy.25 In 1880 for example, Arthur de Gobineau warned of a ‘new fifth century’ should an 
‘Oriental movement into Europe’ occur. In his last work published posthumously in 1887, he 
went into greater detail on this viewpoint writing of an epic encounter between ‘whites’ and  
‘yellows’.26 Many stories followed a similar narrative which shows that a credible fear of the 
Japanese as well as the Chinese was expressed prevalently through popular social mediums 
leading to a mind-set which would not be easily undone. As some have stated: ‘Before the 
first Japanese immigrant appeared in America, the psychological foundation of the Japanese 
stereotype had been laid: it was that of the “heathen Chinese”. The legacy of prejudice 
inherited from the Chinese profoundly influenced the subsequent history of Japanese history 
and was never effectively erased’.27 
Sentiments echoed here were generally attributable more towards the United States 
than that of Britain whose people typically remained unknowledgeable of Japan. Valentine 
Chirol, an ardent imperialist and renowned correspondent for The Times who wrote 
extensively on affairs in East Asia, attested that Japan’s true state had been misinterpreted: 
‘On the whole there was little knowledge of the real facts concerning Japan, and where there 
was knowledge there was little sympathy. In England especially the doctrine that the 
Japanese were superficial, aggressive, and generally objectionable was as fairly vested in 
many quarters as the belief in the “latent power of China, our natural ally”’.28 But British 
                                                          
24 Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart, and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution. Causes 
and Consequences of the Evacuation of the Japanese Americans in World War II (London, 1974), 23. 
Magazines such as these had a profound level of development in the United States and emerged from the 1880s 
onwards having a great impact on social circles. Indeed the question which virtually all editors were asking 
revolved around the idea of what they would do with the national audience they had generated which would 
only continue to expand. See David Reed, The Popular Magazine in Britain and the United States 1880-1960 
(London, 1997), 76. 
25 Philip Darby, The Fiction of Imperialism. Reading Between International Relations and Postcolonialism 
(London, 1998), 26. 
26 Quoted in Michael Keevak, Becoming Yellow. A Short History of Racial Thinking (Oxford, 2011), 125. 
27 tenBroek et. al., Prejudice, 23. 
28 Valentine Chirol, The Far Eastern Question (London, 1896), 139-140. It is worth mentioning here that British 
society during this period was always undergoing change and that a consensus was not always met. As Jose 
Harris has mentioned, ‘Great Britain between 1870 and 1914 was in many respects… a ramshackle and 
amorphous society, characterised by a myriad contradictory trends and opinions, and capable of evolving 
contingently in many different ways. It was not (despite the fashionable jargon of the Edwardian era) a coherent 
“organism”, still less a “corporation”, a “system” or a “machine”’. Jose Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirits. A 
Social History of Britain, 1870-1914 (Oxford, 1993), 3. Further to this an article in the Morning Post stressed 
how a mutual knowledge and appreciation was needed across society for international amity to be achieved:  
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influences on Japan in the period of their development cannot go amiss with foreign 
residences alone totalling 1,200 out of 2,500 making up forty-eight percent of those in 
Yokohama and Nagasaki in 1885. A decade later this had increased to 1,750 out of 4,700 
constituting thirty-seven percent. In this period British residents in Japan made up the 
majority and would not be surpassed until the 1920s when Americans began to outnumber the 
British.29 Another such example can be found in the Japanese press with many newspapers 
and periodicals being printed in English.30 Back home there was in some circles a fascination 
of things Japanese, the possession of a vested interest in its culture through an aesthetic 
movement identified as “Japonisme”, a fad which Olive Checkland labels as being ‘a mild 
obsession’.31 But it transcended artistic boundaries to become more popular as it found its 
way into popular media. Punch cartoonists first became aware of this movement in the 1860s 
and in the 1870s began to criticise it in “intellectual pictures”. By 1888 Punch claimed that it 
penetrated every corner of everyday life leading to the publication of a series of cartoons 
from 26 May to 10 November.32 At this point I will mention the influence which the popular 
press had in Britain. What separated this form of media from others such as books was the 
simple fact that whereas a bestseller could reach sales of a few thousand, newspapers and 
periodicals had a wider printing base and could reach sales amounting into the several 
hundred thousands of copies. Furthermore the readers of the popular presses were far greater 
than book readers.33 On newspapers alone there were there were seventy-four morning dailies 
and eighty-five evening dailies in circulation by 1892. ‘If someone was unable to read a 
newspaper’ writes Lucy Brown, ‘the chances were that they would have the opportunity 
                                                          
‘… nothing can better further the cause of friendship than an opportunity for the individual citizens who go to 
make up the vague entity of modern democracy to definite and vivid ideas of the life of other nations. The 
ordinary man reads little, and even when he reads has too small a background of experience in conditions other 
than his own to be able to form any clear conception of distant and far different scenes’. Morning Post, 12 
August 1909. 
29 James Hoare, ‘The Era of the Unequal Treaties, 1858-99’, in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History 
of Anglo-Japanese Relations. Volume 1: The Political-Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930 (Basingstoke, 2000), 
114. 
30 James Hoare, ‘British Journalists in Meiji Japan’, in Ian Nish (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical 
Portraits. Volume 1 (Folkestone, 1994), 20-21. For further assessments of the Meiji Press see Albert A. Altman, 
‘The Press’, in Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (eds.), Japan in Transition. From Tokugawa to Meiji 
(Oxford, 1986), 231-247; Albert A. Altman, ‘The Press and Social Cohesion During a Period of Change: the 
Case of Early Meiji Japan’, Modern Asian Studies, 15 (1981), 865-876; J. L. Huffman, ‘Freedom and the Press 
in Meiji-Taishō Japan’, in Peter Kornicki (ed.), Meiji Japan: Political, Economic and Social History. Volume 3: 
The Mature Meiji State (London, 1998), 284-307.  For Western printed views of Japan prior to the Meiji 
Restoration see Olavi K. Fält, ‘Image of Japan in Foreign Newspapers Published in Japan Before the Meiji 
Restoration’, in Ian Nish (ed.), Contemporary European Writing on Japan. Scholarly Views from Eastern and 
Western Europe (Kent, 1988), 55-61. 
31 Olive Checkland, Japan and Britain After 1859. Creating Cultural Bridges (London, 2003), 111. 
32 Ayako Ono, On Japonisme in Britain. Whistler, Menpes, Henry, Hornel and Nineteenth-Century Japan 
(London, 2003), 16. See also Punch, 27 February 1869; Punch, 5 February 1876; Punch, 26 May 1888; Punch, 
11 August 1888; Punch, 25 August 1888; Punch, 10 November 1888. 
33 Alvar Ellegard, ‘Public Opinion and the Press: Reactions to Darwinism’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 19:3 
(1958), 383. See also Walter E. Houghton, ‘Periodical Literature and the Articulate Classes’, in Joanne Shattock 
and Michael Wolff (eds.), The Victorian Periodical Press: Samplings and Surroundings (Leicester, Toronto and 
Buffalo, NY., 1982), 3-27. 
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speak to someone who had read that day’s news’.34 As Japan became more prominent on the 
international scene its existence became more open in British circles which in turn led to 
greater interests in things Japanese. 
American attitudes towards Japan were somewhat different in nature. As 
aforementioned the United States was influential in Japan’s opening in the 1850s but their 
interests in this nation revolved primarily around treaties of friendship, trade, amity and 
commerce between the two. Suffice to say levels of fascination did not take-off with the 
levels of fascination as it did with Britain. Indeed the influence of Chinese immigrants and 
later that of the Japanese preoccupied American thought. Furthermore the United States was 
concentrating on its own imperial development with the Civil War of 1861-1865 and other 
various wars against the indigenous populations in the years up to the 1880s. It was only from 
the 1890s where expressions of a vested interest in Pacific affairs took shape through 
occupation of the Philippines. Irrespectively Britain, Japan and the United States share a 
historical link – Britain and America were the first to sign treaties with the somewhat distant 
and unbeknownst land which was now linked with the most powerful nation in the world and 
the world’s most rapidly developing nation in what can be identified as a triangular of 
international diplomacy.35 
These themes take on new meaning in the late 1890s up to the Boxer Rebellion in 
1900 as attitudes towards Japan simultaneously strengthened in some circles and became 
more obsolete in others. Both Britain and America remained neutral in the Sino-Japanese 
War and as aforesaid avoided participation in the intervention. Britain for one started to view 
Japan as a potential new ally but the idea of Anglo-Saxonism was burgeoning with an aura of 
superiority from Britain and the United States reigning over their presence in East Asia. But 
the potential for Asian expansion still caused anxiety and was to some extent feared, 
underlining the power behind the ideas of the yellow peril. In addition to this Japan continued 
to progress and develop with military advancements, the Boxer Rebellion strengthening their 
status on a global level following its collaboration with Western nations. Equally by the turn 
of the century Japan had begun to view the interfering nature of these powers in East Asian 
affairs, specifically the United States following the establishment of its empire in the Pacific, 
with distain as the idea of a white peril flourished in nationalist and extremist circles. It is this 
period from 1895 up to the Boxer Rebellion which the first chapter will address as Japan 
strengthened its hold on East Asian affairs and began to challenge the role of the West. 
Of greater influence than these events was the Russo-Japanese War, an event where 
Peter Duus has argued for the Japanese victory marking the take-off point of their 
imperialism.36 This section will seek to address the rapid strides Japan made in their relations 
                                                          
34 Lucy Brown, ‘The Growth of a National Press’, in Laurel Blake, Aled Jones and Lionel Madden (eds.), 
Investigating Victorian Journalism (London, 1990), 133. See also Aled Jones, Powers of the Press. Newspapers, 
Power and the Public in Nineteenth-Century England (Aldershot, 1996). 
35 H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States. A History of Anglo-American Relations (1783-1952) 
(London, 1954), 553. 
36 Peter Duus, ‘The Take-off Point of Japanese Imperialism’, in Harry Wary and Hilary Conroy (eds.), Japan 
Examined. Perspectives on Modern Japanese History (Honolulu, 1983), 153-157. See also Rotem Kowner, ‘The 
War as a Turning Point in Modern Japanese History’, in Rotem Kowner (ed.), The Impact of the Russo-
Japanese War (Abingdon, 2007), 29-46.  
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with the West following the Boxer Rebellion. Whereas the initial chapter will have looked at 
their growing presence relative to East Asia, this chapter will do the same but in a greater 
international context as it was these years where Japan had a far greater engagement with 
global affairs. One of the most prominent alliances of the time will be looked at here with the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance existing as the first written agreement between a Western and an 
Eastern nation where the latter was regarded as an equal. As a general rule of thumb however, 
many Britons remained ignorant of Japan irrespective of its rapid progress and development. 
How they perceived the alliance will take shape here leading into how these perceptions and 
relations generally between the nations changed. For Britain this was a time of alliance 
building as their grasp of world affairs began to diminish meaning that the influence of the 
United States on the alliance and the idea of Anglo-Saxonism will also be addressed. This 
meant greater rapprochement with America as cordial Anglo-American relations and Anglo-
Saxonism became increasingly more appealing in policies and became widely accepted. It 
has been noted by some scholars and academics however, that Britain favoured pursuing an 
alliance with the new imperial power of the Pacific. As American imperialism continued to 
take shape with victory in the war against the Filipinos in 1902 their relations with Japan 
began to become somewhat strenuous with the notion of conflict beckoning. Like Britain the 
United States remained neutral in the Russo-Japanese War with many sympathising with 
Japan’s quest with the belief that they would not be able to overcome the might of a power 
such as Russia. As this conflict became increasing more one-sided this sentiment changed as 
feelings of estrangement heightened. Furthermore the yellow peril idea blossomed 
contributing to the increasing levels of suspicion and even more Japanese emigration 
westwards. The Boxer Rebellion serves as a prime example of where a strong Japan 
collaborated with Western powers, and it is from here to the Russo-Japanese War where 
Japan experienced a period of profound development. Consequently its presence took on new 
meaning signalling how times were changing, experiencing new relations with the West 
whose perceptions of Japan continued to undergo changes either in favour or disillusionment 
as Anglo-American attitudes differed. 
Events following the Russo-Japanese War will be acknowledged in my final chapter 
so to provide some idea of how influential this victory was and how it affected relations 
between Japan and the West. Anglo-Japanese relations remained better than those between 
Japan and the United States. In an attempt to assert American naval dominance in the Pacific 
1907 heralded the launch of Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet leading to arguments 
that estrangement with Japan deepened after the Russo-Japanese War. This combined with 
the immigration crisis witnessed the emergence of the Asiatic Exclusion League led to 
heightened perceptions of Anglo-Saxonism and a more conscious awareness of the yellow 
peril. Japan’s relations with Britain however, were typically stronger owing to the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, a success of diplomacy from both sides which would be renewed twice 
within the next decade. But this is not to say that such sentiments were universal as some in 
Britain opposed any renewal of the alliance in favour of distancing themselves from the 
growing threat of Japan and establishing more structured and fail-safe alliances with others. 
Disparities within these relations exist and will be of great interest to explore, with this 
triangular relationship between Britain, Japan and the United States experiencing varying 
degrees of conflict and cooperation with one another. Perhaps it would be more accurate to 
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provide an image where Britain is in the middle of America and Japan, mediating between 
the two to ascertain friendly relations with both powers.  
Throughout the course of this study a range of themes will emerge which transcend 
the decade in question here as well as those surrounding it, some of which have been 
mentioned. From the expansion, development and assertion of Japanese and American 
imperialism and their ensuing estrangement in the Pacific to Japanese emigration and 
increasing fears of the yellow peril in British and American circles, this study will serve as a 
springboard for further research and examination into these country’s perceptions of early 
Japanese imperialism. Furthermore it will bring to the foreground the existence of the white 
peril arising out of the growing presence and involvement of Western states in and around 
East Asia. There existed then a contrast in perils with a fear in the West of Asian expansion 
and vice-versa. The yellow peril however, remains a concept more closely linked to the 
United States as they had closer encounters with Japan through immigration and 
neighbouring empires. Britain on the other hand was more open to relations with Japan as 
Japonisme took shape with items of a somewhat alien yet equally exotic nature from a distant 
land became increasingly popular in social circles. Simultaneously Japan’s increasing 
strength showed how it had the potential to be an ally, and a means for Britain to defend its 
interests in the East. Thus there existed a discrepancy in Japan’s relations with Britain and 
America and those country’s perceptions of it. Emerging from this is also the growing nature 
of relations between Britain and America. Many Britons applauded their acquisition of 
imperial status and believed that some form of alliance or agreement best suited British 
interests. All things considered it appears that Britain maintained and reciprocated friendly 
relations with Japan and America, but on the flip side of the coin Japanese-American 
relations were turbulent at best, strengthening the idea that Britain had to mediate between 
the two so as to guarantee their own interests. These themes as well as others dominated 
Western relations and perceptions of Japan, transcending the breadth of this study. 
Scholarly works surrounding this period are specific to either events or themes. There 
is in existence a wide range of written material focusing on Japanese and American 
imperialism, Anglo-Japanese and Anglo-American relations, the yellow peril in the United 
States, and the immigration crisis. William F. Nimmo, Richard Welch Jr., and Walter La 
Faber have made major contributions to studies on American imperialism serving as excellent 
facilitators of information. Nimmo’s work has focused on the simultaneous growth of Japan 
and the United States in the Pacific, detailing how their expansions collided with each other, 
in an epoch which demanded imperialistic and expansionist endeavours. His work Stars and 
Stripes focuses on how the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War saw both Japan and the United 
States emerge as the powers of the Pacific. His arguments primarily focus on American 
diplomatic, economic and military relations with nations within the Pacific basin including 
China, Japan and Korea, as well as Hawaii, Samoa and the Philippines. This study examines 
how Japan could be viewed as a threat to American interests in the Pacific as well as the 
general status-quo. Nimmo explains how this explained the growth of the yellow peril 
ideology in the United States.37 Comparatively, Welch’s work is more pinpointed by focusing 
                                                          
37 William F. Nimmo, Stars and Stripes Across the Pacific. The United States, Japan and the Asia/Pacific 
Region, 1895-1945 (Westport, CT., 2001). 
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on American political relations in and around the years of the American-Filipino War. Being 
politically based, his argument is that actions taken by American diplomats was a response to 
the views expressed in that era by the American population. In doing so he looks at the 
reasons which President McKinley put forward for engaging in this conflict and acquiring the 
Philippine Islands. With America now identified as an imperial power Welch successfully 
provides an analysis of how this newly attained status was greeted with a mix of welcome 
and distain. Here the importance of American popular opinion is made apparent with 
opinions of Japan, East Asia, and the Pacific more generally being assimilated into this work 
as a point of reference to how Americans viewed their country’s position in East Asia and the 
impact this had on their foreign policy.38 Whereas Nimmo and Welch provide accounts of a 
more diplomatic and political nature, LaFeber looks more at the social impact of imperialism 
in the United States. He argues that the period spanning from the American Civil War to the 
years leading up to the First World War was the founding period of American imperialism, 
and a time where the United States was a power player in the Pacific. In a similar approach to 
Welch, LaFeber focuses primarily on attitudes within the United States but additionally 
focuses on the societal changes which this development brought about in other countries. He 
writes how such developments fuelled the Chinese and Russian revolutions as well as 
impacting on other states. It is with this that LaFeber’s work provides an encompassing view 
of the impact which American imperialism had at home and abroad, providing a more social 
approach which the works of Nimmo and Welch lack.39 With these works as well as others 
the impact of American imperialism developing alongside that of Japan’s is addressed, as are 
the political, diplomatic and societal attitudes which contributed to the developments of 
Japanese-American relations in the period addressed in this study. 
Japanese responses to American imperialism lack depth, with Akira Iriye’s Pacific 
Estrangement being perhaps the most prominent publication on this topic in the West. It is 
the knowledge and use of the English and Japanese languages that make this work an 
important port of call for information on the increasing tensions between the simultaneous 
rise of Japanese and American imperialism. It addressing this topic it pinpoints the threat of 
the Japanese empire in American foreign policy on both a political and diplomatic level. In 
return it also provides a comprehensive look into the responses of Japanese diplomats, 
statesmen and policy makers, and how they perceived American imperialism which some of 
them regarded as the white peril. Throughout this work the roles and positions of Japan and 
the United States, and relations between the two changed as a result of the Sino-Japanese and 
Russo-Japanese Wars, and the years surrounding these conflicts.40  
A source of tension and a key facilitator for the yellow peril ideology and Western 
perceptions of race, was the issue of immigration. Here the works of Erika Lee, Michael 
Diamond, and Anthony Best are used which provide a detailed and in-depth knowledge on 
American and British views on this topic. Lee’s work focuses primarily on Chinese 
emigration to the United States and their cross-border movements with Canada and Mexico. 
But this is not to say that Japanese immigration goes overlooked. Views towards the Chinese 
                                                          
38 Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Imperialism. The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1889-
1902 (North Carolina, 2001). 
39 Walter LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913 (Cambridge, 1993). 
40 Iriye, Pacific Estrangement. 
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were very often recycled to incorporate the Japanese as well as well as other Asian 
minorities, with attitudes towards Oriental hordes bearing similar sentiments. This is 
something which Lee emphasises and the views expressed in her works can thus be applied to 
Japanese migratory movements westwards.41 Both Diamond and Best focus more on British 
perceptions of race, thereby providing different analytical viewpoints. Diamond uses British 
popular material to address the yellow peril both towards Japan and China, highlighting how 
race was a key issue in the period studied here, and how other nations had trouble gaining 
acceptance as a racial equal. His work provides an excellent source of information of how 
racial attitudes were manifested in British popular cultures and how in many areas it became 
a norm of society.42 Best adapts a different approach, focusing on the importance of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance in overcoming racial, religious and cultural divides. In the 
formulation of this agreement he highlights how there existed in some political circles a 
mutual respect of each other’s strength and position, and how both nations used diplomacy to 
forge an alliance made on equal terms. In doing this Best discusses the varying attempts of 
both nations to quell racial stereotypes with occasions such as royal visits undertaken to 
achieve this. In spite of these attempts he is forced to conclude how prejudices and 
apprehensions still existed and were expressed through the yellow peril as well as pan-
Asianist ideologies which continued in the years beyond this period.43 
Topics such as American imperialism, race and the immigration crisis in the United 
States have received more attention than others in this period of study. Those such as the 
decline of Great Britain as a global power and the yellow peril in Britain have received far 
less attention from scholars, and a pool of sources have been used to try and counter this 
problem. On Britain’s decline as a global power Anne Orde’s work exists as one of the few 
detailed scholarly materials with many works on this topic choosing to focus on Britain’s 
decline in the years following the Second World War thereby overlooking the influence 
which period on examination here had on Britain’s position. One of Orde’s works for 
example, The Eclipse of Great Britain, addresses how the expansion and rise of American 
power ultimately supplanted Britain as the dominant global power. She argues how this took 
two world wars to achieve, and regarding the period in question writes how the United States 
was hesitant of holding too much power and did not actively seek to overturn Britain as the 
dominant Western power.44 
What all of these topics have in common throughout this work is the use of secondary 
sources which predate the 1990s. Those of Nish, Iriye, and Bradford Perkins are examples of 
this. It is their substantial depth in research which they provide which means their 
                                                          
41 See by Erika Lee, ‘Enforcing the Boarders: Chinese Exclusion Along the U.S. Boarders with Canada and 
Mexico, 1888-1914’, The Journal of American History, 89:1 (2002), 54-86, and ‘The Chinese Exclusion 
Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882-1924’, Journal of American Ethnic History, 
21:3 (2002), 36-62. 
42 Michael Diamond, ‘Lesser Breeds’. Racial Attitudes in British Popular Culture, 1890-1940 (London, 2006) 
43 Best, ‘Race, Monarchy’, and ‘The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American 
Gatekeeping, 1882-1924’, Journal of American Ethnic History, 21:3 (2002), 36-62. 
44 Orde, The Eclipse. See also Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Amherst, MA., 
2004). 
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significance cannot be overlooked. 45 But this is not to say that this study is dependent on 
predated sources which have been widely used and referenced to the point of submission. 
Indeed a number of sources have been used which are more recent then these mentioned, and 
even focus on topics which were overlooked by these authors as well as developing upon 
what has been written. As well as the works of Best and Lee which have been referenced 
above, there is the work of those such as Cemil Aydin who looks at anti-Westernism in Asia. 
Here he argues that anti-Western ideals from the nineteenth century to the outbreak of the 
First World War and beyond, contributed to the collapse of Eurocentrism and Western 
colonialism in East Asia. These factors served as facilitators in influencing other parts of the 
world who had been exposed to ideals of the West.46 Other more recent works focus more on 
societal views of Japan such as Ayako Ono who has looked extensively on the British 
fascination for things Japanese, and how things of a Japanese nature influenced the works of 
prominent artists working in Britain. He argues that whereas Western influences led to the 
opening of Japan, Japanese influences in certain instances influenced Western societal 
circles; an argument strengthened through events such as the Japan-British Exhibition in 
1910.47 In spite of the wide use of recent sources, what can be seen to be lacking is the lack of 
Japanese orientated material. All of the works addressed in this thesis are all published in 
English, meaning that this study can be seen to lack Japanese works which would 
undoubtedly provide inestimable material with which to further assert any claims relating to 
Japan and the West. Furthermore these would have supplied an in-depth contrast which 
would have added breadth of this study and added a new dimension to it. In spite of this some 
Japanese publications have been published in English and serve as useful port of calls such as 
those of Okakura Kakuzo, Shigenobu Ōkuma and Inazo Nitobé.48 Alongside these 
monographs a range of primary material is used stretching from American and British 
newspapers, monographs, travel and globetrotter accounts, journal articles, periodicals, 
letters, British Cabinet and Foreign Office papers, as well as novels and short stories. In spite 
of the lack of Japanese sources used enough primary and secondary material is available 
which permit the questions posed in this thesis to be sufficiently examined and addressed. 
By examining the events which sparked great change in Meiji Japan during this period 
of examination, this essay will shed light on the topic of Western perceptions of early 
Japanese imperialism, and emphasise the fear of this expansion as expressed through the 
yellow peril. The decade constituting the period from the defeat of China to that of Russia 
was the main source for this anxiety. In some circles Japan thenceforth came to be viewed as 
a nation intent on expansion into the Western hemisphere with motives which transcended 
                                                          
45 For the works of Nish see Alliance in Decline and The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For those of Akira Iriye see 
Pacific Estrangement and From Nationalism to Internationalism. US Foreign Policy to 1914 (London, 1977). 
The works of Bradford Perkins are used less than others but his research on Anglo-American relations is 
extremely beneficial. An example of this is his publication The Great Rapprochement. England and the United 
States, 1894-1914 (London, 1968). 
46 Cemil Aydin, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia. Visions of World Order in Pan –Islamic and Pan-Asian 
Thought (Chichester, 2007). 
47 Ono, On Japonisme in Britain. 
48 Okakura Kakuzo, The Ideals of the East with Special Reference to the Art of Japan (London, 1903); 
Shigenobu Ōkuma, Fifty Years of New Japan (London, 1909); Inazo Nitobé, Bushidō. The Soul of Japan 
(Tokyo, 1908). 
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social and diplomatic boundaries. Indeed it is generally accepted by historians and scholars 
alike that the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were significant events in the shaping 
of Meiji history as well as that of East Asia. But how Western imperialists perceived the 
rapidly changing developments is not widely addressed in scholarly material and generally 
goes amiss. By addressing the themes highlighted here alongside others this essay will bring 
to the foreground what other scholarly material is lacking. Consensus towards Japan in the 
Western world was not universal as the British and Americans differed in their views on how 
valuable an ally or how great a threat Japan was. Following their period of Westernisation 
since the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s development attracted the attention of some, yet very 
rarely if ever at all made headline or front-page news. The same is true of their involvement 
in conflict against China and Russia. Many have come to the conclusion that the British and 
Americans were ignorant of Japan and things Japanese, a statement which is truer more so of 
the former than the latter owing to the development of American imperialism and them being 
subjected to influxes of Japanese immigration. Having said this, American viewpoints tended 
to be biased and at times were overly shaped by prejudices which the British were not. It is 
with these attitudes that the yellow peril was treated differently on both sides of the Atlantic, 
but it is not to say that it was non-existent in Britain. Even with events such as the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance there were still groups who treated Japan with suspicion, and viewed them 
as the epitome of the yellow peril. In both circumstances this perception arose from Japan’s 
victories over China and Russia, and it these events which make up the focus of this study, 
and the emergence of Japan as the yellow peril. Great events throughout history have always 
been known to erupt onto the scene and over the course of a decade which spanned from 
victory over China to the defeat of an imperial power; Japan stunned the world and emerged 
as a global power, experiencing a change unbeknownst in their history. A lack of knowledge 
of things Japanese, or close encounters with Japan, meant that Western circles viewed this 
development with a mix of admiration, anxiety and at times a mix of the two. 
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1 
 
 
China’s Defeat and the Boxer Rebellion: the Emergence of  
Japanese Imperialism as the Yellow Peril 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Come, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply,  
and it come to pass, that, when there befalleth us any war,  
they also join themselves unto our enemies, and fight against us,  
and so get them up out of the land’.49 
 
- Exodus 1:10 
  
‘The main incidents of the conflict which has just been brought to a close in China are 
so well remembered that only a brief recapitulation of the more striking features, in 
their relation to the ultimate success of Japan as a nation, may suffice to indicate the 
substantial character of her progress in the art of warfare. As already shown, this was 
the first opportunity afforded to Japan of proving that she had really strengthened her 
position in the East by adopting Western methods and appliances’.50 
 
- John Morris, Advance Japan, 1895 
 
‘Compared with the dark, icon-like figure of the Korean, or with the rich and varied 
types of Chinese beauty, the Japanese is a poor remnant, a degenerate among his 
brothers. Moreover, there is something cold, if not malevolent, in his unlovely face, 
something mysterious and even frightening. You can believe it when they say: “Fear 
the Japanese, do not trust the deep bow, the smile, the lisping and sucking in of 
breath, the rubbing together of his hands. He would smile as he stuck a dagger into 
you, and go on lisping and smiling just the same’.51 
 
- Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovskii, Around Korea, Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula, 1898 
 
                                                          
49 Quoted in tenBroek et. al., Prejudice, War, ii.  
50 J. Morris, Advance Japan: A Nation Thoroughly in Earnest (London and Philadelphia, 1895), 336. 
51 Nikolai Garin-Mikhailovskii, Around Korea, Manchuria and the Liaodong Peninsula (Nagasaki, Yokohama, 
1898) [excerpts], in David N. Wells (ed.), Russian Views of Japan, 1792-1913. An Anthology of Travel Writing 
(Abingdon, 2004), 183.   
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IMAGE ONE: Kobayashi Kiyochika, Our Forces’ Great Victory in the Battle of the Yellow Sea – Third 
Illustration: The Desperate Fight of the Two Warships Akagi and Hiei (October 1894). 
 
Source: Available online at MIT Visualizing Cultures.  
URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_02/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 
January 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
IMAGE TWO: Kobayashi Kiyochika, Picture of our Armed Forces Winning a Great Victory After a Fierce 
Battle at Pyongyang (October, 1895). 
 
Source: Available online at MIT Visualizing Cultures. 
URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_02/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 
January 2015). 
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A watershed moment the year 1895 marks the onset of Japan’s early imperialism. This 
victory was to be a catalyst for change, influencing three key areas: the status of Japan who 
saw the role of their military redefined and their ambitions for greater expansion heighten; the 
hierarchy of power in East Asia as China who historically had been the dominant power and 
the key player in the region was surpassed by Japan; and the relationship between the East 
and West.52 These features are inherently linked and when these changes took place the West 
began to take note of Japan’s position in the Pacific, their presence provoking reactions of 
either fear or esteem approbation. The former of these reached a crescendo at the end of the 
decade as this mix of attitudes would become a cocktail containing a heavy emphasis on one 
ingredient. Following the Treaty of Shimonoseki by only a matter of days was the Triple 
Intervention which stands as testament to this where the influence of other nations 
demonstrates both the worry within some Western states over Japan’s acquisitions and intent, 
and yet the effect which they still had over it.53  Peter Duus has written just this: ‘despite their 
military victory over China, the Japanese still had to bend to the wishes of the Western 
powers’.54 Owing to Japanese interests in Manchuria, Russia had the most to fear and equally 
the most to gain with France’s participation in the intervention more an act of diplomacy than 
of defending their interests.55 Whereas it kept Japan’s expansion into mainland Asia in check 
it equally shows how some Western imperialists were fearful or at the very least anxious of 
its rapid emergence. Although it retroceded the expansionist ambitions of the Meiji 
government it can also be seen as complimenting them as they attracted the attention of three 
of Europe’s major powers. At this point it is worth mentioning that although Japan was 
forced to concede the Liaodong Peninsula, it still walked away from the negotiation table 
with overseas territory by maintaining jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands – 
symbols of how it had begun its stride towards empire, emulating those Western imperialist 
nations from whom they had learnt of the benefits brought about by empire building.  
Throughout the Sino-Japanese War the strength shown by Japan is evident. Although 
pieces of propaganda the woodcuttings of Kobayashi Kiyochika, examples of which can be 
found in images one and two, depict the successes of its army and navy both on land and at 
sea and the strength on show. Although the intervention can be seen to have hampered 
Japanese efforts to establish a continental empire it failed to reign in and contain its ambitions 
                                                          
52 Sino-Japanese tensions had been present since the onset of the Meiji era and had increased thenceforth. For a 
detailed study which addresses Sino-Japanese relations in the decades prior to the outbreak of war in 1894 I 
would refer the reader to Putnam Weale, The Truth About China and Japan (London, 1921), especially pages 9-
46. 
53 For a full text of the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 17 April 1895, see Michael Hurst (ed.), Key Treaties for the 
Great Powers 1814-1914. Volume 2: 1871-1914 (London, 1972), 670-677. For a full text of the Triple 
Intervention of 8 November 1895, see ibid, 678-680. 
54 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword. The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 (London, 1995), 96-
97. 
55 Having said this France did possess interests in Indochina following the Sino-French War (1884-1886). But 
there exists no evidence to suggest that any engrained fear existed amongst the French that Japanese influence 
would spread so far as to manipulate affairs in Indochina. Her primary reason for partaking in the intervention 
was purely to preserve friendly relations and to uphold her treaty obligations with Russia. See Frank W. Ilké, 
‘The Triple Intervention. Japan’s Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism’, Monumenta Nipponica, 22:1/2 
(1967), 122-130.  
- 22 - 
 
and determination. Indeed what followed this saga of imperial acquisition and abatement was 
military rearmament and a revolutionary transformation of the army and navy, as the Meiji 
government sought greater investment in both military personnel and equipment in turn 
bringing about an influx of funds. With this the Japanese military would become a symbol of 
patriotism and national pride. Both the development and proficiency of the military were 
recognised in Western circles with the popular media emphasising the impressive nature of 
Japan’s development. The Illustrated London News for example, reported the following on its 
army: 
 
‘Few instances of rapid change in the adoption of new methods and practices and 
fashions in all history, ancient and modern, have been more remarkable than the 
transformation of Japan, with less than thirty years, from a singularly sequestered 
state, under the rule of barbarian feudal chiefs with the Shiogoon or Tycoon at their 
head, to a compact and vigorous national monarchy, with a Parliament of democratic 
complexion, and with an administrative system which bears comparison with those of 
European states. 
It may safely be averred that the great change now going on is not confined to 
the art of war, but extends to all the elements of civilisation. Yet our illustrations of 
the strikingly different fashions of uniform and equipment of Japanese troops, at 
successive periods of the last quarter of a century, show what a strange alteration has 
taken place in the aspect of the army, the most conspicuous and still the most 
necessary department of national State service. This army is well trained, well 
officered, and we now see how well it can fight’.56 
 
In an edition prior to this, readers were made aware of the strength of the Japanese navy and 
were provided with images of the ships which they used in comparison to those used by the 
Chinese. In both cases these ships were British built with the warship mentioned here, the 
Naniwa Kan, being built at Elswick upon Tyne by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Mitchell and Co. 
Ltd, emphasising the influence of Britain, the world’s global naval power, in the development 
of the Japanese navy by providing them with one of the most powerful cruisers afloat.57 This 
trend continued throughout the rest of the decade. In 1899 The Illustrated London News 
reported on Japan’s launching of a ship, the Asahi which weighed 5,500 tonnes, held an 
armament of four 12-inch and fourteen 6-inch guns, twenty 12-pounders and four submerged 
torpedo tubes, which was built in Britain by the Clydebank engineering and Shipbuilding 
Company Limited, was labelled as a signal of intent for military expansion. The article 
concluded: ‘Not even Japan, it seems, will listen to the voice that pleads for a stay in the 
increase of the world’s armaments; certainly not England, and certainly not France’.58 With 
the world entering a new era of imperialism a strong navy was deemed essential for any  
                                                          
56 The Illustrated London News, 20 October 1894. In an earlier edition the Japanese army were glorified in their 
image being described as a ‘spectacle’ with ‘a verve and intelligence worthy of a first-class European war’. The 
Illustrated London News, 6 October 1895. 
57 The Illustrated London News, 4 August 1894. 
58 The Illustrated London News, 25 March 1899. 
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power to succeed in the modern world. At the turn of the century Paul Reinsch, an American 
political scientist and diplomat, wrote on the importance of a strong navy as it would 
undoubtedly; 
 
‘become a condition of existence, since they alone can protect transoceanic 
possessions and ward off invasion. Among imperial powers holding transoceanic 
possessions, naval warfare rather than land warfare will, in many cases, be decisive in 
the future, and an empire that does not maintain a navy will be shorn of its 
dependencies, as was Spain by the United States’.59 
 
Establishing a strong navy was one of the principle aims of the Meiji government. Following 
the events of 1895 a plan put forward by Rear Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyōe was aimed at 
revolutionising the navy into a world class fleet which possessed the ability to challenge the 
world’s finest fleets. If followed it would bring about the purchasing and construction of 
brand new fleet, improvements to shore facilities, and the establishment of a Naval 
Construction Bureau to regulate all shore-based development. Additionally suggestions were 
made that sixteen capital warships, twenty-three destroyers, and sixty-three torpedo boats be 
added to the initial plan. With this the total displacement of warships totalled over 234,000 
                                                          
59 Paul S. Reinsch, World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century as Influenced by the Oriental Situation 
(London, 1900), 27. The growing importance of the navy continues in this publication up to page 32. 
TABLE ONE:  Japanese Army, Navy and National Expenditures and  
Military Personnel, 1896-1903. 
Year 
Army 
expenditures 
(¥) 
Navy 
expenditures 
(¥) 
National 
expenditures 
(¥) 
Army 
personnel 
Navy 
personnel 
1896 53,243,000 20,006,000 168,857,000 123,913 18,233 
1897 60,148,000 50,395,000 223,679,000 144,179 22,176 
1898 53,898,000 58,529,000 219,758,000 132,666 23,430 
1899 52,551,000 61,662,000 254,166,000 140,000 27,347 
1900 74,838,000 58,275,000 292,750,000 150,000 31,114 
1901 58,302,000 43,979,000 266,857,000 150,000 34,242 
1902 49,442,000 36,327,000 289,227,000 150,000 36,674 
1903 46,884,000 36,118,000 249,256,000 150,000 37,434 
Source: J. Charles Schencking, Making Waves. Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, 1868-1922 (Stanford, 2005), 104. 
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tonnes witnessing a seventy per-cent increase on the size of the navy as it stood in 1895. This 
plan brought with it a budgeted cost of ¥215,000,000 which was double the amount spent on 
the navy in the period 1868 to 1893.60 Military progress is evident from the levels of 
investment they received from the government, points which are stressed in table one which 
shows increases in army and navy expenditure as well as personnel in the years leading up to 
the Russo-Japanese War. With this the military was more than simply a symbol of national 
pride and patriotism but also a statement of intent. 
Military developments such as these led to a new and confident Japan whose 
superiority in East Asia was second to none, a transformation which was met with both 
admiration and apprehension. San Francisco newspaper The Morning Call for example, 
expressed the former of these sentiments, publishing how Japan sought reforms with China 
and Korea on peaceful terms and was forced to go to war solely for the defence of their own 
subjects in residence there.61 Newspapers in Britain were a bit more reverent and highlighted 
the emergence of a new era. The Times for example, wrote of the importance of trade with 
China and how this new Japan was something with which it had to adapt. Such was its effect 
that the status-quo had been changed and could no longer be restored meaning it became 
necessary to accept the new situation and come to terms with it: 
 
‘If China could have been guaranteed to remain in a torpid condition, if Japan had not 
suddenly awakened to a consciousness of her naval and military strength and begun to 
use it, we should, perhaps, have been better pleased to go on as we have done for two 
or three generations. But that is past praying for. A new world has been called into 
existence in the Far East. We must live with it and make the best of it’.62  
 
In demonstrating Japan’s strength Punch published a range of cartoons showing how Japan 
had exchanged roles with China as the leading power of East Asia.63 This was part of the 
characteristic change of Japan who took on the role as the saviour of the East, undertaking a 
civilising mission where it would lead other backward nations to the levels of Westernisation 
and progress which it had attained. In practise however, this can be seen as more of a cover-
up for expansion southwards, the significance of the islands in the South Seas prominent in 
expansionist policy. ‘There were still South Sea islands’ writes Akira Iriye in highlighting the 
importance of this region, ‘which were like empty houses, to which Japan would be most 
welcome. Westerners were fast spreading their influence and control over this region, and the 
Japanese could not be left behind’.64  
                                                          
60 J. Charles Schencking, Making Waves. Politics, Propaganda, and the Emergence of the Imperial Navy, 1868-
1912 (Stanford, 2005), 84-85. For another study which looks at the role of the Japanese navy in the Sino-
Japanese War as well as its development thereafter I would refer the reader to chapters two and three of David 
C. Evans’ and Mark R. Peattie’s publication Kaigan: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial 
Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD., 1997), 32-93. 
61 The Morning Call, 15 January 1895. 
62 The Times, 23 April 1895. 
63 See ‘The Triumph of Civilisation’, Punch, 11 August 1894; ‘Jap the Giant Killer’, Punch, 29 September 
1894; ‘The Jap in the China Shop’, Punch, 27 April 1895. 
64 Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 38. 
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Tokutomi Sohō wrote of such a mission, stating that Japan should now look to extend 
their influence southwards so that it may be able to save those Eastern nations who may 
either be susceptible to or be unable to counter Western influences. On 8 February 1896 he 
wrote:  
 
‘The countries of the Far East falling prey to the great powers of Europe is something 
that our nation will not stand for. East Asia becoming a mire of disorder is something 
that our nation will not tolerate. We have the duty to radiate the light of civilisation 
beyond our shores and bring the benefits of civilisation to our neighbours. We have 
the duty to guide backward countries to the point of being able to govern themselves. 
We have the duty to maintain peace in East Asia for this purpose. As a man has his 
calling, so too does a nation have its mission’.  
 
Tokutomi also wrote of how a strong and expansive “Greater Japan” would be able to 
contribute to ‘spreading righteousness throughout the world’ and that in accomplishing their 
mission in Asia Japan would; 
 
‘break the world-wide monopoly and destroy the special rights of the white races, 
eliminate the special sphere of influence and the worldwide tyranny of the white 
races, [and thereby] create true universal equality and progress in humanity, 
brotherhood, and civilisation for the world’.65  
 
Similar attitudes can be found elsewhere. Following the acquisition of Taiwan the importance 
of the Philippines increased for Japan. In a pamphlet entitled Firipin guntō the Minyūsha, a 
publishing company established by Tokutomi, sought to stimulate interest amongst the public 
for expansion into the south. Although it mentioned nothing of the United States it stated that 
neither Britain nor Germany held any interest in the Philippines and that Japan should 
cultivate a colonisation plan and assert Japanese interest in the region.66 These ambitions also 
included acquiring influence in the Chinese mainland with Manchuria and Korea taking a 
primary role in Japanese plans, their imperial course evident.67 After 1895 Japan sought 
expansion into Asia on a more pronounced level than before, and it was with its pristine new 
                                                          
65 Quoted in John D. Pierson, Tokutomi Sohō 1863-1957. A Journalist for Modern Japan (Guildford, 1980), 
241. 
66 Translated as The Philippine Islands. Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 48-49. Other publications on the Philippine 
question included Fukomoto Nichinan’s  Firipin guntō ni okeruni nihonjin (translated as The Philippine 
Archipelago with Regards to the Japanese, 1889) which provided an account of the Philippines as a Spanish 
colony and perspective for Japanese expansion into and colonisation of the Philippines, and Hattori Tōru’s Yō 
saku (Translated as South Seas Policy, 1891) which detailed Hattori’s excursions to the South Seas and the 
potential which he saw for expansion into Filipino industries such as hemp, sugar and textiles. See Sven 
Matthiessen, ‘The Perception of the Philippines in Japanese Pan-Asianism from the Meiji-Era until the Wake of 
the Pacific War’, GEMC Journal, 4:3 (2011), 129-131. 
67 Such notions were evident long before the 1890s however, with scholars and intellectuals from the Tokugawa 
era such as Yoshida Shōin stating that for the defence of Japan it was necessary to expand into these areas. 
Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 29. See also, David Magarey Earl, Emperor and Nation in Japan: Political 
Thinkers of the Tokugawa Period (Seattle, 1964), 173-175. 
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military and confidence that they would do it. This all falls under the umbrella of pan-
Asianism, a concept which will be addressed later in this chapter. But suffice to say that it 
was with this where Japan would be able to challenge Western infringement in the East, an 
important point to keep in mind when discussing the yellow peril. 
Regardless of what interests they had in East Asia along with the Japanese 
developments mentioned above, many in the West remained aloof from Asian affairs. Some 
writers looked to change this idleness and took to the role of comparing Eastern and Western 
existence so as to establish some understanding and knowledge of Eastern customs and 
lifestyle. In almost every case these writers conclude that they remained ignorant of modern 
methods and welfare. Japan was included in this list. Benjamin Wheeler is worth quoting at 
length: 
 
‘The contrast between those two things, Occidentalism and Orientalism, you cannot 
mistake. You feel it in the air, and yet it may be easy to define; it may not apply in 
every case nor fit every man, but in the main it is this: you have passed out of the 
time-land into the time-less. The Occident lives in time; life is its clock; heart-beats 
are its ticks…. The East, on the other hand, is timeless. There one day is a thousand 
years. The great East has time to spare. In the West, men have so much to do, and so 
little time in which to do it, that they crown time by deviceful effort to the full. 
‘In the West, life is a boat, with a rudder and a keel, that can cross the stream. 
In the East, life, personality, is a chip swept on in the great current. The West is given 
pre-eminently to activity in creating and shaping. It deals, therefore, largely with the 
shaping of the material universe which is the environment of the individual, and in 
subduing it to his control. The East is given to introspection. The West tends more to 
materialism, the East to communication with the things of the spirit. The West is full 
of creation, progress, restlessness, achievement, failure, disappointment, exultation; 
the East abounds in quietism, resignation, and blissful stagnation’.68 
 
Here the West was a place of rapid progress and the East one of contentment and traditional 
manners. Similarly Reinsch writes how the East and West, Orientalism and Occidentalism, 
maintain individual and unique characteristics where both remain ignorant of and fail to 
appreciate the other: 
 
‘Western civilisation, now fully developed, and rich in the accumulated wealth and 
wisdom of centuries, stands panoplied in all the glories of histories. The Orient, which 
believes that it has learned ages ago the sum of knowledge and the essence of truth, is 
still animated with the same spirit, and still has in great measure the same social and 
political institutions that existed at the beginning of the Christian era. Though these 
two civilisations have in some degree reacted upon each other, they still maintain a 
distinct character, with little real mutual understanding’.69 
                                                          
68 Benjamin Ide Wheeler, ‘Greece and the Eastern Question’, in Atlantic Monthly: A Magazine of Literature, 
Science, Art and Politics, 79:476 (1897), 723. 
69 Reinsch, World Politics, 236-237. 
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It could be said that this ignorance and aloofness overlooked what was an obvious time of 
progress for Japan, perhaps the true characteristics being reserved for globetrotting and travel 
accounts similar to those previously addressed. But this is not to say that affairs in the East 
were not being reported on. Although news of Japan’s victory may not have made the front 
page headlines it was with relative ease that one would be able to find examples in European 
presses which voiced the significance of this victory and were favourable towards Japan. 
Irrespective of the intervention a majority of European newspapers and journals ‘began to 
depict Japan as the singular successful case of Westernisation and reform on the larger Asian 
continent, which overall was failing to reform itself. Even some European authors felt they 
had to examine Japan to rethink whether its achievements could teach European states 
anything’.70 Equal attitudes were expressed in the United States where public opinion had 
been aroused by the outbreak and outcomes of this conflict, leading to untold levels of praise 
for the progress of Japanese Westernisation. ‘Japanese victory over China’ writes Iriye, ‘was 
widely interpreted in the United States as a victory of civilisation and enlightenment over 
backwardness and seclusionist foreign policy, and it was expected that post-war China would 
prove to be more receptive to foreign influences and intercourses…. Asia and the pacific 
began to be looked upon as one of the keys to the future of the United States’.71 China’s 
defeat succeeded in raising some heads as some believed that it brought with it a change 
which inherently signalled the beginning of a new era in East Asia. 
Although positive as well as antagonistic attitudes towards Japan began to be 
expressed at this point, opinions generally remained mixed concerning their endeavours and 
were far from being universally or mutually aligned towards a common goal of acceptance. 
In Britain anti-Japanese sentiments can be found as people were disconcerted and at times 
appalled by the distinct lack of gentlemanly behaviour from the Japanese after 1895 when 
they resolved upon further challenging the integrity of China as well as that of Korea. Arthur 
Diósy writes of how a tidal wave of indignation swept over Britain:  
  
 ‘“What!” cried the average Briton, represented by his principal newspapers and 
magazines, with few exceptions, “What! Those impertinent little ‘Japs’ going 
wantonly to attack our neutral ally, China, to disturb the balance of power, to 
jeopardise trade! They will have to pay dearly for their presumption. They may score 
a success or two just at first, but when China brings into play her enormous latent 
strength, when her huge population, her unlimited resources, her boundless staying 
power, begin to tell, Japan must needs be crushed in the unequal conflict’.72 
 
                                                          
70 Aydin, The Politics, 72. 
71 Iriye, From Nationalism, 125. For a greater in-depth look at the American involvement in the Sino-Japanese 
War see Charles Holcombe, The Real Chinese Question (New York, 1909 [1900]), 115, 147; Jeffrey M. 
Dorwart, The Pigtail War: American Involvement in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 (Amherst, MA., 1975). 
72 Arthur Diósy, The New Far East (London, 1904), 6-7. 
- 28 - 
 
In addition to this an account of Japanese meeting with one another in the street can be found 
in an article entitled ‘“How Do You Do!” In Japan’ which ridicules and mocks Japanese 
customs: 
 
‘As two Japanese come in sight of each other they slacken their pace and approach 
with downcast eyes, and averted faces, as if neither was worthy of beholding the 
other. Then they bow low, so as to bring the face on a level with the knees, on which 
the palms of the hands are pressed. 
 A succession of hissing sounds is next made by drawing in the breath between 
the closed teeth, interspersed with a series of complimentary phrases uttered with 
great volubility in a sort of understood falsetto, each trying to outdo his friend in 
rapidity and extravagance of language, while the palms are diligently rubbed against 
each other. 
 At last the climax is reached, and each endeavours to give precedence to the 
other. For some moments –– perhaps for a full minute –– the polite contest continues. 
Then the ceremony abruptly ends, as if the difficulty were capable of none but a 
brusque solution, and the two pass on hurriedly with a look of extreme relief’.73 
 
Regardless of these examples it must not be assumed that Britons holstered a wholly anti-
Japanese approach. Britain’s position as the global power in the world with a range of 
interests in Asia meant that it possessed a different perception to others. Owing to their 
interests in China it may appear apparent enough for one to infer that Britain was pro-Chinese 
but this has been described as nothing more than an illusion.74 
During the Sino-Japanese War both Britain and the United States remained neutral 
with their involvement primarily revolving around a humanitarian basis which included the 
protection of properties in war zones, as well as the lives of Chinese citizens resident in Japan 
and vice versa.75 In the immediate aftermath of the war Britain was more anti-Europe than 
anti-Japanese. As aforementioned it did not participate in the intervention and took the line of 
supporting Japan with the belief that it did more harm than good to British interests in Asia. 
Significantly this included trade with China which exceeded more than £32,000,000 a year 
and accounted for seventy per-cent of China’s total foreign trade.76 But there is more to it 
than this as both Britain and Japan appeared to share common goals. Valentine Chirol made 
                                                          
73 The London Journal and Weekly Record of Literature, Science and Art, 19 May 1900. 
74 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 25. 
75 The American contribution is most apparent here. There were a large number of Japanese subjects who 
resided in port cities such as Tientsin and Shanghai whilst Chinese citizens resided in a number of Japanese 
cities which included the port towns of Yokohama and Kobe. Both China and Japan accepted the American 
offer of protection of their citizens leading to Walter Q. Gresham, the United States Secretary of State, 
forwarding dispatches to Edwin Dun, the American envoy to Japan, and Charles H. Denby, the American 
ambassador to China. These issued them with directions to act as agents for Japanese and Chinese residents in 
their respective areas for the duration of the conflict. When the hostilities spread to Manchuria the United States 
became more involved and concerned with protecting the lives of Americans situated there of which there were 
some 1,000 families of which many were missionaries. In 1894 Naval Secretary Hilary A. Herbert ordered a 
portion of the fleet to Asian waters. Nimmo, Stars and Stripes, 20. 
76 Allen, Great Britain, 584. 
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this point quite clear. In one of his publications he wrote of how they could work together for 
mutual benefaction: 
 
‘No nation can be expected absolutely to renounce all dreams of future 
aggrandisement, and the day may come when the ways of England and Japan in the 
Far East will have to part. But the dread of remote contingencies must not be allowed 
to overshadow the possibilities of present usefulness. For some time to come it looks 
at least probable that England and Japan may have to travel along parallel paths. The 
experience of the last year has taught us the value of Japan, and it has taught Japan the 
value of moderation and prudence, without which she cannot hope to retain the 
permanent goodwill of England’. 
 
He went on to write that; 
 
‘… the interests of England and Japan should be arrayed on the same side, and it is 
upon such an association of interests rather than upon written engagements that must 
be founded in the pacific and, in the true sense of the word, conservative alliances 
which can alone find favour with British public opinion’.77 
 
Similar sentiments are reciprocated in Tokutomi’s writings following his trip to the West in 
1896 where he visited England, Germany, France, Russia, Constantinople, the Balkans, Italy, 
Switzerland and France before returning to England and moving on to the United States. He 
was attracted more to the British than either any other European or the Americans, labelling 
them as ‘self-centred, but law-abiding, self-possessed, easy-going and very likable’, stating 
that they would be a worthwhile ally should the need arise.78 Both Britain and Japan were 
                                                          
77 Valentine Chirol, The Far Eastern Question (London, 1896), 151, 153. The Times was unwavering in this 
point of view with articles detailing before the Boer War that the protection of British interests in East Asia 
made it necessary to secure an ally who could counter the threat of Russia. Whilst they viewed any alliance with 
Germany with caution with the belief that it would not look to alienate Russia they had to look elsewhere, and 
the prospect of Japan became unwavering. See The History of The Times. Volume 3: The Twentieth Century 
Test, 1884-1912 (London, 1947), 373. Similar attitudes can be found in the American presses. Californian 
newspaper The Herald for example, wrote of how the intervention was ‘an outlook for trouble’ and that the 
influence of foreign states possessed the objective solely to start a new war in East Asia. The same article also 
expressed a fear that there was the potential for China to re-enter into hostilities and prolong the war. The 
Herald, 27 April 1895. 
78 Tokutomi also went on to say that in spite of the disparities and discrepancies in the wealth and class of 
society how he was impressed that the London Metropolitan Police could seemingly maintain peace and order 
with little more than a truncheon, and that whereas other European nations were prejudiced towards Japanese 
travellers he experienced no ill-will when in England believing that the yellow peril was not a threat taken 
seriously. Alongside this he got the impression that other European nations were somewhat in awe with “Greater 
Britain” and that the British sympathised with Japan’s aspirations in Korea and Manchuria. Pierson, Tokutomi 
Sohō, 254-258. As well as the links with England, Japan also held links with the prestigious University of 
Glasgow which stemmed from the 1870s. It was with these links that Japan sought entry into the Glasgow 
International Exhibition to be held in 1901. The most prominent individual in cementing these links was 
Thomas Blake Glover who assisted in the development of Japan’s industrialisation throughout Meiji Japan’s 
Westernisation. In 1908 he was awarded the Order of the Rising Sun, second class, and there is still erected a 
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aware of Russia as a threat, and the growing presence of Japan as a counterweight to this 
made Britain look towards viewing Japan as a potential ally. In the spring of 1899 British 
Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain raised the possibility of an Anglo-Japanese alliance 
of some form with Kato Takaai, the Japanese Minister in London. Soon after the conclusion 
of Boxer Rebellion anti-Russian sentiments accentuated following the occupation of most of 
the Peking-Mukden railway line, adamantly refusing to discuss the withdrawal of their troops 
from Manchuria. These acts demonstrated the increasing threat of Russian expansion to both 
British and Japanese interests and their joint aim to prevent such acts of aggression.79 As well 
                                                          
statue of him in Glover Garden, Nagasaki. See Alexander McKay, Scottish Samurai. Thomas Blake Glover, 
1838-1911 (Edinburgh, 1993). 
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IMAGE THREE: Kaiser Wilhelm II’s painting, The Yellow Peril (1895). 
 
This painting and the coining of the phrase “yellow peril” was inspired by Kaiser Wilhelm II following a 
dream he had. The German inscription of the painting reads “Völker Europas, wahrt eure heiligsten Güter” 
translated to mean “Peoples of Europe, guard your dearest goods”. 
 
Source: G. G. Rupert, The Yellow Peril or The Orient vs. The Occident as Viewed by Modern Statesmen and 
Ancient Prophets (Choctaw, Okla. 1911), 143. 
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as this Britain and Japan became close trading partners. By the turn of the century Britain 
provided for a quarter of Japanese imports with their ships being frequently spotted in 
Japanese ports. British nationals also made up nearly half of the roughly 3,000 foreigners 
recruited by the Meiji government to assist with developments as British models served as 
inspiration for the Westernisation of Japan through the construction of railways, telegraph 
systems, and naval developments to name but a few areas.80 It was these feelings and 
collaboration that fostered friendly relations and would serve as fundamentally laying the 
groundwork for a burgeoning alliance. 
Japanese relations with other Western nations were not as equally fortuitous. The 
most prevalent example of this can be found through Kaiser Wilhelm II’s painting entitled 
“The Yellow Peril”. As image three shows the changing of affairs in East Asia stood as a 
threat to the wellbeing of Europe, the purpose of this painting a warning. He depicts the 
Archangel Michael as a symbol for Germany leading the European powers which included 
amongst others Britannia, Marianne, and Germania against the Golden Buddha of Japan 
which personified the yellow peril. With this racial thoughts and ideologies began to sprout 
which as Maik Sprotte has made clear, expressed feelings of superiority exaggerated by 
notions such as Herbert Spencer’s phrase the “survival of the fittest” and Darwinian Theory. 
But what is more Wilhelm used the term as a political tool so as to influence the balance of 
power in Europe as well as keep Russia busy in the East as defender of the Christian world, 
on a line similar to that echoed in the first epigraph to this chapter. Furthermore it gave 
reason for Russia to act aggressively in Manchuria.81 Thenceforth this term was to be found 
in a wide range of scholarly and popular writings as it rapidly crossed all linguistic 
boundaries.82 The fact that it was used as a political tool is significant and cannot afford to be 
overlooked as some in Germany believed that the use of this term threatened friend and foe. 
Bernhard von Bülow was one of them, writing how this painting saw Germany preaching to 
Europe and the West a Holy War against Japan who greeted the term with nothing but 
antipathy and abhorrence.83 This view has been taken on board by historians who have 
labelled Wilhelm’s attitudes and speeches on the matter as being not only problematic but 
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‘ghastly’ and ‘pompous’ which did nothing to benefit Germany’s foreign relations.84 An 
example of this term being used in such a way to manipulate the political atmosphere was the 
Kaiser’s attempt to create a wedge of tension between Japan and the United States, the idea 
being that Germany would benefit by being able to concentrate more on obtaining 
possessions in the Pacific. American general, politician and diplomat Charles Sherrill wrote 
just that: 
 
‘The term “Yellow Peril” was one of the most ingenious of Kaiser Wilhelm’s lines of 
propaganda [which had a purpose] to arouse such suspicions between Japan and 
America as would leave him free uninterruptedly to develop his policy of island 
grabbing in the Pacific’.85 
 
When one looks at the relations between Japan and the United States in the 1890s and 
their estrangement which sprouted towards the end of the decade one may claim that Wilhelm 
was successful in this political gamble. Unquestionably he certainly picked two nations who 
could easily be at loggerheads with each other. In 1890 Americans was fearful that Asiatics 
may overtake the white minority of the population on the island of Hawaii which included 
12,000 Japanese, 15,000 Chinese, 34,000 indigenous natives, and only 2,000 Americans. 
Although the Chinese and Japanese subjects paid twenty-nine percent of all taxes, the white 
minority held political influence as well as economic power and sought the backing of the 
United States. It was here that the topic of annexation was breached with one Hawaiian 
commissioner saying: 
 
‘There is such a large number of Chinese and other cheap labourers on the islands 
who cannot be trusted to vote intelligently that if universal suffrage was declared the 
whites, who represent almost the entire business interests of the country, would be 
outvoted and powerless’.86 
 
Following the end of the Sino-Japanese War these views were more greatly exaggerated with 
the view that if China were to become civilised there was a fear that it would unite with 
Japan. Stafford Ransome wrote that; 
 
‘… it is not probable that either Japan or any other nation will have a great deal of 
influence with her; but it is reasonable to suppose that as soon as that process has been 
accomplished China and Japan will be found on the same side when it is a question of 
facing a common Western enemy’.87 
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In addition to this there existed a belief that the comfort and security of the West was under 
threat from the combination of these two nations. As Henry Hyndman wrote retrospectively 
in 1919 when reminiscing on the affairs of the mid-1890s: 
 
‘The Japanese claim a controlling voice in the future of China, with her enormous 
population and her vast potential for wealth. They are on the high road to secure it, 
regardless of Great Britain or any other nation. What this may mean to the world at 
large can be judged by those who read the recent history of Japan. All other details of 
world-policy seem trifling in comparison with this. The suicide of the white race may 
leave the planet open to the supremacy of the yellow’.88 
 
A fear of Japanese expansion following their acquisition of influence over China sought 
about an increase in tension in the West as the idea that a threat of this magnitude would be 
unconquerable began to emerge. As Stafford Lyman has stated on the matter it was this 
combination which was feared purely because the dominant groups of the West, namely its 
spokesperson, leaders, officials, intellectuals, opinion makers, as well as others, believed that 
the particular element of the peril under discussion was not keeping to its place and 
threatened to claim any and all of the opportunities and privileges which it had been excluded 
from. Furthermore there was the fear and belief that it stood as a threat to the status, security, 
welfare and well-being of the dominant ethnic group.89 Although this consensus was not all 
encompassing it ultimately came to be the threat of the yellow peril, the movement of 
Asiatics on a small or large scale a reason to ere on the side of cautiousness which at times, in 
some circles, became extreme.90 This was then a racial problematic with the late nineteenth 
century seeing a mix of Chinese and Japanese constitute the makeup of the peril although it 
was the latter which was the most influential. 
Western fears of the yellow peril were blossoming as the Japanese became the 
embodiment and face of this threat. At the turn of the century The Spectator put forward to 
the British public the possibility of ‘a Japanese military caste controlling China and 
organising a native army and military’.91 Elsewhere Matthew Shiel’s book The Yellow 
Danger told the story of Chinamen as well as Japanese disguised accordingly acting as spies 
in Western Europe for a future invasion which he believed would be equally as tragic as the 
Black Death which plagued the Middle Ages. Any total victory for the Asiatics where 
Westerners were forced to be submissive would bring about ‘the reign of hell’, a fear which 
intensified as many Europeans fled further westwards to flee any encounter. A counter attack 
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led by the English put a stop to this as their superior naval power combined with that of 
others successfully conquered the yellow threat, the Japanese outdone by European pre-
eminence.92 Although published earlier in the decade William Crane’s short story The Year 
1899 told the story of an Oriental invasion, a Chinese led cohort which incorporated the 
Japanese, African Americans, Puerto Ricans, various Caribbean peoples, and those 
nonconforming American Indian tribes. In this story Europe and the United States were 
invaded by these peoples. Initially overrun they managed to regroup, counter and invade 
China. The Japanese were humiliated and disgraced, and the Chinese were forced to 
withdraw.93 What novels and stories such as these have in common is their depiction of 
Oriental races with racial stereotypes emerging as a means to further assert Western 
dominance. As aforementioned Japan was the personification of this threat: ‘As an Oriental 
power’ writes Gina Owens, ‘Japan focused the “Yellow Peril” fears of the West: Japanese 
national characteristics became central to the image of the Oriental hordes. Racial stereotypes 
cast as “national characteristics” were promoted by the Western powers as justification for 
their dominant position, forming part of the armoury of racial theories that originated in the 
late nineteenth century. Japan became both a victim and proponent of such ideas’. But there 
was more to it than just this as these stereotypes took on a more extreme racial view where 
Japanese traits could not escape examination: ‘Physical racial characteristics were also 
identified in spurious “scientific” theories and research, which were used to justify an 
ordering of humanity with the whites firmly ensconced at the top of the hierarchy. From 
“yellow-monkeys” to “dwarf slaves” and “venomous lice”, the Japanese were subjected to a 
barrage of racial insults from the 1850s reaching a crescendo in Second World War 
propaganda’.94 With the establishment of these stereotypes it does not become difficult to 
envisage a divergent margin between East and West where different customs, beliefs and 
attitudes permeated. When one addresses each region individually two ideologies emerge 
from these racial tendencies: in the West there is the concept of Anglo-Saxonism amongst the 
British and Americans which has already been acknowledged, and in the East there was the 
pan-Asianist concept, again something which has already warranted some attention, which 
was vociferous in its view that Asiatic nations should dissolve all things related to the West.  
Although Anglo-Saxonism has its roots in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it 
took on new meaning in the nineteenth. Generally referred to as a union primarily between 
Britain and the United States, it represented the distinct and superior racial elements of these 
nations. Its rise to prominence was identified as only one stage in a relentless Western 
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movement which begun in India, had stretched into the German forests, and was playing 
itself out in the United States and in the British Empire’s settlement colonies.95 Reginald 
Horsman has written on the changes Anglo-Saxonism undertook throughout these centuries, 
concluding that by the end of the nineteenth century it had undergone a profound change 
when ‘an interest in national origins, in the intimate relationship of race, language and nation 
was of course not peculiar to Great Britain, but the Anglo-Saxons combined a long 
idealisation of their institutions with overt signs of nineteenth century success; of the 
apparently inevitable drive of Great Britain and the United States to world domination…. By 
the middle of the nineteenth century the idea of a superior Anglo-Saxon race regenerating a 
world of lesser races was firmly engrained in English thinking’.96 The development of a key 
relationship between Britain and the United States can be seen to originate here as both held 
vested interests in East Asia, the encroachment of Russia into northern China, as well as 
Japan’s greater presence which Britain and America perceived as a threat to their commercial 
interests and the integrity of China with the Open Door Policy.97 American imperialism was 
significant in defining Anglo-Saxonism in the nineteenth century. With their belief that 
Britain was far better qualified to direct colonies, the strength of this ideal is apparent. 
‘Powered from a common mould, cherishing similar values’ writes Bradford Perkins, ‘the 
two peoples were assumed to have the same noble conception of the duties of empire’.98 This 
was a time where Britain in particular was seeking to forge friendly relations and alliances so 
it could rely on others to help protect and defend their interests in the world’s distant corners, 
like those in East Asia. Both America and Japan appealed to them but in the 1890s the notion 
of Anglo-Saxonism was stronger than an Anglo-Japanese union. 
Britain was certainly keen to secure a formal alliance with the United States. 
Following American successes in the Spanish-American War the two certainly expressed 
cordial relations. Reinsch expressed how the two shared commonalities: 
 
‘The friendship between Great Britain and the American Republic is usually accepted 
as firmly established, and it may be looked upon as one of the most fortunate results 
of the late [Spanish-American] war that the unreasoning bitterness and 
misunderstanding between these two great nations have given way, even for a time, to 
a feeling of common interests and mutual good will. The best minds of both nations 
have long realised that, with all the commercial and industrial rivalry between them, 
they are at one on the essentials of civilisation and government’.99 
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In a speech at Birmingham on 13 May 1898 in the midst of this conflict, Chamberlain made 
his views on the importance of an alliance with Britain’s Anglo-Saxon counterpart known, 
accentuating the importance of this concept with the primary duty of statesmen being; 
 
 ‘to establish and maintain bonds of amity with our kinsmen across the Atlantic…. I 
do not know what the future has in store for us, I do not know what arrangements may 
be possible with the United States, but this I know and feel –– that the closer, more 
cordial, the fuller and the more definite, these arrangements are with the consent of 
both people, the better it will be for the world. And I even go so far as to say that, 
terrible as war may be, even war itself would be cheaply purchased if in a great and 
noble cause the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack should wave together over an 
Anglo-Saxon alliance’. 
 
In the House of Commons a month later, he qualified the idea of an Anglo-American alliance 
by further emphasising the importance of Anglo-Saxonism and the superiority which came 
with it: 
 
‘Nothing in the nature of a cut-and-dried alliance is at this moment proposed. The 
Americans do not want our alliance at this moment. They do not ask for our 
assistance, and we do not want theirs, at this moment. But will anyone say that the 
occasion may not arise, foreseen as it has been by some American statesmen, who 
have said that there is a possibility in the future that Anglo-Saxon liberty and Anglo-
Saxon interests may hereafter be menaced by a great combination of other Powers.... I 
think that such a thing is possible, and in that case, whether it be America or whether  
 
There was then a deep underlying sentiment that drew Britain closer to America and a desire 
for a formal alliance. For this reason many historians such as Alan Dobson and Anne Orde 
have regarded the year 1898 as a turning point in Anglo-American relations as America 
emerged as an imperial power.100 This is something which Britain welcomed. In his 
autobiography American historian Henry Adams described the joy he witnessed in London 
following the victory of the United States being something ‘as melodramatic as any plot of 
Napoleon the Great’ and a ‘diplomatic triumph’ which brought about a great ‘sense of 
satisfaction’.101 Britain formed a close relationship with the United States and was always 
cautious when negotiating friendships and alliances with others so not make any 
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commitments which may force them to fight against their Anglo-Saxon counterpart.102 Indeed 
where the powers of Europe were at time openly hostile towards American imperialism, 
Britain expressed a desire for friendly relations by remaining aloof from European alliances 
and extending its sympathy to the colonial adventures of their kindred.103 American scholar 
Harry Thurston Peck wrote in the same vein as Adams when word of successes in 1898 
spread across London:  
 
‘Within six hours after the cable had told the story, London burst out into the rainbow 
hues of the American national colours. Thousands of American flags… [and] 
streamers of red, white and blue effected a brilliant contrast with the smoky walls of 
the metropolis. A great multitude of people assembled before the American Embassy, 
cheering heartily for the United States’.104 
 
Britain had effectively become pro-American, a supporter and advocate of American 
interests. In strengthening this assertion one can look at the reform clergyman Washington 
Gladden and his travels. In the summer of 1898 he toured England giving a lecture entitled 
Causes of the War, and the Reasons for Friendship Between England and America to which 
his listeners willingly engaged. Upon its conclusion they even sang with great enthusiasm 
‘The Star Spangled Banner’ and applauded his speech with vigour.105 It can also be said that 
British imperialism influenced the emergence of American attitudes towards imperialism. In 
discussing this, an article entitled ‘America on England’ found in Chums magazine told a 
story of how an English subject was confined by the King of Abyssinia. In his refusal to 
surrender the captive he found himself the recipient of a rescue mission which cost 
$25,000,000 and saw the advance of ten thousand English soldiers who were willing to march 
seven hundred miles and were prepared to fight for the freedom of one man. The article 
concluded that it was the broadness of the British Empire which permitted this to take place 
and to be a success.106 Friendly relations however, were not universal between Britain and 
United States with there being instances of British disapproving of American imperialism and 
vice-versa.  
Regarding British sentiments towards the United States Paul Kramer states how some 
disapproved because of their promise of eventual self-governance and rapid and extensive 
employment of Filipinos in the colonial bureaucracy. Some even criticised them for their 
insufficiently harsh, hierarchical attitudes and public racism against the Filipinos. Carl Crow, 
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an American newspaperman, businessman and author, wrote of this perception how the 
British Colonial Service was amused and entertained at the mistakes and failures of the 
United States and were more than happy to offer patronising advice, taking the role of master 
teaching the student.107 Equally so however, Americans were found to be sceptical of an 
alliance with Britain. From early as February 1898 Irishmen in New York had begun to 
organise an Anti-British Alliance Society with anti-imperialists such as Carl Schultz 
declaring that overseas expansion was the result of and would lead to entangling 
commitments which would be hard to get out of.108 This Anglophobia can be found 
elsewhere. American historian George Burton Adams wrote how the English were a 
‘thoroughly selfish’ nation and goes on to say; 
 
‘There is on the part of many a positive dislike of England, a readiness to accept the 
worse interpretation of any act of hers, a belief that she is particularly our enemy and 
would do anything that she can to embarrass or injure us…. On the part of many 
more, probably a much larger number, who do not feel the positive dislike or actual 
hostility, there is a feeling of suspicion, a conviction that England is capable of much 
evil, that she is not kindly disposed towards us, and that she must be carefully 
watched’.109 
 
In spite of this it is evident that Britain was most expressive in its keenness for an alliance 
with America as Britons welcomed the emergence of a second Anglo-Saxon imperialist, 
willing to overlook or ignore any antipathies which emerged, even if this feeling was not 
reciprocated.110 
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At this juncture I will take some time to examine American imperialism and the 
Japanese responses to it as it is this confliction of empires which stands as a principle reason 
for estrangement. Having defeated Spain the United States had propelled itself to the apron of 
the world stage having earned the right to walk through the proscenium of empire. As The 
Times put it victory would thenceforth lead to; 
 
‘a profound change in the whole attitude of the policy of the United States. In future 
America will play a part in the general affairs of the world such as she has never 
played before. When the American people realise this, and they realise novel 
situations with remarkable promptitude, they will not do things by halves’.111 
 
With this came the end of the Monroe Doctrine and isolationism, the policy which had 
characterised American feelings towards foreign involvement which nations such as Britain 
in the past had been typically pleased about.112 Victory had ‘created a significant U.S. stake 
in Eastern Asia, inspired expansive visions of influence in the region, and thus set the stage 
for a string of conflicts that Americans in 1899 could not have anticipated in their wildest 
imaginings’.113 The mind-sets of those in the United States had now changed as a prosperous 
era for development was to commence as attitudes towards government, politics, the 
economy and social well-being underwent change.114 For these reasons Anglo-Saxonism 
strengthened as Britain and the United States shared a mutual and common ground on 
attitudes to imperialism. As Morton Keller has asserted, it was the American policy of 
actively embarking on territorial acquisition and engaging in guerrilla warfare with the 
Filipino nationalists which made them a colonial imperialist like their Anglo-Saxon ally.115 In 
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with newspapers and magazines, as well as periodicals such as The Advocate of Peace, heralding the beginning 
of a new era in American policy and the fulfilment of her destiny. See Iriye, From Nationalism, 142, 164; Hunt 
and Levine, Arc of Empire, 66; the article entitled ‘Becoming a Great Power’, The Advocate of Peace (1894-
1920), 60:7 (1898), 149. But not all Americans favoured imperialism. For a look at the contrast between 
imperialists and anti-imperialists I would refer the reader to Michael Patrick Cullinane’s publication Liberty and 
American Anti-Imperialism 1898-1909 (New York, 2012) with a specific focus on chapter one which looks at 
the origins of anti-imperialism and chapter two which addresses opposition to the Treaty of Paris. 
115 Morton Keller, ‘Anglo-American Politics, 1900-1930, in Anglo-American Perspective: A Case Study in 
Comparative History,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22:3 (1980), 461. 
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spite of some contemptuous feelings between the two, Anglo-American relations certainly 
prospered from 1898 as mutual ideologies would see them cooperate on a hitherto 
unparalleled level. Thereafter there existed between the British and American people a sense 
that insecurities amidst world affairs would be tackled leading to the strengthening of Anglo-
American cooperation.116 A worthy example of this can be found in the collaboration 
between the two in the Boxer Rebellion. Although not solely an Anglo-American affair the 
Battle Yancun, one of the most significant battles of the rebellion, was led by British and 
American troops showing their cooperation for the first time in in a major engagement 
                                                          
116 Allen, The Great, 549. 
IMAGE FOUR: ‘Uncle Sam’s Picnic’, Puck, 28 September 1898. 
 
This print shows Uncle Sam assisting four little girls with the tags of “Hawaii”, “Ladrones”, “Puerto 
Rico”, and “Cuba” onto a wagon which is filled with other young children such as “Hawaii” who are sat 
alongside American, waving their flags patriotically. The two horses are labelled “Liberty” and “Union” 
and the old man perched on a log with a hat labelled “Monroe Doctrine” and is identified as the Old Party, 
a symbol of the past. The caption here reads the Old Party asking “Ain’t ye takin’ too many in, Sam?” to 
which Uncle Sam responds with “No, Gran’pa; I reckon this team will be strong enough for them all!” 
 
Source: Available online at the Library of Congress. 
URL: < http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2012647475/ > (accessed 6 January 2015). 
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signalling how times were changing.117 There emerged the notion that events which were 
deemed to threaten the global status-quo would be rectified as Britain and the United States 
would be swift and efficient in countering any such problems or misdemeanours, fulfilling 
their roles as frontrunners of Anglo-Saxonism. 
Part of the responsibility which this tag brought with which in some ways can be seen 
as protecting and securing the Western world, was the concept of the “White Man’s Burden” 
following the publication of Rudyard Kipling’s poem of the same title in November 1898. Its 
aim was to encourage American imperialism and their take-over of the Philippine islands so 
that it may join with the likes of Britain in the possession of a global empire. In this work he 
pleaded with the United States to: 
 
‘Take up the White Man’s burden –– 
 Send forth the best ye breed –– 
 Go bind your sons to exile 
 To serve your captives’ need; 
 To wait, in heavy harness, 
 On fluttered folk and wild –– 
 Your new-caught, sullen peoples, 
 Half-devil and half-child’.118 
 
Kipling was of the belief that these American ventures possessed the same virtues as Britain’s 
endeavours. In September he had written to Theodore Roosevelt of what America’s intent 
should be: 
 
‘Now go in and put all the weight of your influence into hanging on permanently to 
the whole Philippines. America has gone and stuck a pickaxe into the foundations of a 
rotten house and she is morally bound to build the house over again from the 
foundations or have it fall about her ears’.119 
 
This can be seen through the picture taken from the American periodical Puck in image four 
which shows the rapid rate of its progress and influence, its imperialism spreading across 
their territory as they asserted their presence. The idea of the White Man’s Burden can be 
seen here as Uncle Sam takes on a large number of countries and civilisations portrayed here 
as children showing how the Monroe Doctrine had been left for dust. These “children” 
needed to be educated on the principles of the modern world, the way which Westerners lived 
being a symbol of the natural path of development. This was the general principle of 
                                                          
117 Duncan Andrew Campbell, Unlikely Allies. Britain, America and the Victorian Origins of the Special 
Relationship (London, 2007), 194-195. 
118 Quoted in Perkins, The Great, 85. This sentiment was not unilateral in Britain and is a good example of 
opinions in society being divided. Varying opinions began to emerge on how to rate other racial groups, how 
much responsibility came with Britain’s place in the sun, how to react to British people who well short of the 
standards expected of them, and to foreigners who exceeded expectations. Diamond, ‘Lesser Breeds’, 6. 
119 Quoted in Patrick Brantlinger, ‘Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” and Its Afterlives’, English Literature 
in Transition, 1880-1920, 50:2 (2007), 172. 
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Kipling’s work which was used to epitomise the duty of the white race to extend their 
civilisation to overseas territories which belonged to any and all other races which included 
the yellow races of the East.120 What Kipling’s poem does is intrinsically like imperialism 
and race, two concepts which as we have thus far seen held great levels of importance in the 
late nineteenth century. Relating it to Japan it is similar to their cries of pan-Asianism and the 
idea of “Asia for the Asiatics”, the two notions coming head-to-head expressing the 
sentiments on both sides of the globe with the yellow and white perils respectively. Whereas 
some may have viewed the United States as the ideal “Western” nation in the East, perhaps 
the most enlightened “child” to have learnt the ways of the West albeit through a more 
indirect education, and the curators of an idea where their influence over Asia was paramount 
in creating unity, others may have seen their growth with apprehension, the burden of the 
white man thenceforth being to deal with the growing threats which emerged from these 
territories which experienced such tutelage. 
With the increasing strength of Japan the focus shifted onto them as being the yellow 
peril which saw Britain and America come closer together. Both however, were enthusiastic 
about maintaining their interests in East Asia, as aforesaid, regarding China and commercial 
interests, as well as keeping both China and Japan in check and ensuring that they did not get 
too big for their boots and too much to handle.121 Western fiction warned of such an 
eventuality creating an image of ‘Oriental hordes’ that possessed the intent of ‘descending on 
Europe [and] bringing about despotism where there exists enlightened rule’.122 As one 
American magazine mentioned: 
 
‘The peoples of the Occident are face to face with a powerful Oriental competitor in 
the arts of war, diplomacy, industry and commerce’.123 
 
Other periodicals and publications such as fiction and short stories expressed a fear of Asian 
expansion westwards on a line similar to that echoed by Wilhelm II and the publications of 
Sheil and Crane cited above. Oto Mundo’s publication The Recovered Continent tells of how 
Chinese armies overcame forces in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and how headlines 
screamed: ‘FOUR HUNDRED MILLION CHINESE ARE POURING LIKE A FLOOD 
OVER EUROPE'.124 One thing which is certain amongst Westerners is their confidence in 
                                                          
120 Charles H. Sherril, ‘The White Man’s Burden’, The North American Review, 223:830 (1926), 65. 
121 At this point it is worth stating how Japan viewed the United States in particular as being hypocritical. On 16 
August Japanese liberal Kōtoku Shūsui denounced America as being equally as aggressive and selfish as those 
others who had intervened in East Asian affairs. The United States was no longer viewed by Japan as the 
symbol of man’s struggle for freedom. Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 26, 60. See also Hunt and Levine, Arc of 
Empire, 59-61. 
122 Owens, ‘The Making’, 32. 
123 Arena, November 1898. 
124 Oto E. Mundo, The Recovered Continent: A Tale of the Chinese Invasion (Columbus, OH., 1898). See also 
William F. Wu, The Yellow Peril: Chinese Americans in American Fiction, 1850-1940 (Hamden, CT., 1982), 
38; Owens, ‘The Making’, 692. For other novels looking at the threat of a Chinese invasion see the following: 
H. J. West, The Chinese Invasion (San Francisco, 1873); Atwell Whitney, Almond-Eyed (San Francisco, 1878); 
Pierton W. Dooner, Last Days of the Republic (San Francisco, 1880); Wolter, A Short and Truthful History. 
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being superior over Eastern nations, and in every case where a novel or short story is written 
on either the Chinese or Japanese invasion, or an invasion by both, it ends with the success of 
the West and the success of Anglo-Saxonism. French political economist Pierre Leroy-
Beaulieu perhaps puts it best in his publication The Awakening of the East where he writes 
how Europe’s strength would be able to counter any degree of threat expressed through the 
yellow peril ideal. He writes: 
 
‘If this war [the Sino-Japanese War] had taken place fifty, or even twenty-five, years 
ago, when Europe paid less attention to foreign affairs, it is probable that the Manchu 
Dynasty would have been replaced by that of Japan. Possibly then the “Yellow Peril” 
–– the military “Yellow Peril” –– which to-day is but a mere chimera, might have 
become a very evident reality. The Japanese, after having thoroughly reorganised and 
disciplined the Chinese army, might at a given moment have let loose its innumerable 
hordes upon the Western world’.125 
  
In spite of this belief that Europe stood as an effective barrier against any encroaching Asian 
hordes there still existed a fear which pieces of fiction and scholarly studies such as those 
mentioned here expressed.  
Displays of Chinese revolutionaries alongside extreme nationalists acting out against 
foreign imperialists during the Boxer Rebellion stood as an example of the threat which the 
yellow peril posed, and of what potentially lay in wait for the West. This was an occasion 
where Japan was extremely enthusiastic to get involved, something which cannot be 
overlooked as it made up the highest representation of forces in the Eight Nation Alliance. 
Whereas Russia committed to sending 4,800 troops, Britain 3,000, and the United States 
2,800, Japan sent over 8,000.126 Prime Minister Yamagata Arimoto stressed the excitement 
amongst the Japanese for involvement in this alliance, albeit a short lived one, by stating how 
he was excited by the prospect being alongside the likes of Britain and America. Furthermore 
Arimoto hoped that this would allow them to challenge Russian ambitions in the East.127 
Japan’s involvement and enthusiasm however, made some more weary of their intent, taking 
the view that Japan used this rebellion as a way to acquire a stronger foothold in Asia where 
it could seek to gain a greater influence over China. This allowed Japan to test the waters 
further whilst aiming of overseas expansion. What Japan came to realise however, is that it 
needed the support of a major power. In theory this meant choosing between either Britain or  
                                                          
Although these works pre-date the 1890s and the subject of this chapter there are worth noting as they exist as 
excellent example of materials which were recycled to incorporate the Japanese.  
125 Pierre Leroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening of the East. Siberia––Japan––China (New York, 1900), 246. A 
chimera is a fabled fire-breathing dragon monster which can be found in Greek mythology as depicted by 
Homer with a lion’s head, a goat’s body, and a serpent’s tail. It was killed by the Bellerophon, perhaps the most 
infamous slayer of monster before the time of Hercules. In this metaphor the Chinese and Japanese hordes are 
the fire-breathing monster and the forces of the West the hero, restoring the status-quo.  
126 Of the other nations in this alliance France sent over 800 troops, Austria 58, and Italy 53. The number of 
German troops that were sent over is disputed and thus unclarified. Nimmo, Stars and Stripes, 47; See also Ian 
Nish, ‘Japan’s Indecision During the Boxer Disturbances’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 20:4 (1961), 450. 
127 Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the Powers 1890-1990 (London, 1994), 19. 
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TABLE TWO: Japanese Subjects Resident Abroad, 1889-1900 
Year Males Females Total 
1889 13,815 4,878 18,688 
1890 17,919 6,031 23.950 
1895 34,332 11,945 46,277 
1896 40,348 13,994 54,342 
1897 43,707 15,078 58,785 
1898 58,114 17,687 70,801 
1899 76,633 22,406 99,039 
1900 98,985 24,986 123,971 
Source: W. Crewdson, ‘Japanese Emigrants’, The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review, 56:333 
(1904), 815. 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia, the two powers that resided on either side of the Great Wall.128 Japan favoured an 
alliance with the former of these which in some cases was reciprocated by Britain who 
preferred a formal agreement with Japan over the likes of Germany but not the United States. 
Anglo-German relations were hampered when British diplomat Francis Bertie found out that 
Russian troops had been deployed to occupy Manchuria, taking over part of the British 
railway there. He directed his anger at Russia for embarking on what he viewed as a heinous 
act, and towards Germany for their lack of support. Soon after he concluded along with Lord 
Salisbury and Sir Thomas Sanderson that Germany had demonstrated how they were an ill-
suited ally, and that Britain should consider Japan as the ally who could slow the Russian 
advance and hamper their ambitions in Asia.129 Although Japan sought further friendly 
relations with the West their ambitions and intent in Asia were still not overlooked. Historian 
Paul Cohen reaffirms this point where he mentions how the Boxers and the events which 
made up the rebellion and the role of Japan therein were the ‘yellow peril personified’.130 
But there was more than just the unravelling of events in the East which sparked 
concern. Throughout the 1890s there was an increased Japanese presence in the United 
States, especially on the West Coast. The San Francisco Call for example, published an 
article which bore the title ‘Japanese Goods Flooding San Francisco’.131 Immigration itself 
however, also increased. As previously mentioned the Philippine Islands and Hawaii were the 
initial recipients of this but the numbers of those immigrating to the United States also saw an  
                                                          
128 Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 76. 
129 Zara Steiner, ‘The Last Years of the Foreign Office, 1898-1905’, The Historical Journal, 6:1 (1963), 69-70. 
See also Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London, 1980). 
130 Paul A. Cohen, History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience and Myth (New York, 1997), xii; 
Lyman, ‘The “Yellow Peril” Mystique’, 719. 
131 Here the cheap nature of Japanese labour is also expressed which held the potential to cause troubles in the 
United States. The San Francisco Call, 25 November 1895. 
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TABLE THREE: The Destinations and Classifications of Japanese Emigrants in 1900 
Destination 
On Official 
Duty 
Students Merchants 
Labourers 
and Others  
United States and Colonies 46 554 3,361 86,689 
Great Britain and Colonies 133 40 512 7,530 
Russia and Colonies 15 65 286 3,587 
Holland 4 2 –– –– 
France and Colonies 44 36 18 799 
Portugal and Colonies ––  1 –– 9 
Germany 33 162 5 14 
Belgium 10 5 5 1 
Italy 7 –– –– 6 
Spain 2 –– –– –– 
Austria 8 13 10 5 
Peru 1 –– –– 693 
Brazil 7 –– –– 2 
Mexico 6 3 4 32 
Siam 7 3 29 39 
Korea 538 16 9,669 5,606 
China 202 40 1,391 1,630 
Total: 1,063 940 15,320 106,642 
Source: W. Crewdson, ‘Japanese Emigrants’, The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review, 56:333 
(1904), 816. 
 
 
 
 
 
increase. As we can see from table two the number of Japanese citizens’ resident abroad 
increased throughout the 1890s peaking at the end of the decade, with table three providing a 
more detailed image of where they found themselves. As can be seen the United States and 
its colonies experienced the greatest influx of migrants attracting diplomats, academics, 
importers, exporters and labourers as well as many others. Owing to these high numbers 
Americans felt a threat to their way of life, the Japanese becoming the new immigration 
threat which brought about emerging desires to restrict any further developments.132 
                                                          
132 It is worth mentioning here that some in Japan viewed emigration as a principle issue in strengthening and 
developing the Japanese way of life. In an article entitled The New Homeland of the Japanese Race Tokutomi 
Sohō reflects on the ideas of Charles Dilke by stating that a nation should expand for reasons of race and 
national civilisation. He suggests that ‘today is not a time when the world is conquered by military might; it is a 
time when the world is subjected by race’. On 30 June 1890 Sohō went further, asking the question: ‘what 
territorial base is our race building overseas?’ He admitted with great shame that ‘the extent of Japan’s 
expansion consists of only a few thousand students in San Francisco, ten thousand workers in Hawaii, and… a 
few prostitutes in Hong Kong and Singapore’. He insisted that Japan must imminently seek to ‘develop a policy 
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Hyndman wrote of how their emigration to the United States was the new focus point 
following Japan’s rise in East Asia. In contrast to China who was subjected to emigration 
laws, Japanese emigration showed how times were changing, with the American Exclusion 
Act of 1897 ineffectual as they were allowed to take the place of the excluded Chinese in the 
Pacific Islands and California. He goes on to mention that this did not mean that they were 
welcomed with open arms, highlighting how there were  reports of Japanese being brutally 
attacked in California where their shops and businesses were ransacked, and their residences 
placed in great jeopardy. Americans now looked to intimidate the Japanese and coerce the US 
government into excluding them in the same way they did with the Chinese in the previous 
decade with the belief that they ‘were equally members of an alien race: in fact, a Chinaman 
and a Japanese, both now without pigtails, when dressed in European garb, can scarcely be 
distinguished by white men’s eyes from one another’.133 As one can see from the third 
epigraph to this chapter Japanese characteristics were not viewed favourably and should be 
viewed with caution. The San Francisco journal Organized Labour, published in an editorial 
on 17 March 1900 how neither the Chinese nor the Japanese were in any way beneficial or 
desirable contributions to American society: 
 
‘Chinatown with its reeking filth and dirt, its gambling dens and obscene slave pens, 
its coolie labour and bloodthirsty tongs, is a menace to the community: but the 
snivelling Japanese, who swarms along the streets and cringingly offers his paltry 
services for a suit of clothes and a front seat in our public schools, is a far greater 
danger to the labouring portion of society than all the opium-soaked pigtails who have 
ever blotted the fair name of this beautiful city’.134 
 
In the following year the United States Industrial Commission wrote how the Japanese were 
more submissive than the Chinese but were at the same time far less obedient and less 
desirable, possessing most of the vices of the Chinese but having none of the virtues. They 
labelled the Japanese as a tricky, unreliable and dishonest class.135 In America they had 
become victim to ill-sentiment which has previously been directed against the Chinese. 
Robert Heizer and Alan Almquist have been vociferous on this point, stating that ‘prejudice 
against the Japanese sprouted in the rich soil that had nourished anti-Chinese studies shortly 
before’.136 If anything the exclusion of the Chinese led to a fear of the Japanese as 
Californians portrayed this new immigration wave as yet another “Oriental invasion” with 
newspapers in San Francisco urging their readers to ‘step to the front once more and battle to 
                                                          
to motivate our people to embark upon great adventures abroad… to stimulate their enterprising spirit and to 
encourage their spirit of boldness to seek residence outside the homeland’. Only in doing so could Japan hold 
any influence in the modern age, voicing this as ‘a matter of the greatest urgency today’. Quoted in Pierson, 
Tokutomi Sohō, 226. See also Charles Dilke, The Problems of Greater Britain (London, 1890). 
133 Hyndman, The Awakening, 186-188. 
134 Quoted in tenBroek et. al., Prejudice, War, 24. 
135 Ibid, 23-24. 
136 Robert F. Heizer and Alan F. Almquist, The Other Californians: Prejudice and Discrimination Under Spain, 
Mexico, and the United States to 1920 (Berkeley, 1971), 178. See also Hyman, ‘The “Yellow Peril” Mystique’, 
692, 698. 
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hold the Pacific Coast for the white race’. The Japanese were greatly feared because of their 
labour and work ethic as well as their race. As Erika Lee states, ‘the Japanese were especially 
feared, because of their great success in agriculture and their tendency to settle and start 
families in the United States (as compared to the Chinese who were mostly sojourners). The 
political and cultural ideology that came to be used in the anti-Japanese movement 
immediately connected the new Japanese threat with the old Chinese one’.137 Lyman provides 
us with a deeper insight into the mind-set of Californians by detailing how there was ‘a belief 
that, whether as warriors or immigrants, or, as some would have it, warriors-as-immigrants, 
Asiatics from the “Middle Kingdom” were “invading” America with an eye to 
“conquest”’.138  
Similar attitudes can found when looking at this issue with the British dominions. 
Canada for one was cautious of increasing Japanese immigration and shared attitudes similar 
to those described here. In British Colombia for example, the growth of the Anglo-Saxon 
population was slow whilst Asian immigration more generally was experiencing hitherto 
untold levels. In 1891 the numbers of Japanese there were nothing more than trifling, by 1896 
there were around 1,000, and by 1901 there was a recorded number of 4,544 in the province. 
This combined with the Chinese numbers sparked images of Oriental hordes marching 
westward.139 Elsewhere it was a fear of the yellow peril which brought the community 
together. In Australia for example, Major-General Kenneth Mackay published a novel 
entitled The Yellow Wave. A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia where he wrote of 
a scenario of Asiatics primarily made up of Chinaman owing to their vast population looking 
for expansion into Australasia. Here the Australian community ‘became galvanised into 
warlike life, and cried out for arms with which to drive back the Mongols into the sea’.140 In 
spite of their confidence Mackay’s story concludes with the Asiatic defeat, their 
backwardness being no match for the discipline, training and prowess of Western nations 
who were always superior, their ability able to counter the endless waves of Mongols. 
Although the Japanese may have been viewed by some in a slightly more favourable light 
than the Chinese their presence was not openly welcomed as people remained cautious of 
their intent with the idea of an Oriental invasion, those mass hordes using the pacific islands 
as stepping stones, to descend onto America’s West Coast as well as in other states a genuine 
fear. 
Having previously mentioned the presence of two distinct ideologies in the East and 
West, namely Anglo-Saxonism and pan-Asianism, I shall briefly address the latter of these 
                                                          
137 Lee, ‘The Chinese Exclusion’, 44. There was however, a noted disparity between Chinese and Japanese 
immigrants in the United States with the significant difference being that whereas Japan had a right to settle in 
America, the Chinese did not. In contrast to the Chinese the Japanese were ‘clean, quiet, capable Asiatics’ who 
‘were formidable in the labour market, [and] were even in some respects perhaps more objectionable than the 
Chinese’. Hyndman, The Awakening, 188. For a more detailed view of the Japanese in America in contrast to 
the Chinese see page 194. 
138 Lyman, ‘The “Yellow Peril” Mystique’, 689-690. 
139 Patricia E. Roy, White Man’s Province: British Colombia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 
1858-1914 (British Colombia, 1990), 91-92. I would also refer the reader to the entirety of this chapter in this 
work entitled ‘The Politics of Restricting Immigration, 1896-1902’, 91-119. 
140 Kenneth Mackay, The Yellow Wave. A Romance of the Asiatic Invasion of Australia (London, 1895), 352. 
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which emerged out of the hostilities of the other. Western discrimination towards Japan 
prompted a turn to pan-Asianism which exacerbated Western fears, accentuating ideas of 
Japan as the epitome of the yellow peril. This in turn posed a threat to Japan. Politician and 
scholar Kenchō Suematsu said of the matter how it was for Japan’s own good that it seek to 
counter this problem. In one of his articles he wrote: 
 
‘The so called doctrine of the yellow peril readily moves the hearts of Western 
peoples and is nowadays popular on the continent. If we do not combat this doctrine 
with all our power, there is a danger that European counties will actually join together 
against us. By attacking the yellow peril doctrine in all quarters, we shall prevent the 
combined interference of various European powers’.141 
 
Tokutomi echoed similar attitudes having written in an article published on 23 June 1893 
where he described how the white races were a constant presence in Japan: 
 
‘The present position of our country in the world is no different from that of forty 
years ago…. The most progressive, developed, civilised and powerful nation in the 
Orient still cannot escape the scorn of the white people’.142 
 
If Japan was to develop along the lines it wanted then this was something that needed to be 
addressed. Although it expressed cordial relations with Britain and to a lesser extent the 
United States, Japan remained apprehensive as to whom it could trust.143 With reserved 
attitudes towards these nations combined with an anxiousness regarding the Kaiser and his 
desire to open the umbrella of his new favourite term over any state where a fear of the East 
rained down, Suematsu directed his articles such as the one above at a number of European 
newspapers and periodicals.144 It suffices to say that Japan was becoming increasingly more 
conscious of race as being a key political issue, a point which Yumiko Iida has been keen to 
stress.145 Extreme sentiments began to be voiced by some Japanese on the issue of tackling 
what they saw as this white peril. Konoe Atsumaro wrote in Do jinshu domei how the 
presence of Western imperialists in China would inevitably lead to a conflict between East 
and West, the kind which fiction warned about: 
 
‘Asia will not be able to escape becoming a stage for racial war…. The final destiny 
of the world will be a war between the white and yellow races, in which both Chinese 
and Japanese will stand on the same side as the enemy of the white race…. Western 
                                                          
141 Quoted in Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 285. 
142 Quoted in Pierson, Tokutomi Sohō, 229. 
143 With regards to the United States many Japanese, particularly nationalists, pictured America’s imperial 
emergence in the Pacific as being part of the same phenomenon which witnessed European powers scramble for 
bases and concessions in China. See Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 61 
144 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 285-286. 
145 Yumiko Iida, ‘Fleeing the West, Making Asia Home: Transpositions of Otherness in Japanese Pan-Asianism, 
1905-1930’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 22:3 (1997), 415. 
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imperial powers compete in Asia for their own interests. Asia is Asia’s Asia…. It 
should only be Asians who make decisions on Asian issues’.146 
 
It was this kind of story which bred fear in Western circles, adding hype to the yellow peril 
emotions. These sentiments show how there was a desire to tackle this infringement into 
Asian affairs. Stories emerged and became prevalent in nationalist circles emphasising the 
need for the establishment of some kind of pan-Asianist policy. Yano Ryūkei’s novel 
Ukishiro monogatari took into account the strength of Japan and how they could overcome 
the West. Here he tells the story of a group of Japanese South Seas adventurers taking over 
the possession of a British warship and then setting sail to explore Africa.147 
At this point it is worth bringing to the foreground the fact that some in the West 
opposed any European or American influence which manipulated events or affairs in East 
Asia with the belief that things should unfold in their own natural way for fear of creating an 
area even more openly hostile towards the West. Leroy-Beaulieu wrote of how Japan was 
fearful of losing their independence, re-emphasising the threat of Russia: 
 
‘The Ministers of the Mikado are very naturally somewhat alarmed at the thought that 
their country may soon be the only one in the whole world inhabited by a non-
European race that maintains its independence, and they cannot forbear asking 
themselves how long this independence may be allowed to last, all the more so since 
Japan is in immediate contact with, numerically speaking, the most powerful state in 
the world, the Russian Empire, which borders upon China’.148 
 
Hyndman too wrote on reflection the existence of a white peril in the East which was of a 
greater hazard to the world than the yellow peril: 
 
‘We are inclined nowadays to take more account of the European invasion of Asia 
than of the Asian invasion of Europe. Yet the influence of the East upon the West and 
the far less powerful influence of the West upon the East have been going on for 
many, many centuries’. 
 
He went on to state that; 
  
                                                          
146 Translated as The Alliance of the Common Race, 1898. Quoted in Ibid, 416. Similarly American politician 
Roland Usher, wrote how pan-Asianist ideology constituted their policies and decision making: ‘The basic 
postulate of Japanese policy is the domination of Asia by Asiatics. The mere fact that the Japanese identify 
themselves with those Asiatics for whom dominion is intended must not conceal from us the true breadth and 
significance of Japanese policies. They see populous countries, for the most part untrained in European methods 
of organised warfare and therefore incapable of resisting even moderate measures of coercion from Europe, 
upon whose rich resources and underdeveloped markets the European has fixed his covetous eyes’. Roland G. 
Usher, The Challenge of the Future. A Study in American Foreign Policy (Boston and New York, 1916), 255. 
See also Kakuzo, The Ideals, 1-3. 
147 Translated as The Tale of the Floating Fortress. See Thomas Schnellbächer, ‘Has the Empire Sunk Yet? The 
Pacific in Japanese Science Fiction’, Science Fiction Studies, 29:3 (2002), 382. 
148 Leroy-Beaulieu, The Awakening, 168. 
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‘One of the shrewdest English observers who ever passed many years in the Far East 
gave it as his sober judgement that white men were fatal to Asiatics; that the good 
they could do was practically nothing; that the evil they wrought was incalculable; 
and that no Eastern State, if it considered the well-being of its people, would allow of 
the settlement of white men in its midst. Once there, it was impossible to deal with 
them effectively otherwise than by complete destruction. And to this rule there could 
be no exception. Sooner or later the white man must be crushed, if wholesale 
calamities were to be averted’.149 
 
Sentiments in Japan echo these points. This combined with Anglo-Saxonism and their views 
that it personified the peril alongside the feelings of Americans towards Japanese and 
Oriental emigration generally, contributing to this Asia for Asia attitude. 
East Asia had entered a new era which would see it play a more integral role in global 
events. Japan was developing as a force to be reckoned with and as historians have 
recognised this brought about the origins of Japanese-American estrangement. Iriye identified 
1898 as a sign of unavoidable conflict. ‘History’ he wrote, ‘was at last becoming global, the 
Eastern and Western hemispheres were joined together, and mankind was being moulded into 
one unit. The United States was a symbol of the new age. Having departed from its Monroe 
Doctrine, it had expanded into the Eastern hemisphere under the name Anglo-Saxonism. The 
taking of the Philippines just because a ship was sunk in Cuba was essentially no different, no 
less criminal, than Germany’s plundering of Kiaochow, or Russia’s and Britain’s taking of 
Port Arthur and Weihaiwei. All these seizures indicated the coming conflict of races’.150 
Roger Daniels asserts similar claims writing how the successes of 1898 resulted in the United 
States becoming ‘a player in Asian politics, which placed it on a collision course with Japan, 
and, later in the later twentieth century, led to three separate American wars in Asia’.151 With 
these changes and the feeling that the East was getting closer to the West it is not a 
misinterpretation of the evidence to state that a new era had begun in East Asia. British 
newspapers related this to Japan’s victory over China, the Daily News for example wring: 
 
‘All who have turned their thoughts to the question are agreed that the peace will have 
far-reaching, and, to some extent, incalculable consequences. For weal or woe, a new 
era has dawned in the East. The East… has been awakened to new life by the rude 
touch of Japan…. It is evident that Japan will necessarily be the dominant power in 
China’.152 
 
If Japan personified the yellow peril it must also exist as the personification of the new era 
with their military successes ranking alongside its social transformations and political 
victories. Sidney Gulick, a scholar and missionary who spent his time working to foster 
greater relations and knowledge of customs between Japan and America, wrote how the 
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Boxer Rebellion demonstrated these skills, with the alliance contributing to their changing 
attitudes towards the West.153 In addition to this an increasing interest in the East had seen it 
thrust into a world of commercial competition which brought about trade and economic 
benefits. But for Britain it signalled the beginning of their decline as its influence there began 
to diminish, unable to compete in an environment where two other nations were becoming 
increasingly more powerful. Thus Britain began to look for allies. Chamberlain was aware of 
the situation in the East with the Franco-Russian alliance meaning that any sort of action in 
the North China Seas was unthinkable owing to a French squadron stationed in Indochina. 
Furthermore as the partition of China began with Britain demanding the lease of Weihaiwei 
he was more aware than ever in the need for an ally in the East. He had only a few prospects: 
there was America, who did nothing but occupy the Philippines; the Japanese, who had 
favoured the partition of China from as early as 1895 with their own interests in mind; 
Russia, whose interests in East Asia were well known; and Germany, who in spite of the 
difficulties mentioned above and the fact that they possessed very minimal interests in China 
and focused solely on affairs in Europe, were near the top his list and were bombarded with 
proposals for an alliance. It was this conclusion that he came to which would bring about the 
origins of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.154 Where there was a newfound competition amongst 
nations for dominance and influence, for Britain there was competition and decision making 
to be done regarding whom to approach as their ally.  
China’s defeat, the Triple Intervention, the rise of American imperialism and with it 
the increasing presence of Anglo-Saxonism, and the Boxer Rebellion all contributed to the 
tumultuous affairs of events in the East with the beginnings of Japanese pre-eminence in the 
region which would continue to develop throughout the 1900s as we shall see in the 
following chapter. Following the intervention Japan embarked on a military revolution which 
lasted up to the Russo-Japanese War and would revolutionise their army and navy to make 
them the most significant indigenous nation in the East. This transformation made people in 
the West sit up and take note of East Asia as people began to compare the worlds of 
Orientalism and Occidentalism. Although the European presses were generally favourable 
towards Japan after 1895 with the view that victory did not make it a strong enough nation to 
compete with those of the West, anti-Japanese antagonisms developed. The most significant 
of these was Kaiser Wilhelm II’s coining of the term “yellow peril” which came to be used to 
epitomise the fear of an Asian expansion westwards of which Japan was to become the face 
as their growing presence as the West promoted racial stereotypes which appeared in fiction 
and monographs. This was in part a result of the rise in Anglo-Saxonism following the rise of 
the United States as an imperial power which served to heighten Anglo-American relations. 
Part of the reason for this was so that the United States had an effective means with which to 
defend their own interests as there was an increasing fear of Japanese immigration to the 
West Coast which saw attitudes towards the Chinese recycled as they were seen by 
Americans as the new threat to the American way of life. As it happened the legal exclusion 
of the Chinese subsequently saw an increased fear of the Japanese. Contrastingly there 
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existed in the East, as well as amongst few writers in the West, a white peril and the 
apprehensive fear of Western involvement there. American imperialism constituted part of 
this, resulting in estrangement between these two states competing for empire in the Pacific. 
All this combined to signal the changing of the guard in the East between China and Japan. 
Western views of this included either an admiration of Japan’s victory in 1895 or of fear and 
trepidation to which the intervention and expressions of the yellow peril corroborate. These 
are attitudes which only blossomed in this era and as we will come to see, the years following 
the Boxer Rebellion would bring about a more engrained mind-set amidst the West towards 
the early imperialist years of Meiji Japan. 
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Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: the Collapse of Russia and  
the Personification of Japan as the Yellow Peril 
 
 
 
 
 
‘… the significant thing is that, whatever this new empire arising out of the old has 
done, she has done well…. [T]he Japanese are a people quick to learn, and no national 
or local vanity has prevented them from recognising and correcting their own 
blunders. On w other hand, their successes have been too marked and noteworthy to 
be belittled or ignored’.155 
 
- Henry Codman Potter, The East of To-Day, 1902 
 
‘England and Japan have realised the dream of Alexander –– the marriage of the East 
and the West. No event recorded in English history is fraught with graver 
consequences to the Anglo-Saxon race and to humanity at large than the alliance of 
England and Japan. Europe, at the insistence of Germany, has begun to look on 
England, the former champion of freedom, as a bad European; and, indeed, the 
definite contract entered into between King Edward VII and the Mikado to call on 
each other’s fleets and troops to come to the assistance of either in case of attack by a 
third Power is partial justification for the charge’.156 
 
- Coloniensis, ‘The Seamy Side of the Alliance’, 1905 
 
‘… one may hesitate to express confident opinions about “the Japanese”, for the 
people are no longer seen en masse, and among individuals there are differences as 
among ourselves. We are often asked, “Do you like the Japanese?” and the answer can 
be only, “Yes and no”. Who can answer such questions in truthful generalisations? 
How we differ in our judgements of Western nations, and how insufficient on all 
cases are our data as we attempt on the basis of our narrow experience to describe the 
characteristics of a people!’157 
 
- George William Knox, Imperial Japan, 1905 
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If victory over China in 1895 marked the beginning of Meiji Japan’s early imperialism, then 
their success over Russia in 1905 must be regarded as a far greater, significant, and definitive 
watershed moment. A catalyst for future expansion, this moment can be seen as one of the 
biggest success of the Meiji government as Japan’s future would thenceforth be changed 
forever. Indisputably the collapse of Russia left Japan as the leading indigenous power in 
East Asia with only the United States and their territories in the Pacific being the primary 
obstruction to any future plans for development. But it was not merely the conquering of an 
imperial power which strengthened Japan’s status. In the years following the Boxer Rebellion 
Japan became increasingly closer to Britain through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its 
subsequent renewal, and succeeded in maintaining cordial relations with the United States up 
to the end of the Russo-Japanese War.158 It is this period which formulates this chapter with 
the themes previously presented being further examined as Japan’s influence took on new 
strides. Whereas the Treaty of Shimonoseki was swiftly followed by the Triple Intervention 
and the retrocession of territorial gains, the Treaty of Portsmouth was followed by no such 
qualms.159 Although these negotiations can be seen as being overtly favourable to Russia, the 
fact remains that Japan had shown that they could rebuff any challenge posed to them in the 
East, their army and navy continuing to grow from strength to strength, their might becoming 
increasingly more apparent throughout the 1900s. 
In this period Japan was more alike Western nations than ever before, developing in 
terms of commerce, trade and military as it sought further parity. Image five provides an 
interesting comparison of Japanese and Russian soldiers, showing that there is very little to 
distinguish between them and that they could easily be mistaken as a Western nation having 
successfully developed to the point of assimilation following their emulation and 
Westernisation. As Henry Potter in the opening epigraph to this chapter states they could no 
longer be ignored. Indeed people now began to identify Japan as a global power: 
 
‘The Japanese are a first-class Power; there is nothing funny about their army, or their 
navy, or their politics. Their great national institutions are desperately in earnest, 
because from the moment they were conscious that they were a first-class Power they 
have been conscious that they may be called upon to make a life-and-death struggle 
for their existence’.160 
 
Others have written in a similar ilk: 
 
‘Quaint and playful Japan has developed into a giant able to handle the hugest 
implements of modern warfare with unsurpassed skill. She is there, as the coming  
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world-power, claiming her right as the cannon’s mouth to a predominant voice in the 
settlement of China’.161 
 
Japan had gone a step further than in the previous decade, its rise fuelling China’s decline and 
their own ascendancy. With this came the notion that Japan must be treated with seriousness, 
a point which Donald Lammers has made clear by arguing that the Japan of the 1900s was 
Asia’s symbol of progress: ‘unlike so any of the putatively passive societies of Hither Asia, 
whose golden age of achievement lay buried in the past, Japan was unmistakably growing in 
power; it was already the “Britain (or Prussia) of the Pacific”; even, in some formulations, the  
 
 
                                                          
161 Michael J. F. McCarthy, The Coming Power. A Contemporary History of the Far East, 1898-1905 (London, 
1905), xiv. 
IMAGE FIVE: Watanabe Nobukazu, Illustration of Russian and Japanese Army and Navy Officers 
(February 1904). 
 
Source: Available online at MIT Visualizing Cultures. 
URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 
January 2015). 
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TABLE FOUR: A Comparative Growth of Japan’s Development in the  
Years 1894 and 1904 
 1894 1904 
Population 41,000,000 46,000,000 
Business companies 4,595 8,612 
Business capital $ 309,000,000 $ 613,000,000 
Capital of banks $ 56,000,000 $ 270,000,000 
Foreign trade $ 115,000,000 $ 393,000,000 
Government income $ 49,000,000 $ 125,000,000 
Money in circulation $ 138,000,000 $ 296,000,000 
Deposits in saving banks $ 146,000,000 $ 1,494,000,000 
Clearing house accounts of 
the four main cities 
$ 126,000,000 $ 1,793,000,000 
Oil business $ 5,000,000 $ 16,000,000 
 
Tonnage of Steamships 120,000 715,000 
“       “ Sailing ships 45,000 340,000 
“       “ Navy 65,000 275,000 
Miles of railway 1,500 5,600 
Source: Sydney Lewis Gulick, The White Peril in the Far East. An Interpretation of the Significance of the 
Russo-Japanese War (London and New York, 1905), 125. 
 
 
 
 
 
nation of the future”’.162 Arthur Diósy wrote on this topic in 1904 stating how its 
amelioration was reaching its climax:  
 
‘For a quarter of a century the sun of New Japan had been steadily rising over the 
horizon, while China continued to sink deeper and deeper into the slough or 
corruption, losing one tributary state after another through the incompetence and 
venality of her officials, the inefficiency of her diplomatists, and the contemptible 
weakness of her forces’.163 
 
Some went further than this and stated how Japan’s successes saw them become more 
appealing as an ally who possessed the capacity to rebuff any displays of aggression.164 
Japan’s progress had undoubtedly reached new heights. Even before their victory over Russia 
                                                          
162 D. N. Lammers, ‘Taking Japan Seriously. Some Western Literary Portrayals of the Japanese During the 
Climax of their National Self-Assertion c.1905-1945’, in Robin W. Winks and James R. Rush (eds.), Asia in 
Western Fiction (Manchester, 1990), 200. 
163 Diósy, The New, 11. 
164 See for example Dyer, Dai Nippon, 388. 
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IMAGE SIX: Nitei, Harbour Entrance of Port Arthur: Russian Flagship Sinking at Port Arthur (1904). 
 
Source: Available online at MIT Visualizing Cultures. 
URL: < http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 
January 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
IMAGE SEVEN: Shinohara Kiyooki, A Righteous War to Chastise the Russians: The Night Attack of the 
Destroyer Force (December, 1904). 
 
Source: Available online at MIT Visualizing Cultures. 
URL: <  http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/throwing_off_asia_03/toa_essay02.html > (accessed 6 
January 2015). 
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Japan could be regarded as the leading nation in the East but to any who raised objections or 
showed reluctance towards this statement the Russo-Japanese War had a great effect in 
manipulating public opinion.  
A great deal of truth resides in the statement that Japan’s progress in the decade since 
their victory over China saw them reach new heights with table four demonstrating the 
developments Japan made in terms of commerce, economy and military which experienced 
dramatic levels of progress and development. Within a decade business capital increased by 
more than forty-nine percent, government income by sixty percent, foreign trade by seventy 
percent, and the capital of banks by seventy-nine percent. Additionally the tonnage of the 
navy increased by more than seventy-six percent, and the miles of railway laid down in Japan 
by more than seventy-three percent, further highlighting the development of the military and 
the efficiency in the transportation of troops and equipment. Regarding military development 
the Meiji government continued to place a strong emphasis on the navy. An editorial in the 
Kokumin shimbun of 25 October 1905 compared Japan to Britain and stressed the importance 
of maintaining a strong navy. It stated how ‘seawater is in the lifeblood of the nation’ and 
expressed the view that ‘nothing can be obtained without paying a price, and the importance 
of this truth is nowhere greater than the navy on which pivots our nation’s rise or fall’.165 
Japanese propaganda during the Russo-Japanese War emphasised the strength of their navy, 
as shown in the woodblock print by Nitei in image six and by Shinohara Kiyooki in image 
seven which show the demise of Russian ships. Regarding military progress more generally, 
one may look at the work of the British Japanologist and scholar who came to be professor of 
Japanese at Tokyo University, Basil Hall Chamberlain. His publication Things Japanese was 
released in the closing months of the war and details the significance of patriotism and its role 
in gaining dominance over Russia: 
 
‘In less than two months from its inception, the Japanese established their superiority 
in the handling of modern vessels, in gunnery, in tactics, in everything that makes for 
efficiency. Now, after six months, little remains of their opponents’ fleet but disabled 
hulks, while the exploits of Admiral Tōgō and his brave subordinates will live on in 
the memory of future generations’.166 
 
This is further stressed by Patrick Porter who writes how the British military observing Japan 
throughout the war regarded it ‘as an audit of two warring cultures, an arbitrator of their 
contrasting values and viability as civilisations’, placing a spotlight on military dominance 
which came subsequent to their rendering of social and political cohesion.167 Alfred Stead 
emphasises the combination of these forces in the Russo-Japanese War and the significance 
of their victory: 
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‘When the flag of the Rising Sun rose upon the forts of Port Arthur, the sun of 
Russia’s Asiatic empire sank in blood-red glory, and the Far Eastern peoples had 
demonstrated their right to decide the fate of Far Eastern lands. And far more than 
that, a new world Power had thrust itself upon the world in a manner not to be 
ignored…. The Cinderella of ten years ago had become the proud princess of to-
day…. No longer can the white races of Europe sit above the salt while the nations of 
Asia sit below. Japan, a brown race, a nation of Asia, has demonstrated her right to sit 
above, and, as she has done so by the force of arms’.168 
 
It is from views such as this where the idea that the Japanese possessed the right character 
which set them apart from other Asiatics began to emanate, allowing for progress to take 
shape. Henry Dyer writes about this point and is worth quoting at length: 
 
‘If I were attempting to sum up briefly the qualities of the Japanese which has enabled 
them to make such wonderful developments in such a short time, I would mention as 
the most important factor the intense loyalty of the people, which compels them to 
make any sacrifice – even life itself – when they consider it necessary for the honour 
of their country. This, combined with their great intellectual ability, enables them to 
take full advantage of the modern science and organisation necessary for the 
attainment of the objects of their ambition. Their great power of foresight prepares 
them for all their enterprises, both of peace and war, with an exact and scientific 
prevision not excelled by any other nation. While they are permeated by Eastern ideas  
they have been able to appropriate much that is best in Western thought, and thus they 
unite many of the best qualities of the East and the West’.169 
 
Further asserting this point of view was the notion that Japanese patriotism fuelled their 
desire for change, continued Westernisation, and expansion setting them further apart from 
other nations.170 Japan could thenceforth be seen with complete legitimacy as being the 
Western state in the East, their position in world affairs parallel to that of Britain or 
America’s, but their neighbours being the likes of China and Korea whose positions were 
paltry in comparison. 
Questions on Japan’s status as an Asian nation now emerged with some viewing them 
as more of a state who was leaving Asia as opposed to guiding it forward. George Knox for 
example, wrote how times had changed to the extent that the Japan could be incorporated into 
the clique of the white nations: 
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IMAGE EIGHT: Kindness to a Fallen Foe: A Japanese Solider Giving a Wounded Russian Refreshment and 
Cigarettes. 
 
Source: The Illustrated London News, 27 August 1904. 
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‘… the Japanese think earnestly… of their position among the nations; and they 
render us a service as they prove that the earth is not the exclusive possession of the 
white man, and show themselves worthy to be classed with the most advanced nations 
in science, in art, in enlightenment, and in war. They are not curiosities, to be prized 
for their novelties, nor are they inferiors to be patronised and governed; but they are 
men of like passions with ourselves, to be feared as foes, loved as friends, and to bear 
their part in the great task which was given to men in the beginning – “To subdue the 
earth” and make it the fit abode for enlightenment, truth, justice, beauty, and 
peace’.171 
 
Japan had traditionally been viewed as a barbaric nation possessing customs frequently 
scorned upon by Westerners who believed that there was no reason for them to be present in 
a changing world. By 1905 however, some began to look through this facemask where a 
compassionate side hitherto unknown can be seen to have materialized. Sydney Gulick talks 
of the humane treatment of the Japanese on Russian prisoners, underlining how they were 
treated in a contrasting manner to the stereotypical barbarism held in the West towards those 
in the East. To provide a specific example Gulick writes how a group of fifteen Russian 
prisoners appreciated the good will of the Japanese to the extent that they wrote an appeal to 
the emperor pleading with him that come the end of the war and their release from 
incarceration, that they be permitted to remain in Japan and become Japanese subjects. This 
letter was translated and published in the local presses, and was greeted with esteemed 
satisfaction.172 This can also be viewed in image eight which shows an injured Russian 
soldier being cared for by their conquerors.173 It is not surprising that the idea of Japan 
becoming increasingly more Western began to emerge. As we have already seen Dyer 
identified Japan as the “Britain of the East”, and other writers can be seen to take a similar 
approach. Diósy writes of how Japan’s destiny revolved around the possession of a strong 
and powerful navy, something which for centuries had transcended Britain’s position in the 
world. Japan was to become the next domineering sea power, alongside which it would 
possess a military with high levels of efficiency and patriotic spirit – a combination which 
would allow them to crush any opponent. Furthermore their active and thriving industry 
mixed with a strong commerce and economy would bring in a massive influx of capital from 
abroad, and fuel developments in natural resources and advances in the sciences, 
strengthening its ship-building industry and the carrying of trade – ‘in short, Japan powerful, 
prosperous, progressive, and rich – the Great Britain of the East!’.174 Dyer however, provides 
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a more personal recollection of the Japanese and their desire to achieve such lofty heights 
which I shall provide here: 
 
 ‘When I arrived in Japan (in 1873) the highest ambition of all the officials with whom 
I came into contact, and also of my own students, was that their country might 
become the Britain of the East, and they not infrequently got laughed at by foreigners 
for what considered their conceit. During the thirty years which have elapsed since 
that time they have kept their ideal steadily in view, and few will deny that they have 
gone a long way towards its realisation’. 
 
He goes on further to write: 
 
‘So far as I have been able to judge from the utterances of her statesmen, from the 
opinions expressed by the press and the general ideas of the people, the Japanese have 
no higher ambition than that their country should become the Britain of the East, 
resting secure in her own strength, but with no wish for territorial expansion in other 
parts of the world’.175 
 
Japanese Westernisation can thus be seen to have separated them from the rest of Asia. As it 
continued to develop the rest of Asia stood idly by as Japan’s relations with the West 
blossomed into something ground-breaking as they were treated with a greater degree of 
parity. 
As the previous chapter highlighted there was no other nation Japan sought to 
establish friendly relations with than the world’s leading naval power, their mutual interests 
becoming more closely aligned in the immediate years after 1900. In Britain there was a view 
that Japan was different to other Asiatics. Their victory over China stood as an indication of 
this and people began to write of the distinguishing characteristics of the Japanese with 
anthropological disciplines increasing in popularity. One renowned craniologist said how he 
had never found traces of a more extensive miscegenation than with the Japanese: 
 
‘There is scarcely a race which has not contributed to make the Japanese nation, the 
Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Malay, and even, in the south, a slight tinge of Negrito 
from the islands of the Pacific’.176  
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Similar phrenological approaches can be found elsewhere. As one British periodical wrote 
when looking at the East and West: 
 
‘Ethnologists tell us that the Jap, this remarkable islander, possesses a cranial feature, 
the os japonicum, which differentiates him not only from the European, but also from 
the remainder of the Oriental races, and certainly he has lately shown a wonderful 
facility for the adoption of new ideas, whenever such seem good to him, without the 
hesitancy and delay which often precede their adoption in the West’.177 
 
Comparable attitudes can also be found on the other side of the Atlantic through Japan’s 
participation in the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904 which witnessed a display of 
ethnological exhibits. One of which displayed Ainu, the indigenous people of Japan who had 
been labelled as a dying race following the Meiji Restoration as their numbers decreased, 
who provided many points of discussion for anthropologists with regards to their place in the 
world’s racial hierarchy.178 The rapid transformation of affairs in East Asia and with it the 
changing perceptions of Japan, brought about these tendencies as views moved towards the 
affirmative. As Catharina Blomberg has written it was these military successes in the 1890s 
and 1900s brought about this change as ‘the Western view of Japan as a land of simpering, 
pigeon-toed geisha twirling their parasols under blossoming cherry trees changed 
dramatically, and those powers which viewed the expansionist tendencies of Russia with 
unease expressed admiration of “brave little Japan”, so unlike chaotic China’.179 Britain was 
no exception to this with Gordon Daniels writing on the changing perceptions taking shape in 
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Rydell, John E. Findling, and Kimberly D. Pelle, Fair America. World’s Fairs in the United States 
(Washington, 2000), 55-57. For more on the Louisiana Purchase Exposition see Robert W. Rydell, All the 
World’s Fair. Visions of Empire at American International Expositions, 1876-1916 (Chicago, 1984), 154-183. 
For a look specifically at the Ainu in Meiji Japan see David L. Howell, ‘Ainu Ethnicity and the Boundaries of 
the Early Modern Japanese State’, Past and Present, 142 (1994), 69-93; David L. Howell, ‘The Meiji State and 
Logic of Ainu “Protection”’, in Helen Hardacre and Adam L. Kern (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Meiji 
Japan (Leiden, 1997), 612-634; Yamada Takako, ‘Anthropological Studies of the Ainu in Japan: Past and 
Present’, Japanese Review of Cultural Anthropology, 4 (2003), 75-106. 
179 Catharina Blomberg, ‘Isles of Gold or Police State – the Western View of Japan from Marco Polo to the 
Present’, in Koyoko Koma (ed.), Image of Japan in Europe. Material of International Conference “Image of 
Japan in Europe” Held On 13-14 October 2007 at Vytautas Magnus University Japanese Studies Centre 
(Kanaus, 2008), 63. 
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there, attesting how they ‘have been moulded and remoulded by complex and rapidly 
changing circumstances. The transformation of Japan and the transformation of Britain have 
shaped both realities and perceptions, while government cultural policies, developments in 
communications, and the spread of popular education have all been potent influences on 
Britain’s ideas’.180 British approaches towards Japan in the 1900s had distanced themselves 
from the changing attitudes which had taken place in the decade previous as Anglo-Japanese 
relations continued to blossom. 
The pinnacle of these relations at the beginning of the twentieth century was the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Prior to engaging in an examination of this agreement I will firstly 
mention relations on a more general scale which were typically of a cordial nature as the two 
grew closer together. Japanese historian and author Kanichi Azakawa wrote just this: 
 
‘If there ever was a need of an agreement with the rising Power of the Orient, it had 
probably been never more keenly felt by the British government than in the last part 
of the year 1901. Side by side with these favourable circumstances for an 
understanding, the student should not for a moment lose from sight two fundamental 
conditions which drew together, not only the governments, but also the people, of 
Great Britain and Japan with mutual attraction’.181 
 
A new era of friendly relations between the two had begun following the Boxer Rebellion as 
ideas of a formal alliance with the United States began to fade from the political agenda in 
Britain. It was because of this that they got closer to Japan as the appeal of joining forces 
with East Asia’s most powerful nation was near impossible to refuse. Japan had now become 
of ‘marriageable age’.182 Through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Britain became the first 
Western power to formally approach Japan with both nations sharing common aims regarding 
peace in East Asia. As W. T. A. Barber wrote on these commonalities: 
 
‘At present England’s interests are clearly the same as hers, and we may rejoice, if our 
ally of to-day come through this baptism of fire without hurt to us, that she may be 
our ally for many years to ensure the peaceful freedom of the commerce and 
development of the distant East’.183 
                                                          
180 Gordon Daniels, ‘Elites, Governments and Citizens: Some British Perceptions of Japan, 1850-2000’, in 
Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000. Volume 5: 
Social and Cultural Perspectives (Basingstoke, 2002), 3. For a more detailed outlook of Anglo-Japanese 
relations in the Victorian era see William G. Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858 
(London, 1951). 
181 K. Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict. Its Causes and Issues (Boston and New York, 1904), 201. Paul 
Reinsch also speaks of the friendly nature between Britain and Japan at this time writing how they were ‘on the 
whole friendly and favourable to active cooperation in the affairs of the far Orient’. A new era of friendly 
relations between Britain and Japan had begun following the Boxer Rebellion where Britain has failed in 
securing a formal alliance with the United States. This stood as a reason why Britain got closer to Japan with 
any hesitation on engaging in a formal alliance quickly deteriorating as the appeal of joining forces with East 
Asia’s most powerful nation was near impossible to refuse. See Reinsch, World Politics, 180-181. 
182 Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 95. 
183 W. T. A. Barber, ‘The Coming of Age of Japan’, London Quarterly Review, October 1904. 
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For Britain this represented the ‘strategic umbrella’ of their foreign policy in its quest to 
defend their own interests in the Middle Kingdom, but for Japan some have regarded the 
alliance as a stepping stone in manoeuvring of their own imperialism.184 
Being the first union between an Eastern and Western nation where the two were on 
an equal footing stands as the most significant outcome of this agreement. Some scholars 
have regarded it as a somewhat inevitable result of their growing closeness.185 These 
sentiments are also evident in primary material. On this significance John Solano writes how 
the communication between Britain and Japan was amongst the most effective acts of 
diplomacy to greet the status-quo of East Asia: 
 
‘The pen, through the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, has forged the mightiest weapon of 
war which the world has ever known. It has ranged together, in concert of action, 
irresistible powers of sea and land. The greatest and most powerful navy, with an 
attendant host of transports, brings the whole earth within the reach of the strongest 
and most efficient army. Two little islands, set half the world apart to East and West 
against the coasts of the largest continent, have stretched a link of steel across it, 
which not only secures their common interests against the menace of a common 
danger, but, at the same time, safeguards the peace of nations fort the benefit of all 
humanity’.186 
 
Azakawa identified how the alliance was a rare and unique product of history, owing to its 
bringing together of East and West, strengthening the relationship between these two worlds: 
 
‘seldom seen in history, especially when it is considered that it united reciprocally two 
nations widely apart in race, religion, and history, one of which had rarely entered into 
a regular alliance with even a European power’.187 
                                                          
184 T. G. Otte, ‘The Fragmenting of the Old World Order. Britain, the Great Powers, and the War’, in Rotem 
Kowner (ed.), The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War (Abingdon, 1997), 93. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, 
77. 
185 Dyer is perhaps the most vociferous of those around at the time of the alliance highlighting this inevitability: 
‘As Great Britain was the first Foreign Power to recognise the freedom of Japan from foreign jurisdiction, she 
was also the first to follow up that by a treaty of alliance which bound the Britain of the East to that of the West 
with more than the ties of diplomatic friendship. The advisability of such an alliance had been gradually 
impressing itself on the minds both of British and Japanese statesmen as a very natural result of the political 
developments which had taken place in the Far East’. Dyer, Dai Nippon, 329. 
186 E. John Solano, ‘The World Influence of Britain and Japan’, The Monthly Review, 21:32 (1905), 11. I would 
also refer the reader to the article written by American Senator Johnathan Dolliver where he states that the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance brought ‘the whole world to its senses’ in a way hitherto unmatched. Johnathan P. 
Dolliver, ‘Significance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, The North American Review, 174:546 (1902), 603. 
187 Azakawa, The Russo-Japanese, 202. At this point I will bring to the reader’s attention the influence of a 
prominent Japanese, the Foreign Minister of the Meiji government and former ambassador to Great Britain Aoki 
Shūzō. Ian Nish has brought to light his significance by detailing his ability to influence the foreign presses and 
public opinion as well as his ability to build and formulate friendly relationships. This along with his experience 
of European courts and skill at diplomacy permitted him to influence sentiment of the British towards Japan. 
‘Aoki’s place in Anglo-Japanese relations’ concludes Nish, ‘was historically significant. At many crucial 
- 68 - 
 
 
On this note it is perhaps worth underlining the fact that this agreement was of greater 
significance to Japan than it was to Britain.188 Irrespectively however, it brought together the 
East and West in a way which had hitherto never before been worthy of consideration, and 
was only worth mentioning when Japan began to show itself in an imperial gaze. With this 
they began to be seen as a nation with a ‘large share of Anglo-Saxon virility’ whilst equally 
‘imbued in Eastern thought’ with philosophies powerful enough to ‘profoundly affect social 
and political conditions’. Dyer concluded the following: 
 
‘It will be interesting to watch how far the Britain of the East is in alliance with the 
Britain of the West, not only for political purposes, but also how far the two Powers 
are able to co-operate in the solution of the most important problems which lie in the 
future, and thus promote the highest welfare of the human race’.189 
 
Should the two be able to cooperate then the potential which the alliance brought with it was 
unwavering, perhaps a stepping stone towards the two gaining near total control of the seas. 
With Japan’s mix of ‘pluck, determination, and endurance, and with a rapidly growing 
knowledge of modern warfare and its methods’, Stafford Ransome has stated how Britain 
could not want anything more than an ally who held equally ambitious naval plans: 
 
‘Together, as far as naval warfare is concerned, England and Japan could at the 
present day hold the position against all corners; and the interests and authority of 
these two countries could be maintained entirely by means of naval welfare. Neither 
wishes to acquire territory in Russia or in Central China, and, in the event of war, 
their energies could consequently be entirely devoted to dealing with the ships and 
holding the coast-line of the enemy. In fact, as matters now stand, Japan and England 
could, by playing a somewhat waiting game after hostilities had begun, bring about a  
 
                                                          
junctures, he seems to be pointing the way to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Although his residence in London 
was comparatively short, he did affect relations beneficially in 1894. For twenty-five years the in the Meiji 
period, Britain had not appeared to be an obstacle among the powers. Yet Britain was the big fish who had to be 
caught if Japan was to win back her international self-respect. And Aoki was the lucky fisherman’. Ian Nish, 
‘Aoki Shūzō (1844-1914)’, in J. E. Hoare (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume 3 
(Richmond, 1999), 137, 143. 
188 Part of the reason for this is that Japan believed that this alliance countered the threat of Russia whose 
ambitions for expansion into Asia were made aware in the previous chapter. Shigénobu Ōkuma wrote how this 
agreement was made with the primary purpose of defending British and Japanese interests by providing them 
with written testament to ‘preserve permanently the integrity of China and Korea against the Muscovite 
Empire’. Ōkuma, Fifty Years, 116. Documents in the British Foreign Office papers echo these viewpoints: 
‘Their [Japan’s] main object in entering into such a contract is to make it plain to Russian that she must keep her 
hands off that country. Japan will, in my belief, never accept a stipulation that she is not to be allowed to take, 
without our permission, measures which we might regard as provocative, but which she would defend upon the 
ground that they were forced upon her by the conduct of Russia’. FO 46/560. Anglo-Japanese Agreement by 
Lord Lansdowne, 1 January 1902. 
189 Dyer, Dai Nippon, 402-403. 
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 TABLE FIVE: Estimates of Battleship Tonnage of the  
Major Powers as of 1902 
Britain 561,900 Italy 124,153 
France 246,096 United States 119,120 
Russia 193,311 Germany 115,968 
Japan 129,715   
Source: Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement. Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911 (Cambridge, MA., 
1972), 83. 
 
 
 
 
 
coal famine which would cripple the whole of their opponents, including Russia, if 
the season of the year were well chosen’.190 
 
This is further emphasised by table five which shows how Britain held an overwhelming 
influence whilst Japan possessed the fourth most powerful navy. Should the two be combined 
then it would take an alliance of a far greater magnitude than France, Russia and Germany to 
challenge this naval supremacy. To even pose a challenge it would require the incorporation 
of either Italy or the United States into the coalition seen in 1895, a union which would not 
have been forth coming. A perfect example of the pen being mightier than the sword, the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance is symbolic of the East and West forging a closer relationship. 
Although the endeavours of American imperialism can be seen to have brought these two 
worlds closer together as each stood on the others doorstep, the 1902 agreement showed that 
two such distinct worlds could operate bot amicability and diplomacy.  
One can imagine the delight which spread throughout Japan where people believed 
that joining with the world’s indisputable leading power affirmed their global status. 
Tokutomi Sohō expressed how a formal pact with ‘the greatest naval power in the world’ was 
a consequence of Japan’s newfound standing in East Asia: ‘it is precisely because we are 
strong that England sought an alliance with us’. He used this as reason why Japan should 
continue with its policy of imperial expansion.191 For Japan it held a profound diplomatic 
significance in their foreign relations. Kenneth Brown writes how it stood as the formal 
recognition of Japan’s progress and of their ambitions to achieving great power status which 
thenceforth could only continue to develop.192 Murashima Shigeru has stated how this ‘was 
an epoch-making period for the Japanese. They had achieved their diplomatic and defence 
aims, albeit insufficiently, since the Meiji Restoration as a result of treaty revision in 1894 
and victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and had established a modern state. They now 
stood on an equal footing with the Western powers, and their external activities were of great 
                                                          
190 Ransome, Japan in Transition, 248-249. 
191 Quoted in Pierson, Tokutomi, 275. 
192 Brown, Britain and Japan, 1-2. See also Colin Holmes and A. H. Ion, ‘Bushidō and the Samurai: Images in 
British Public Opinion, 1894-1914’, Modern Asian Studies, 14:2 (1980), 315. 
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importance in the international arena’.193 It had brought about the idea of a Eurocentric 
civilisation coming to an end.194 
Many Britons also approved of this relationship and commended the government for 
approving the agreement.  Members of the Shirley Ward Conservative Association for 
example, wrote to Lord Lansdowne how they; 
 
‘desire[d] to forward to you an expression of our high appreciation of the 
Statesmanship you have shown in the recent treaty with Japan, which ensures the 
consolidation to maintenance of a general peace in Eastern Asia, particularly 
safeguarding our Indian Empire, thereby enabling the Government of that Country to 
devote all their energy to fostering, and developing, internal industrial and agricultural 
matters, for the benefit of millions of our fellow subjects. 
 We also hope that this clear understanding with regard to Asia, will greatly 
tend towards the maintenance of peace in Europe, and help to build up by 
international community of industrial interests, a better understanding, based upon 
mutual respect, for the rights of each other’.195 
 
For Britain the alliance had profound diplomatic importance, marking the culminating point 
where relations between Britain and Japan split from other European powers such as 
Germany, France and Russia who held a vested interest in the East.196 With this agreement 
Britain could now able to delegate the defence of their dominions and interests to Japan. At 
the turn of the century Britain had thirty-eight battleships and cruisers stationed in the East, 
and by the end of the decade this number had been halved and was continuing to fall.197 That 
they did not have to invest as much money into maintaining a fleet in East Asia stood as a 
reason why the alliance met approval, The Times stressing the need for an ally there: ‘It was 
only half recognised before the Boer War that the protection of British interests in the Far 
East made it necessary to secure an Eastern ally. The need became increasingly insistent as 
                                                          
193 Murashima Shigeru, ‘The Opening of the Twentieth Century and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1895-1923’, 
in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations. Volume 1: The Political-
Diplomatic Dimension, 1600-1930 (Basingstoke, 2000), 159. 
194 Giffard, Japan, 25-26. 
195 FO 46/603. Letters from Members of the Shirley Ward Conservative Association to Lord Lansdowne, 13 
October 1905. 
196 This echoes similarity to the Triple Intervention where the development of two groups in East Asia emerged, 
one consisting of France and Russia and the other Britain and Japan, with Germany mediating between the two 
groups siding with France and Russia on all political issues, and with Britain on things financial. See Nish, The 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 36-37. In a similar vein Kaiser Wilhelm II persisted in voicing concern over the 
yellow peril and the threat which Japan brought. In a letter to Tsar Nicholas II he wrote of how a Japanese 
legation has been sent to reorganise the Chinese army and how they would seize this opportunity to us the 
Chinese army now at their disposal to expel all other foreigners. Letter XXVI (from the Kaiser to the Tsar), 2 
September 1902, in Isaac Don Levine, Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar, Copied From the Government 
Archives in Petrograd Unpublished Before 1920; Private Letters From the Kaiser to the Czar Found in a Chest 
After the Czar’s Execution and now in the Hands of the Soviet Government (New York, 1920), 84-87. 
197 Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan 1911-15. A Study of British Far Eastern Policy (London, 1969), 17-18. 
For a more general look at the diplomatic significance of the alliance for Britain I would refer the reader to 
section 5 of Anthony Best’s article ‘Race, Monarchy’, 177-179. 
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the war lasted. Salisbury had tried and had failed to come to terms with Russia. For three 
years Chirol had watched the British government consistently weakening in the face of 
Russian pressure. No attempt to bring in Germany as a counter-weight could, as he 
understood, succeed, for she would never alienate Russia by opposing her in China. The 
Yangtze Treaty of 1900 was a warning’.198 Joseph Chamberlain spoke of this point stating 
how Japan were the best means of defending British interests in the East: 
 
‘[The Japanese] are rapidly increasing their means of offence and defence, and in 
many contingencies they would be valuable Allies. They are at this moment much 
inclined to us and, being very sensitive, would appreciate any advance made to them. 
If we decide to take anything and were to inform them beforehand, I imagine that we 
should be sure of their support. I do not suppose that a Treaty of Alliance would be 
desirable, but I should hope that an understanding might be arrived at which would be 
very useful. In any case they are worth looking after as it is clear that they do not 
mean to be a quantité négligeable in the East’.199 
 
Hostilities between Britain and Japan were virtually non-existent as many were content to see 
the alliance unfold. Following the Russo-Japanese War and its renewal in September 1905, 
there was equal enthusiasm amongst Britons to continue friendly relations. The Times 
published a speech by Sir Edward Grey which said that no one doubted the obligation of 
maintaining the ties created with Japan, a view which gained support amongst conservatives 
and liberals.200 This political approach can also be found on a social level as many believed 
                                                          
198 The History of The Times, 373. At this point I would stress the influence of Valentine Chirol who was 
regarded as an expert on foreign relations, possessing access to the foreign secretary as well as other senior 
officials in the Foreign Office. American President Theodore Roosevelt invited him to Washington in 1905 and 
spoke of him as the godfather of the alliance and the primary catalyst for its inception. Roosevelt saluted him on 
this issue and stressed his importance. See the following publications of Valentine Chirol: Far Eastern and Fifty 
Years in a Changing World (London, 1929), 208-209. See also Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 12, 368. It is 
worth bringing to light however the fact that Chirol was not the only person to have a high level of influence in 
orchestrating the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Renowned diplomat and military officer Colonel Sir Claude 
MacDonald, known best for his service in China and Japan cannot go amiss. His services have been widely 
acknowledged as pioneering. For his role in Anglo-Japanese relations and the 1902 alliance there is no better 
work than that of Ian Nish and his article, ‘Sir Claude and Lady Ethel MacDonald’, in Ian Nish (ed.), Britain 
and Japan: Biographical Portraits. Volume One (Folkestone, 1994), 133-145. See also Sir Hugh Cortazzi, 
‘Royal Visits to Japan in the Meiji Period, 1868-1912’, in Ian Nish (ed.), Britain and Japan: Biographical 
Portraits. Volume 2 (Folkestone, 1994), 79-93. 
199 Quoted in Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 64.  
200 The Times, 1 June 1905. Other conservative newspapers such as the Glasgow Herald and Birmingham Post 
as well as periodicals such as the Spectator and the National Review welcomed it by stressing the maintenance 
of cordial and friendly relations. See Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 343-344. The Monthly Review 
published two parallel articles on the alliance’s renewal. One entitled ‘The Seamy Side of the Alliance’ looked 
at the agreement being an example of Britain’s decadence whereas the other entitled held a contrasting view. 
See Coloniensis, ‘The Seamy Side’, 1-10 and Solano, ‘The World Influence’, 11-37. I would also refer the 
reader to Pro Patria, ‘England’s Decadence, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty’, Contemporary Review, 88 (1905), 703-
707. Attitudes in Japan were generally enthusiastic after 1905 as leaders felt that Britain was a reliable ally who 
could be called upon if and when she was needed. Russia was regarded with great contempt whilst relations with 
the United States were strained because of their intervention in Manchuria and anti-Japanese sentiment on 
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that that its renewal ensured the maintenance of a force in East Asia which was vastly 
superior to that of any European power.201 To provide a specific example, imperialist 
politician Richard Haldane on one occasion urged an undergraduate audience to pay less 
attention to sport and to take encouragement and motivation from the fierceness and 
devotedness to the principles and practices of discipline which had led to Japanese victory at 
the battles of Liaoyang and Mukden.202 In spite of these feelings however, there remained 
scepticism towards the alliance. 
Although the benefits which it brought with it were widely known some in Britain 
remained cautious, a sense of untrustworthiness present towards its initial inception and of its 
renewal. In 1902 some believed that Japan was a nation too different and accordingly 
unreliable with whom to forge a stable and endurable agreement: ‘To some British observers, 
the differences between their country and Japan were so profound that they could not 
contemplate any understanding [of an alliance] being reached’.203  But more to this there was 
the idea that it brought with it a false sense of security. As one article in The Monthly Review 
published: 
 
‘Our treaty with Japan is dangerous, because it is an opiate that lulls to sleep a people 
that should be up and doing 
The Japanese Treaty, moreover, enables the Mikado to call upon the British 
fleet for use in the Far East –– a departure from established practice without a parallel 
in history. The Japanese Treaty, while barring the way to an understanding with 
regenerated Russia, not only prevents the federation of the British Empire, but hastens 
the establishment of the Australian republic under the suzerainty of the United States, 
which is the ideal of many Australian working men. For these reasons I hold that the 
Japanese Treaty of Alliance is an instrument showing, not wisdom but cunning; not 
strength but decadence; and the appearance of Japanese troops in the Hooghly is more 
likely to break that consolidate the British Empire’.204 
 
As can be seen here there was a fear that Japan would use the alliance as a stepping stone in 
their imperialist ventures. Indeed the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Lansdowne, 
warned how Britain had to keep a watchful eye: 
 
‘Unless we do so, Japan will be free to embark upon hostilities in which we may 
become involved over some comparatively insignificant local question’.205 
 
                                                          
America’s West Coast. Britain was seen as the power that would be invaluable in smoothing out differences. 
Lowe, Great Britain, 30. 
201 Bruce M. Russett, Community and Contention. Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 
MA., 1963), 6. 
202 See G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency. A Study in Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914 
(London, 1990), 59. 
203 Best, ‘Race, Monarchy’, 172. 
204 Coloniensis, ‘The Seamy Side’, 10. 
205 CAB 37/59, no. 132, 1901. Government Document from Lord Landsdowne, 16 December 1901. 
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This defeated the purpose of the alliance for Britain who looked to limit their involvement in 
Eastern affairs. Irrespectively however, its significance cannot be overlooked with some such 
as Cemil Aydin stating that Japan had now entered the club of ‘white-Christian great 
powers’, although some Britons and Americans believed that Japan still belonged to the 
yellow race and was nowhere near equal to the superiority of the West and all white-Christian 
nations. Along the lines outlined in the second epigraph above Britain could now be seen as a 
bad European having provided Japan with the capacity to become a more poignant threat. 
Tension between the legal status of Japan in international law and popular perceptions of 
Japanese racial inferiority thus began to emerge.206 With the coming together of two parallel 
races it was almost inevitable that scepticism would play its part. But never before had Japan 
been accepted as an equal power by a Western state than in 1902 where the notions of 
extraterritoriality and unfair treaty provisions had become a thing of the past, the alliance 
standing as a defining moment, a watershed moment, in Japan’s foreign relations.207 
But what of the presence of the United States in East Asia in the early years of the 
1900s? As mentioned in the previous chapter, it was their Anglo-Saxon kin across the 
Atlantic who was Britain’s primary focus in gaining an ally. America’s need to have public 
support for negotiating foreign alliances or for the use of any and all expressions of force 
however, made Britain look elsewhere for support in East Asia and their union with Japan.208 
Indeed America had somewhat alienated itself from the two since the consummation of their 
partnership. In 1901 when Japan sought clarification regarding the American position 
towards the Russian displays of aggression in Manchuria and how they intended to keep it in 
check, the United States responded by saying that would not undertake any positive action. 
With specific regards to Britain, the Boer War did not meet with approval from the United 
States who opposed colonial wars thereby placing strain on Anglo-American relations. It 
subsequently became clear that Britain could not rely on their Anglo-Saxon ally for any form 
                                                          
206 Aydin, The Politics, 40. 
207 Peter Lowe writes how that by 1905 and their success over Russia, many Japanese believed that the alliance 
had served its purpose with public opinion moving away from the idea of this agreement as being an invaluable 
agreement between the two powers. Many believed that Japan now had less to gain and that Japanese statesmen 
and diplomats acquiesced far too readily and willingly to British demands and pressure. Party politicians such as 
Inukai Tsuyoshi, a member of the Rikken Seiyūkai a conservative party which supported bureaucratic control 
and militarism, and Ozaki Yukio, member of the Kenseitō party which was under the leadership of the liberal 
politician Shigénobu Ōkuma, viewed the alliance as a hindrance to Japanese dominance in East Asia. Along 
similar lines, the thinking of pan-Asianist ideologies through groups such as Genyōsha (the Black Ocean 
Society) and Kokuryukai (the Black Dragon Society) the alliance stood in the fundamental thinking of Asia for 
Asians. Regarding the Japanese government itself it was not disconcerted by public opinion with the point of 
view that the alliance was a necessity for both Britain and Japan and Anglo-Japanese relations, even if for 
different reasons. Lowe, Great Britain, 31. Pan-Asianist organisations such as the Genyōsha were founded in 
the 1880s and developed in power and influence. None held more prominence than the Kokuryukai who 
emerged in 1901 and sought Japanese domination over all Asia. David E. Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: 
Japan’s Criminal Underworld (London, 2003), 24. For a list of prominent radical organisations in the Meiji era 
and their ideologies see Sven Saaler, ‘Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, 
Creating a Region, Forging an Empire’, in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (eds.), Pan-Asianism in 
Modern Japanese History. Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (Abingdon, 2007), 4. 
208 Allen, Great Britain, 585. See also 607. 
- 74 - 
 
of concrete support yet alone an alliance.209 Relations however, generally remained on good 
terms albeit with a mix of hostility and at times mistrust. Lionel Gelber has stressed how an 
Anglo-American understanding was ‘among the most decisive events of modern history’ with 
the rapprochement between the two at the turn of the century assuming ‘so deep and 
historical a significance’.210 English journalist Sydney Brooks explained British public life to 
an American audience in 1903 by saying how both spoke for nationalism, imperialism and 
the ascendance of social and economic groups of its nation.211 It was with these thoughts 
which saw Henry Allen conclude that at the turn of the century ‘the foundations of Anglo-
American friendship… were now firmly laid, the British people and their governments were 
too determined to acquire American goodwill, and the tide of the next years was running too 
strongly towards this amity for incidental rivalries to disrupt these developments’.212 With 
this Anglo-Saxonism seemed to be developing and a bond forging. Nevertheless the United 
States was reluctant to engage in military alliances.213 It was this which led to disputes 
between the two nations with the First Venezuelan Crisis of 1895, the Second Boer War of 
1899-1902, and the Second Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903 being examples of friendship 
turning into hostility.214 Typically on this topic the Americans ‘disliked Britain’s tacit 
endorsement of Japan’s policy in China’ which the 1902 agreement did little to help, whereas 
‘British officials were often exasperated by what they took to be the naiveté of Americans in 
the East’ which led to a scenario where Anglo-Saxon cooperation would only serve to 
weaken the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, something which Britain was not prepared to accept.215 
They can thus be seen to have moved towards Japan in a more favourable light than the 
United States, an idea which was not met with widespread acceptance. Rudyard Kipling was 
one of them with his feelings expressed in an illustration taken from the front cover of Puck 
early in 1902, shown here in image nine where he is trying to get the British lion to move in a 
certain direction. Where there existed tensions and mistrust between Britain and the United 
States in the forging of friendly relations following the Sino-Japanese War, similar 
sentiments transcended the opening years of the twentieth century though Britain moved 
towards allying with Japan.  
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IMAGE NINE: ‘Et Tu Brute!’ Puck, 29 January 1902. 
 
In this illustration Rudyard Kipling is holding a pen labelled “criticism” which he is using to prod the 
British lion into a certain direction and course of action. The caption describes the expression of the lion, 
reading “I didn’t mind the others, Rudyard; but I never thought you’d be prodding me!” 
 
Source: Available online at the Library of Congress. 
URL: < http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2010651558/ > (accessed 6 January 2015). 
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At this point it is worth mentioning the significance of American imperialism which 
continued to go from strength-to-strength. Samuel Moffat, chief editorial writer of the New 
York Journal, put the attitudes of a vast majority of the populace towards imperialism best 
when he wrote in 1901: 
 
‘It is based upon the fact that the United States is, and intends to remain, the 
paramount Power of the Western Hemisphere…. For other Powers the only question 
is whether they will accept it or collide with it. If this fundamental principle be once 
accepted, no country will have any trouble in maintaining harmonious relations with 
the United States’.216 
 
America possessed an intention to expand, something which Britain was more than aware of 
with the knowledge that the American navy was undergoing a programme of expansion so 
that its overseas interests could be administered without the need of an ally. Although the 
United States may have been the sixth highest nation in terms of battleship tonnage as shown 
in table five, their potential for development exceeded this. In a cabinet memorandum the 
First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Selborne, echoed the opinion shared by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence who identified the American navy as one of the ones to be wary of: 
 
‘It is certain that it would be a hopeless task to attempt to achieve an equality with the 
three largest navies; but I go further and say that, if the United States continue their 
present naval policy and develop their navy as they are easily capable of developing it 
if they choose, it will be scarcely possible for us to raise our navy equal to that both of 
France and the United States combined. I propose therefore to consider our position 
almost exclusively from its relative strength to that of France and Russia 
combined’.217 
 
Selborne later wrote to George Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 
emphasising the potential threat of America should its navy expand: 
 
‘I would never quarrel with the U.S. if I could possibly avoid it. It has not dawned on 
our countrymen yet… that, if the Americans choose to pay for what they can easily 
afford, they can gradually build up a navy, fully as large and then larger than ours and 
I am not sure they will not do it’.218 
 
On its own expansion, America claimed that their focus on becoming an imperial power was 
not to seek engagement in overseas conflicts but to aid in the maintenance and lasting of 
peace. During his second inaugural address as president, William McKinley said how he 
looked to preserve the status-quo and that any quarrels which may arise be settled by 
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217 Quoted in Ibid, 25. 
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‘peaceful arbitration’ so to ‘avoid the horrors of war’.219 Similar attitudes were expressed in 
the inaugural address of Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 where he placed a heavy attention on 
the notion that ‘toward all other nations, small and large, our attitude must be one of cordial 
and sincere friendship’.220 It was with this approach that Roosevelt sort to mediate the peace 
talks following the Russo-Japanese War, a feat which saw him presented with the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1906. 
Like Britain the United States remained neutral during the Russo-Japanese War with 
public opinion being favourable towards those ‘gallant little Japs’.221 As news of Russia’s 
struggles circulated with the idea of a Western nation losing somewhat badly to one in the 
East, this attitude began to change as an ‘undercurrent of apprehension’ began to emerge in 
American mind-sets. The place where this was most profound was the West Coast owing to 
high numbers of Japanese resident there. Following the American annexation of Hawaii in 
1898 some 60,000 Japanese who inhabited the islands were now permitted to enter the United 
States without the need of a passport. By 1899 the number of those resident on the West 
Coast was five times higher than it had been four years earlier. They were grouped with 
Chinese immigrants and experienced the same racial prejudices.222 Following the Portsmouth 
Treaty Japanese-American relations distanced as Japan begrudged the terms imposed to them 
as being more unfair on their status than the intervention of 1895. Whereas Roosevelt looked 
for the United States to be a silent partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan believed 
themselves worthy of greater recognition and that Russia be subjected to harsher terms.223 
Ralph Minger echoes this point stating how American public opinion towards their 
competitor in the Pacific had changed and vice versa. Whilst the Japanese experienced 
uproar, Americans began to regard their immigration as a serious problem.224 Estrangement 
intensified more now than in the 1890s as increasing tensions led to mounting talks of war 
between these two nations in the Pacific arena which would see the confrontation of two 
major powers representing different races, cultures and traditions.225 In the United States 
immigration took on a new emphasis as the yellow peril ideology becoming more vociferous.  
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As we discovered in the previous chapter a fear of this peril and immigration were 
intrinsically linked and if there was an event which acted as a springboard for an intensifying 
of this attitude then it was Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Many historians have 
identified the influence which this victory had on British and American attitudes towards this 
plucky nation in the East. Gina Owens marks this point as a time where Western fears were 
stimulated: ‘The Russo-Japanese War profoundly altered both Japan’s status in the world and 
the opinions of Japan held by Western powers. In the space of a decade (1895-1905) Japan 
became the primary focus for Western fears. Racial ideology was the means through which 
the West justified to itself and to others its domination of millions. Japan’s precipitous rise 
threatened the very core of the West’s self-perception and its precarious position of rule’.226 
Similarly Jean-Pierre Lehmann identified that 1905 marked the take-off point for the yellow 
peril for the simple reason that has already been identified – the collapse of a Western 
imperial power to an Eastern nation who was regarded as only just beginning to get to grips 
with modern warfare. Lehmann concluded ‘that a yellow people could defeat a white people 
in a major war was contrary to all accepted laws of nature and history’.227 These views are in 
keeping with the general sentiment of Westerners towards the Japanese. Gulick for one wrote 
how the defeat of Russia marked a greater emergence of the yellow peril in the West: 
 
‘It is sometimes said that Japan’s victory spells the immediate rise of the yellow peril. 
She will reorganise China’s military power; and raising her to the standard of her own 
efficient financial, educational and governmental attainments, will make those four 
hundred million people invincible. And then combined, China and Japan will exploit 
the world. Victorious Japan, they say, means bumptious Japan, swaggering Japan, 
Japan with a “big head.” All of which would signify discomfort and immediate danger 
to America and Europe. This in truth is the yellow peril feared by some’.228 
 
Similar writings can be found elsewhere: 
 
‘The bogey of the “Yellow Peril” has been raised as a reason why Eastern nations 
should not be encouraged to strengthen themselves with all the appliances of Western 
arts, both of peace and war, and the rapid development of Japan has led to the fear that 
she may place herself at the head of an Asiatic combination which might overwhelm 
the civilisation of Europe’.229  
 
Some have gone further and stressed that a victorious Japan would have been presented with 
the opportunity to establish a unified Asia which could pose a threat to the West. This is an 
attitude which was brought to light in the previous chapter but took on a new meaning in the 
years surrounding the Russo-Japanese War. One article is worth quoting at length: 
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‘In these articles [which emerged upon the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War] it 
was said that, unless Japan were defeated by Russia, an immense Chinese army would 
arise under Japanese leadership, which would first wrest with her Asiatic possessions 
from Europe, and then wage war against the white races, Christianity, and European 
civilisation, as in the days of Genghis Kahn and Tamerlane. 
 If the yellow races should become united into one solid mass, or if China 
should follow in the footsteps of Japan, the danger of a conflict with that immense 
power would, indeed, be very great for the European powers, and especially for those 
European powers which have valuable and extensive possessions in Asia’.230 
 
This was also expressed in Jack London’s short story ‘The Unparalleled Invasion’ which told 
the story of a victorious Japan colonising Korea and China thereby creating an 
insurmountable population level, and an Asiatic expansion westwards. It required the 
unification of the West to overhaul this threat.231 Elsewhere in an essay entitled ‘The Yellow 
Peril’, London also emphasised the threat of Japan: 
 
‘To-day, equipped with the finest machines and systems of destruction the Caucasian 
mind has devised, handling machines and systems with remarkable and deadly 
accuracy, this rejuvenescent Japanese race has embarked on a course of conquest, the 
goal of which no man knows. The head men of Japan are dreaming ambitiously, and 
the people are dreaming blindly, a Napoleonic dream. And to this dream the Japanese 
clings and will cling with bull-dog tenacity. The soldier shouting “Nippon, Banzai!” 
on the walls of Wiju, the widow at home in her paper house committing suicide so 
that her only son, her sole support, may go to the front, are both expressing the 
unanimity of the dream’.232 
 
Even more than a decade earlier Japan had further displayed itself to the West as the yellow 
peril. Now more than ever before, Western nations were apprehensive of its intentions and 
desires to expand their empire, and in which direction they would go. Many believed that if 
this was to happen then immigration stood as the foundation of this expansion.  
But this may not have been the intention of the Japanese who continued to pursue 
Westernisation. Sidney Osbourne highlights how the East lacked the prosperity of the West 
and that all Asiatics and Oriental subjects sought something better: 
 
‘The attitude of the Asiatic toward this dog in the manger policy may be likened to 
that of the poor labouring man who sees himself and his large family forced to starve 
because his little patch of ground is not large enough to raise sufficient for their needs, 
whereas over the fence, in his rich neighbour’s yard, the provisions are not only over-
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abundant but in danger of going to seed for the want of attention and the fruits rotting 
on the ground for the lack of someone to harvest them. And not even a watch-dog to 
guard such precious treasures! Under such circumstances would it be at all surprising 
if our poor labouring man climbed the fence some dark night and helped himself? 
That is the problem of the Pacific’.233 
 
Movement westwards was appealing in nature but it was this migration which brought about 
problems. Significant numbers of Japanese were migrating abroad, primarily to America but 
also to the British Dominions, including Australia, Canada and New Zealand.234 When 
considering expansion the Japanese had in mind the wider Pacific base which saw them 
collide with the United States who still held influence in the Philippines. In 1902 there were 
around 1,500 Japanese labourers on the island signifying a threefold increase since 1898. But 
Hawaii was of greater interest with the number of passports issued to Japanese labourers 
moving there increasing from 5,913 in 1897 to 12,952 in 1898, and to 27,155 in 1899. When 
Hawaii came under American jurisdiction however, immigration laws were tightened leading 
to a drop in Japanese emigration there. If anything however, this simply led to an increase in 
emigration to the West Coast which brought about a near doubling of the Japanese population 
there between 1889 and 1900, their total number of residents in the United States totalling in 
the region of 24,000. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War there were more than 65,000 
Japanese in Hawaii and in the region of 40,000 on the West Coast.235 As can be seen from 
these statistics the Japanese looked towards emigration to America as their movement into 
areas in the Pacific were restricted. As the United States did not impose such restrictions 
many found themselves there which exacerbated the already on edge levels of antagonism. 
Prevalent on the West Coast more than anywhere else in the United States, the yellow 
peril by 1905 had emerged as a significant part of everyday life. American policy had moved 
on from an impulsive and somewhat rash mind-set which solely revolved around issues of 
immigration and policy towards China to incorporate Japan and the threat it posed.236 This 
can be seen when looking at the Japanese workforce there. Regarding the worker himself the 
following was noted: 
 
‘The American foreman is confronted by the difficulty that nearly every Japanese 
labourer knows the word “yes” as is prepared to use it in reply to every question that 
he is asked’.237 
 
                                                          
233 Sidney Osbourne, The Problem of Japan. A Political study of Japan and of Her Relations with Russia, Great 
Britain, China, Germany, the United States, the British Colonies and the Netherlands, and of the World Politics 
of the Far East and the Pacific (Amsterdam, 1918), 164. 
234 Ayako Hotta-Lister, The Japan-British Exhibition of 1910. Gateway to the Island Empire of the East 
(Richmond, 1999), 17-18. 
235 Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 84-85. 
236 Owens, ‘The Making’, 33. 
237 W. Crewdson, ‘Japanese Emigrants’, The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review, 56:333 (1904), 
817. 
- 81 - 
 
TABLE SIX: Average Wages of American and Japanese Workers Per Day 
 (shown in US dollars) 
 Americans Japanese 
Carpenters 3.59 1.54 
Forman Carpenters 5.75 2.43 
Engineers 4.72 1.66 
Foreman Painters 4.00 2.50 
Painters 3.25 1.50 
Sheet Metal Workers 3.16 1.50 
Tinsmiths 3.50 1.50 
Source: A. E. Yoell, ‘Oriental vs. American Labour’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences, 34:2 (1909), 28. 
 
 
 
TABLE SEVEN: Immigration to the United States, 1891-1924 
Decade Number of immigrants 
1891-1900 3,688,000 
1901-1910 8,795,000 
1911-1920 5,736,000 
1921-1924 2,345,000 
Total 20,564,000 
Source: Roger Daniels, Not Like Us. Immigrants and Minorities in America, 1890-1924 (Chicago, 1997), viii. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE EIGHT: Japanese Migration to the United States, 1861-1924 
1861-1890 3,000 
1891-1900 27,000 
1901-1908 127,000 
1909-1924 118,000 
Total: 275,000 
Source: Roger Daniels, The Politics of Prejudice. The Anti-Japanese Movement in California and the 
Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (Berkeley, 1977), 1. 
 
 
 
 
S 
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Indeed when one looks at the comparison of wages which were demanded by Japanese and 
American workers one can see that there existed a reason for tension. This is shown in table 
six which details the biggest difference as being the pay amongst Forman Carpenters where 
the Japanese demanded $3.32 per day less. Other significant differences included the pay of 
engineers and painters which stand at a difference of $3.06 and $2.75 respectively. This 
happened at a time where America was experiencing peaks numbers of foreign arrivals. At 
the beginning of the 1890s the number of foreign born as a percentage of the American 
population stood just shy of fifteen percent, a number which was equalled at the end of the 
1900s.238 Looking specifically at the American census on the West Coast Japanese 
immigrants and native born in California make up a majority of the population. In 1890 they 
made up over fifty-six percent of the total Japanese population in the United States which had 
decreased to just over forty-one percent by 1900, and had increased to over fifty-seven 
percent by the end of the decade.239 Tables seven and eight highlight this point, the former 
showing that the 1900s experienced the highest number of immigrants in the space of thirty-
three years, whilst the latter details how the Japanese made up a majority. When one looks at 
table eight the years 1891 to 1900 can be described as unrestricted and growing, and the 
following period of 1901 to 1908 as being at its peak and still unrestricted. It was figures such 
as these which led to many identifying the influx of foreign individuals as a problem with 
immigration and the onset of a crisis.  
When comparing the yellow peril sentiment in America to that of its existence in 
Britain one finds a stark contrast as there was a faction which emphasised the friendship 
between the two, and on occasion completely dispelling the notion of its existence. In the 
introduction to the book The Japanese Spirit a Victorian poet and novelist wrote how this 
notion was non-existent: 
 
‘Concerning the foolish talk of the Yellow Peril, a studious perusal of this book will 
show it to be fatuous. It is at least unlikely in an extreme degree that such a people, 
reckless of life though they be in front of danger, but Epicurean in their wholesome 
love of pleasure and pursuit of beauty, will be inflated to insanity by the success of 
their arms. Those writers who have seen something malignant and inimical in their 
gracious politeness, have been mere visitors on the fringe of the land, alarmed by their 
skill in manufacturing weapons and explosives –– for they are inventive as well as 
imitative, a people not to be trifled with; but this was because their instinct as well as 
their emissaries warned them of a pressing need for the means of war. Japan and 
China have had experience of Western nations, and that is at the conscience of 
suspicious minds’.240  
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Indeed some have written how British public opinion wavered from the lines of those in 
America and that Japan would start acting like Europeans.241 Diósy for example wrote the 
following: 
 
‘Britannia wavers; her lovely face –– a reminiscence, may-be, of sweet English girls 
seen at Cowes –– is pensive. She knows that peril well, you see; she has done a good 
deal of business with him in the past, and, naturally, feels reluctant to use her spear 
against an old and valued customer’.242 
 
Here the importance of Anglo-Japanese relations is emphasised, the alliance helping to 
prevent anti-Japanese sentiment from sticking in the minds of the British public. On the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Australian adventurer and correspondent for The Times 
in Peking George Morrison, wrote to Valentine Chirol about the successes which Japan will 
bring, and how it will make its mark on the Western world: 
 
‘I am unfeignedly glad that war has come. I have no fear of the result. Japan will 
astonish Europe. She will move forward, I believe, irresistibly. Already she has done 
well and the effect of her success has been remarkable. Should she drive the Russians 
from the Yalu as it is certain she will do, she will have the assistance of every 
Hunghutzu in Manchuria’.243 
 
Interestingly the radicals of Britain’s left-wing politics did not use the idea of the yellow peril 
and the fact that Japan was an Asiatic race who was culturally alien to make the headlines. 
Indeed Japan was admired for the amazing progress which it achieved in such a short space 
of time.244 The idea of there being a peril was definitely not as profound in English society as 
it was with their Anglo-Saxon kin across the Atlantic. But this society was far from anti-
Japanese, anti-Asian, or anti-Orient free as images of these places were used as 
entertainment, the recipient of gesticulation. 
Perhaps the best example of this is the portrayal of the East in theatre. Although this 
might not be expressive of a peril per say to the extent it was in the United States it exists as a 
means of how society in the Orient was perceived.  ‘In plays and musical comedies’ writes 
John MacKenzie, ‘the Orient provided an unrivalled opportunity to portray not only spectacle 
in setting and costumes, but also peculiar people with funny names, odd laws and customs, 
and characters who were slippery, grasping, and, even more interestingly, lascivious. The 
orient, after all, had become a source of anxiety and strain, a place of complex trading 
relations and periodic warfare’. A number of plays which had a theme focused on the Orient 
were amongst the most successful and long-running of the period. The Geisha (1896) ran for 
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760 performances, San Toy (1899) for 768, Chinese Honeymoon (1901) for 1,075 which 
stood as a record for the time, The Cingalee (1904) for 365, a naval comedy entitled The Flag 
Lieutenant for 381, and an Anglo-Chinese play Mr. Wu for 403 performances.245 Specifically 
to Japan the most infamous play was Gilbert and Sullivan’s The Mikado or the Town of Titipu 
which became the most frequently performed Savoy Opera. It stands as a prime example of 
Japan being used for satirical purposes and a means of creating comedy and entertainment, as 
well as being an expression of Japan’s unique beauty.246 The streets of London treated Japan 
and the Orient as a means of amusement with their customs and traditions being the subject 
of appreciation but perhaps more frequently of ridicule. It must be remembered however, that 
Londoners were not in immediate contact with the Japanese and that owing to Britain’s vast 
empire, and the nationalistic fervour and pride of Britons which came as a result of it, that the 
presence of Japanese elsewhere brought with it reason to be apprehensive. Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand who like those on the West Coast were sceptical of Japanese expansion 
after 1905. As the British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour was reported to have in government 
memoranda: 
 
‘Sir George Clarke has pointed out to me that there are obvious difficulties –– not to 
say absurdities –– in showing Australia and other Colonies to treat our Japanese allies 
as belonging to an inferior race. At the same time, I am very doubtful whether this is a 
subject on which we either can, or ought, to coerce our self-governing Colonies, 
though it seems obvious to me that if we permit them differentiate against the 
Japanese immigrant we can raise no objection to the Japanese differentiating against 
the British trader, whether he come from Australia or from England. There is much to 
be said for trying to get this question put on a satisfactory basis before the Treaty is 
signed, though, om the other hand, it may be one of the difficulties which it is best to 
ignore, in the hope that, during the currency of the Treaty, it may not arise in an acute 
form’.247 
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Table three shows how Britain and its colonies were the second highest recipient of Japanese 
immigrants looking to move to the West. It was with this mind-set that the word “Oriental” 
was used in a derogatory manner. Here more comparisons are made between the 
Occidentalism and Orientalism. Gulick states how the “Oriental” brought with it negative 
connotations and hampered the path of progress:  
 
‘In my own use of the word, oriental signifies that type of civilisation which does not 
recognise the value or rights of the individual person as such. It represents autocratic 
absolutism in government; it emphasises the rights of the superior and the duties of 
the inferior; it ranks man as inherently superior to woman; it has no place for popular 
education or for representative government, and it esteems military virtue as the 
highest type known. In other words in oriental civilisation the community is supreme, 
the individual of no value whatever in himself. 
 By occidental I mean that type of civilisation which recognises and builds on 
the inherent value and inalienable rights of the individual person. The community 
exists for its individuals. The final motive of conduct is the highest welfare of the 
individuals in the community. The communal life is the means and not an end. It does 
not ignore the value or the necessity of communal life, but it finds the justification for, 
and the roots of communal life in the inherent nature and needs of individual persons. 
The typical representatives of occidental civilisation to-day are England and America. 
To occidental, therefore, I prefer the word Anglo-Saxon. In its logically developed 
forms, Anglo-Saxon civilisation emphasises constitutional and representative 
government, obedience to law, inherent equality and liberty of all men even though in 
social rank and person attainments there may be great inequalities; it emphasises 
popular education, the mutual duties and rights of older and younger, superior and 
inferior, the prime importance of personal character, the equal importance of the 
family with the military, the commercial, and the industrial virtues’.248 
 
It was not merely the hampering of progress which Westerners attributed to those in the East, 
it was the fact they held on to their traditions and customs, things which the West perceived 
as traits of an underhand and deceitful civilisation: 
 
‘It is certainly true that to a great many Europeans who have mixed with Orientals the 
Eastern character has seemed a hopeless melody of simplicity and cunning, fidelity 
and treachery, wisdom and folly, suspicion and trust, cruelty and superstition, which 
is always stultifying itself and always needing the presence of at its side of the more 
ponderated Western character, and although there is no doubt that the judgement of 
Europeans as to the majority of Orientals has been considerably justified by one set of 
facts, yet another set is not wanting which tends to support a less favourable view’.249 
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Alongside their concentration on the fact that the Occident inhabited the superior being and 
civilisation was the idea of Anglo-Saxonism, both experienced varying levels of the yellow 
peril with it being more a form of entertainment in Britain whilst Americans treated it with 
greater sincerity and apprehension.  
Russian defeat stands as the pinnacle of this threat. Fears that Japan now possessed 
the ability to hamper American trade in southern Manchuria and the Open Door Policy in 
China emerged. Combined with their immigration crisis this led to an increase in anti-
Japanese sentiment. As Henry Hyndman has stated, by the end of the war some Americans 
believed that Japan now had the opportunity to deal with the presence and perceived threat of 
the United States in the East with the same ‘relentless efficiency’ which they had displayed in 
the wars with China and Russia.250 Japan had now become a major power in the Asia-Pacific 
region which as historian Tadashi Aruga states, witnessed the end of ‘an era of amicable 
U.S.-Japanese relationship’. With this the idea of the peril had to be nipped in the bud. One 
American newspaper published an article asking ‘Is There Anything In the Yellow Peril?’ 
with the subtitle of ‘Uncle Sam Has Nought to Fear if He is Vigilant’. The article concluded 
that Japan was the main source of the peril, but provided the United States be anything but 
negligent and indifferent they could only benefit from affairs in the East and would have 
nothing to fear from it.251 Thenceforth the United States sought only to restrain any Japanese 
attempts at expansion and challenge their burgeoning hegemony.252 In addition to this the fact 
that many felt cheated at the Portsmouth peace talks was evident in America as one 
anonymous letter entitled “The Angry Japanese” published in The New York Times stresses: 
 
‘With all our patriotism we could not but cry that such a great failure on the part of 
the Japanese diplomats is a permanent and irredeemable national disgrace to the 
history of the Rising Sun….  
Just examine the peace terms now supposed to be agreed upon…. There is no 
diplomatic victory on the part of Mr. Witte, there is no diplomatic strategy whatsoever 
on the part of the Japanese….  
I hereby declare to the world: Wage war with Japan upon the least pretence 
and you are sure to win a diplomatic victory, whether you shall win or not on the 
battlefield. I hereby thank Russia and Witte that they were so mild in their peace 
terms, while they could, if they had tried, have imposed and got a large indemnity 
from Japan.  
                                                          
250 Hyndman, The Awakening, 151. Osbourne also brings to light how troubles now began to appear in 
education, stating how they brewed in schools with owing to the segregation of Japanese school children. 
Osbourne, The Problem, 151. 
251 The Pacific Commercial Advertiser, 24 December 1905. 
252 In addressing this Tadashi Aruga brings to light how these American attempts were in many ways futile 
owing to Japan’s connection with the Entente powers, specifically Britain with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
which was renewed twice prior to the outbreak of the First World War, and because of American involvement in 
European affairs during the war. Tadashi Aruga, ‘Reflections on the History of U.S.-Japanese Relations’, 
American Studies International, 32:1 (1994), 9-10. 
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‘Lastly, a few words to Komura and the Elder Statesmen of Japan: Those who 
know where to die, when to commit hara-kiri, are truly great; or at least they may be 
said to know how to apologise. True samurai prefer death to living a shameful life’.253 
 
It was this animosity which led to the outbreak of the Hibiya Riots in Tokyo which expressed 
how the Japanese felt that their patriotic endeavours during the conflict were betrayed by 
their own statesmen who had previously been commended for their success.254 These riots 
have been seen as accentuating the notion of pan-Asianism with the idea of unmei kyōdōtai 
spreading across not only the Asian world but also the Arab.255 This unrest can be regarded as 
heightening the caution of Japan to the West, accentuating the yellow peril in the same way 
as the Boxer Rebellion. Rotem Kowner for one writes how these riots displayed the violence 
of what was perceived as an ‘infuriated mob’.256 It is from this that an image of a mass hoard 
can be inferred with Japan once again standing out as the epitome of the peril, sentiments 
which had deepened by the end of 1905 and now on a far grandeur scale as their pre-
eminence in the East became second nature.  
In the years after the Boxer Rebellion these feelings became far more profound, the 
Japanese victory over Russia serving as the crux of anti-Japanese feelings and an example to 
the West of what level of threat they posed to their way of life. But as we have previously 
discovered Japan was fearful of losing its independence, an attitude which prevails in the 
years examined here as the notion of a white peril continued to develop. Indeed many 
believed that their war with Russia was a result of the increasing Western infringement in 
Eastern circles. As one Japanese statesman and diplomat put it, the reality of the white peril 
was the real threat whilst the yellow peril was simply a myth.257 But beyond this was a 
                                                          
253 The New York Times, 4 September 1905. 
254 Michael McCarthy talks of the importance which the Mikado in particular had during the Russo-Japanese 
War. That he and his statesmen had ‘shown themselves magnanimous as well as prudent’ witnessed the nation 
express their gratitude with a personal gift to him of ¥20,000,000 (£2,000,000) which was unanimously voted by 
the Diet ‘as a memento of the single successes achieved in the war’ which ‘were mainly due to imperial virtues’. 
Quoted in McCarthy, The Coming Power, 13-14. 
255 Unmei kyōdōtai is translated to mean “common destiny”. Saaler, ‘Pan-Asianism’, 10. See also Iida, ‘Fleeing 
the West’, 410-421. At this point I will direct the reader to an interesting study looking at Japan’s claim to the 
Islamic world which overlaps a period of this study: Selçuk Esenbel, ‘Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the 
World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945’, The American Historical Review, 
109:4 (2004), 1140-1170. 
256 Kowner, ‘The War’, 30. 
257 Baron Kentaro Kanekō, ‘The Yellow Peril is the Golden Opportunity for Japan’, The North American 
Review, 179:576 (1904), 644. In addition to this Gulick writes how there was a view that the Russo-Japanese 
War was solely a result of the white peril in the East, and that the meaning behind this conflict was for the 
defence of her empire and the desire to establish a permanent and lasting peace. For a look at the former of these 
points I would refer the reader to pages 138-153 of Gulick’s The White Peril and to pages 154-163 for the latter 
of these points. Following on from this James Bashford writes of how a policy amongst white races had 
developed which had a purpose of excluding all yellow and Oriental races which spanned across five continents 
and a portion of the sixth. This he argues has been engrained in policy since the middle of the nineteenth century 
where since 1848 Portugal had annexed approximately 800,000 square miles of territory, Belgium, 900,000; 
Germany and Russia each 1,200,000; the United States, 1,800,000; France, 3,200,000; Great Britain, 3,600,000; 
and other white nations approximately 500,000. This totalled 3,200,000 square miles of territory annexed in the 
space of the last seventy years, constituting an area three and one half times the size of Europe. He goes on to 
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feeling amongst Japanese that they had become the civilised power during this conflict where 
they were the ones fighting for the principles of freedom and enlightenment which had been 
bestowed on them: 
 
‘Brains plus education plus thorough-going enterprise of this kind must conquer all 
things –– even the Muscovite, who, content to keep his own country enslaved in 
ignorance, would fain crush such an enlightened and progressive people as those of 
Japan’.258 
 
Along with this idea there was a belief that people in the West maintained a profound distaste 
of Japan which developed more after the war with Russia. Revolutionist and scholar 
Taraknath Das, who was anti-British and openly opposed their rule in India and Bengal, 
wrote of these attitudes. In the introduction to his book Is Japan a Menace to Asia? which he 
dedicated to the cause for Asian independence, he wrote: 
 
‘The awakening of Asia is the most outstanding feature of the present age. The future 
of Asia is bright and glorious if the new spirit of Asia be rightly directed in co-
operation with all the Asian people. We hope, though we may not live to see it fully 
accomplished, that Japan and China and India will work unitedly, standing for Asian 
independence against all outside aggressions’.259  
 
When addressing Japanese unpopularity Das further writes: 
 
‘Some of the far-sighted Japanese statesmen fully realise that she will have to fall 
back to Asian aid in case a combination of powers arises against her. So to them the 
vital plank of Japan’s policy is to establish a community of interests between all the 
yellow races (if not Asiatic people) and to begin with the strongest of them all –– 
China. Japan faces the strongest opposition of Great Britain and U. S. A., both haters 
of Asiatic people. The strongest of all oppositions come from Great Britain because 
her interest in Asia is immense’.260 
 
Pan-Asianist sentiments can in many ways be seen to have contributed to the emergence of a 
new era in East Asia, the defeat of a Western imperialist bringing about a new level of 
consciousness amongst Asiatics.  
                                                          
mention: ‘The tendency at present is to exclude the Asiatic races from Europe, Africa, North America, South 
America, Australia, and from Russian holdings in Asia, and to confine them to the southern portion of this last 
continent. The exclusion policy extends not only to the Chinese and Japanese and Malays, but to the people of 
India, a portion of whom, are cousins to the higher branches of the white race’. James W. Bashford, China: An 
Interpretation (New York and Cincinnati, 1916), 446. 
258 Edmund Mitchell, ‘Japan at St. Louis’, Temple Bar: A Monthly Magazine for Town and Country Readers, 
July 1905. 
259 Taraknath Das, Is Japan a Menace to Asia? (Shanghai, 1917), v-vi. 
260 Ibid, 32-33. 
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With their newly established empire Japan was on the same footing as other 
imperialists, becoming the first Eastern state to do so thereby facilitating a new world order. 
Diósy details the significance of this emergence by stating how; 
 
‘… it was the Empire of the Rising Sun that gave the Old Far East its death-blow. The 
New Far East is the Far East as Japan has made it by her adaptation of Occidental 
civilisation, and by the results of the policy towards her neighbours the new methods 
enabled her to pursue’.  
 
Japan’s growth and expansion as an economic power also merited attention: 
 
‘The enormous industrial development of New Japan, and the competition, in many 
cases successful, it has entered into with the Occident–not only in Japan itself, but in 
markets hitherto considered as virtually reserved for the products of Europe and 
America–supply an object-lesson that teaches us what the Far East can do when 
thoroughly aroused’.261 
 
East Asia could now be seen as a hub for global affairs as changes such as these saw Japan 
acquire its own momentum which was beyond the ability of Britain and America to either 
halt or control. Richard Langhorne also states how this was now a place thwart with difficulty 
owing to the fact that it contained an international system embryonic in nature as it 
incorporated the European powers of Britain, France, Germany and Russia as well as the 
United States, all of whom continued to possess influence and sway in this area of the 
world.262 With this there was the idea that the East and West were getting closer together, that 
idea first expressed in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as imperialism emerged in both world 
arenas in a short and rapid space of time leading to competition and the potential 
estrangement. As Inazo Nitobé puts it: 
 
‘When one calls at a neighbour’s front door, one is usually received with courtesy; on 
the other hand, one may possibly be considered an intruder in the backyard, no matter 
how innocent. Just as the marginal utility of commodities fixes their value, as 
economists teach us, so it is in the margins of civilisations that the powers of 
expansive nationalities seem to be tried and determined. America has extended her 
borders to the Philippines, and Japan the edge of her dominions to Formosa. Here they 
almost meet. American trade, increasing in China, is brought into competition with 
Japanese, and as in these outskirts of commercial territory, inhabited by alien races, 
each nation tries to demonstrate and assert its own superiority, the timid are afraid that 
we may come to know each other in ways not agreeable. 
 ‘With the growth of imperialism the stronger nations look upon each other 
with suspicion and jealousy, and, unlike the more innocent intercourse of former days, 
                                                          
261 Diósy, The New, 102, 338. 
262 Richard Langhorne, The Collapse of the Concert of Europe. International Politics, 1890-1914 (London and 
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when men delighted in the exchange of the ideas and arts of peace, modern 
imperialism, impelled by feverish megalomania and zest for commercial supremacy, 
has come to regard all competitors, not only as rivals, but as potential enemies, whose 
existence jeopardises their own and whose fate must therefore be decided at the point 
of the sword’.263 
 
But not only the result of imperialism this coming together can be regarded as a symptom of 
progress and a result of technological innovations such as the electric telegraph and the 
steamship. A combination of these factors can be seen to have led to the collision of these 
distinct worlds. Langhorne concurs with this point: ‘The result was a change in the nature of 
international power in which its expression became more and more technological, and caused 
an upset in traditional relationships both between powers and between different parts of the 
world. This change in the currency of international power coupled with the emergence 
beyond Europe of new powers, dealing also with in the new currency, faced the great powers 
with a world-wide sphere of international operation in which the old bases of the international 
system in Europe had become geographically and practically inappropriate’.264 Times were 
continuing to change in a similar ilk to the turn of the century, a statement which is true of 
Britain whose dominance in East Asia continued to diminish. At home there was the concern 
of a military threat with the belief that their traditional defences, significantly the Royal Navy 
which although it remained the best navy in the world found itself going head-to-head with 
other developing navies, would not be able to protect Britain in the future to the same degree 
it had done centuries past. Growing economic competition as developing countries in the East 
like that of Japan, opened up new markets leading to writers, journalists and pundits 
publishing works on this panic. The works of Ernest Williams and Fredrick Mackenzie which 
featured the penetration of British markets both at home and abroad by superior foreign 
goods are perfect examples of this, becoming bestsellers.265 In the space of five years since 
the Boxer Rebellion East Asia had become a prominent area for economic, commercial, and 
imperial development. Owing to the growing strength of Japan the Orient and Occident had 
become closer together as the former of these hemispheres became a global powerhouse with 
Japan the glowing symbol of progress in the East. 
Whereas the years after the Sino-Japanese War witnessed the retrocession of Japanese 
imperialism the years following the Boxer Rebellion saw them acquire a more reputable 
accreditation as an imperial state and emerge as an indisputable global power. This began 
                                                          
263 Nitobé, The Japanese Nation, 2-3. On the coming together of East and West Nitobé cannot overlook the 
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with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as Britain moved away from the idea of a formulating a 
formal agreement with the United States, the idea of Anglo-Saxonism which had been 
prevalent towards the end of the nineteenth century being overshadowed by the devising of 
an alliance with a nation who was more than enthusiastic to share the burden of defending 
British interests. Regardless of this split both Anglo-Saxon nations supported Japan in the 
early 1900s. By the end of the Russo-Japanese conflict however, Americans had become far 
more cautious of Japan’s and their rise to power, whilst the British maintained a generally 
friendly approach. It was this which led to the idea of Japan as being the epitome of the 
yellow peril being more widely accentuated, their seemingly comfortable victory combining 
with displays of discontent in its immediate aftermath showing how the Japanese and even 
Asiatics more generally had the potential to disrupt the Western way of life as the Boxer 
Rebellion did in 1900. But it was more than their newly established military prowess which 
made people in the West stand up and take note. In America there was a fear of Asian 
immigration surpassing the levels which Chinese emigration witnessed in the 1880s. It was 
now without doubt that Japan had become the most powerful nation in the East as its 
Westernisation had led to modernisation with the establishment of a continental empire which 
did not receive any respite as it had following the war with China. As Japan was the only 
Asiatic imperial power the notion of them leaving Asia and becoming increasingly more 
similar to Western states materialised. Beyond this however their development was also seen 
to bring about the awakening of Asia as this area of the world could no longer be overlooked 
in a way which it had been in centuries past. It was this which further fuelled yellow peril 
sentiment, with America and Europe no longer the cornerstone of global affairs. Whereas the 
1890s saw a changing of the guard between China and Japan, the years up to the war with 
Russia saw them emerge on the world stage as an indisputable leading regional power leading 
to expressions of the yellow peril prevailing as a genuine fear and as a form of entertainment. 
By 1905 this fear had reached its peak and thenceforth Japan would find itself alienated and 
branded by Westerners who feared their next expansionist move. Having conquered an 
imperialist state in the form of Russia, Japan was on top of the world, standing on the 
shoulders of giants. The cost of success was them being labelled as a primary threat and the 
epitome of the yellow peril. Thenceforth however, Japan became increasingly more 
independent and less reliant on alliances with the West as it pursued policies of continental 
expansion as a means to counter the white peril and assert their pre-eminence in what was 
their own back garden. 
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Some Concluding Reflections on  
Japan and the Yellow Peril 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Japan and the Japanese have not been so much in evidence before the world since the 
Treaty of Portsmouth was signed as they have been last month. For Japan is showing 
herself as expert in the great art of advertisement as she has already shown herself in 
the arts of war. Japan all this year has been in London, preening her feathers and 
warbling her sweetest music like a golden oriole of the tropical forest, murmuring 
softly to each passer-by, “Am I not fair to see? Come and look and gaze your fill. For 
that purpose have I come, and for that purpose I remain yet three months more –– 
three months and no more”’.266 
 
- Review of Reviews, 1910 
 
‘The truth is that in spite of the countless visitors to Japan and the mass of literature 
about things Japanese, the European world is still curiously far from an adequate 
understanding of these “Yankees of the Pacific” – ignorant of the common facts of 
their life and country, still more ignorant of their real character and temperament’.267 
 
- Sir Henry Norman, The Real Japan, 1909 
  
 ‘That a yellow race could ever defeat a white race had never occurred to us, and we 
were correspondingly startled and alarmed. We abruptly ceased to think of the 
Japanese as a third-rate nation of polite, well-meaning, and harmless little men, 
drinkers of tea and wearers of kimonos. They became the Yellow Peril’.268 
 
- E. Alexander Powell, Asia at the Crossroads, 1922 
 
 
                                                          
266 ‘Japan in London’, Review of Reviews, 15 August 1910. 
267 Sir Henry Norman, The Real Japan. Studies of Contemporary Japanese Manners, Morals, Administration, 
and Politics (London, 1909), 338. 
268 E. Alexander Powell, Asia at the Crossroads. Japan : Korea : China: Philippine Islands (New York, 1922), 
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Dramatic changes were a significant feature in this decade of the Meiji era; changes which 
saw Japan acquire an empire, defeat a Western imperialist on the battlefield and become the 
predominant indigenous power in the East going head-to-head with the United States for 
hegemony in the Pacific. The fundamental change which took place however, occurred in the 
decade prior to the 1890s as colonialism took place where Africa and Asia were the primary 
targets for Western imperialists for the establishment of colonies. Although it was primarily 
these nations who sought to acquire protectorate states with a primary focus being more on 
China, Japan materialized in the 1890s following the Sino-Japanese War as Asia’s answer to 
the changing state of global affairs as their embarkation to establish a programme of empire 
building catalysed a change hitherto unbeknownst in the East. It is for this reason that the ten 
year period stemming from the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the early years of its 
imperialism, are significant in the development of Meiji Japan. Substantial differences 
separate the years after the war to the Boxer Rebellion and the subsequent five years up to the 
end of the Russo-Japanese War in terms of Japan’s relations with the West, and how or if 
Westerners perceived them as a threat. The premise of this work has been to address in detail 
the significance of the events which formulate this period and how they were received, 
perceptions which have not been widely addressed in historiography. Following the Sino-
Japanese War, Japan was regarded as a growing threat whereas by the end of the conflict with 
Russia in 1905 they had firmly established itself as the epitome of the yellow peril. They had 
moved away from the traditions of a now distant past as their Westernisation and 
modernisation had redefined its position. Japan’s growing ascendency was received with 
greater and unparalleled levels of attention as they became the key player in the East, the 
orchestrator of a new world emerging out of the old. 
It was the Sino-Japanese War which led to the emergence of Japanese imperialism 
and the genesis of a new world in the East as well as a new hierarchy there as their victory 
brought about the occupation of Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands, the beginnings of 
continental expansion marking the inception of Meiji Japan’s empire. Of such profound 
influence was this development that even the Triple Intervention, that act of mischief from a 
select few anxious Europeans in their attempts to retrocede and reverse its newfound status, 
could not hamper its occurrence. The key point here however, is not that Japan lost some of 
what they had won at the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it is that a select few European powers 
deemed it prudent enough to enforce their will upon affairs in the East highlighting how there 
was an awareness and a sense of anxiety towards Japan’s newly acquired strength. 
Thenceforth the term “yellow peril” emerged, receiving widespread attention as images of 
Oriental hordes and the idea of an invasion spreading across the Middle East followed 
quickly across Europe with the potential to reach the United States, which some viewed the 
Boxer Rebellion as expressing, began to sprout amongst those who were cautious of a change 
in the status quo. But there was more reason for the emergence of this sentiment than merely 
Japan’s rapid rise, and that is the simultaneous advent of American imperialism where 
through their occupation of the Philippines it had effectively set up camp in Japan’s back 
garden. As Britain commended the ascendency of the United States the notion of Anglo-
Saxonism became prevalent in British and American societal and political circles as relations 
between the two entered into rapprochement and the beginning of prosperity. As the West 
entered the realms of the East however, those in the Asia-Pacific area started to move 
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westwards as the trend of emigration took shape. This is true of Japan as the Meiji 
government sent envoys to Western nations, and as Japanese subjects sought a more thriving 
standard of living. Japanese immigration to America’s West Coast in the decade after the 
exclusion laws had been applied to the Chinese, saw Orientals enter Western territory.269 As 
some migrated westwards those nations to which they went began to express fear of what was 
a completely new culture from a part of the world with inherently different traditions and 
ethos. Thereafter Western attitudes came to view Japanese development and progress with a 
mix of admiration and fear; a respect for their swift victory over China and acquiescence, 
adoption and adaptation of Western cultures and attitudes, and trepidation because of this 
expression of strength, their ambitions for further gains, and the movement of Japanese. It is 
with the latter of these perceptions which saw a growing fear of Japan as the yellow peril 
materialise. 
Following the Boxer Rebellion further changes took place to those experienced in the 
last days of the nineteenth century. With the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan had now joined 
with one of the leading Western nations, its significance being that an Eastern nation had 
agreed a formal agreement which treated them with equality, extinguishing notions of 
extraterritoriality. It was with this that Britain can be seen to have moved slightly away from 
the bonds of Anglo-Saxonism as it was only with Japan that they could engage in a union 
which protected their interests in the East, the United States persistent in their reluctance to 
partake in an coalition or union which held the potential to drag them into foreign 
entanglements which did not directly affect them. This is not to say however, that America 
did not play a part in East Asian affairs, nor that the idea of cordial Anglo-American relations 
and Anglo-Saxonism had disintegrated in any way. In the early 1900s the United States still 
focused on its position in the East with the Filipino-American War, and even sought to be a 
silent partner in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. With this the United States still held an interest 
in how Japan progressed, and like Britain expressed feelings of support which continued into 
the Russo-Japanese War. As this conflict ensued these feelings of support began to alter, a 
statement truer of America as its expressions of the yellow peril became far more vociferous. 
Japanese emigration to the West Coast fuelled these sentiments as estrangement between 
these two nations furthered. Although these expressions can also be found in British circles 
they were far from being expressed on an equal level and to the same standard. Indeed in 
London theatre the Orient and the traditions which had transcended Asiatic nations for many 
a century was treated with ridicule as theatre productions used them as a form of comic 
entertainment. But the changes taking place in Japan were not overlooked by either of these 
nations. With the occurrence of pan-Asiatic sentiment and the support which this ideology 
expressed growing, an idea of Asia awakening was voiced, strengthening the idea of the 
yellow peril. This was catalysed by the Russo-Japanese War which saw the collapse of a 
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Western imperial power and a greater expression of what these Oriental hordes were capable 
of should they have an appropriate leader to guide them westwards. Whereas Japan’s victory 
over China was followed by the retrocession of what acquisitions they had made no such 
occurrence followed the Russo-Japanese War. Although there was some qualms following 
the Treaty of Portsmouth with many in Japan believing that Russia was not treated with the 
level of discipline and punishment which was expected, holding the belief that they were still 
not viewed by all many in the West as a nation on equal standing. The Hibiya Riots stand as a 
prime example of Japan’s nationalistic endeavours and expression, emphasise these feelings. 
By the end of Russian conflict Japan had affirmed itself as the staple power in East Asia and 
was now more independent than ever before, their confidence extremely high. It is with these 
factors that Japan had become the yellow peril personified in the West as their newfound 
strength and imperial gains saw the concretion of them as a growing threat. This sentiment 
was expressed through the popular media.270 
By examining the ten year period from the Sino-Japanese War to the signing of the 
Treaty of Portsmouth, the period of indisputable progression for Meiji Japan, this work has 
sought to add to the historiography surrounding this period and this topic. By providing 
insight and a distinct level of acumen into the emergence of Japan as the epitome of the 
yellow peril and the fear amongst which came with it, this work acts as a point of 
information, a springboard relating to the events which sparked and fuelled this sentiment. In 
using these two conflicts as well as other events such as the Boxer Rebellion and the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, this work as sought to contribute to existing scholarship. Through 
addressing the effects which these events had on Japan, the Japanese and its military, 
commercial, economic and societal development, and the perceptions of such changes in the 
West, the findings outlined in this thesis have developed upon and added to existing works 
from a range of academics. The works of those such as Erika Lee and Gordon Daniels who 
have focused on both Chinese and Japanese emigration westwards, as well as other scholars 
whose works focus on the same topic but are not as widespread such as Andrew Cobbing, 
have highlighted how these nations were the primary recipient of Japanese influences as they 
looked westwards, and that how perceptions changed.271 Alongside more general works 
offered by the likes of Akira Iriye and Peter Duus who offer a more singular look of Japanese 
imperial development and how it came into closer contact with other nations, an all-round 
and encompassing picture is provided, allowing for the various aspects which contributed to 
Japanese growth alongside Western the observations of these changes which this study has 
addressed to take place. This piece of research is unique in that it has focused on the growth 
of the yellow peril and the growth of Japanese imperialism in the space of ten years spanning 
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two conflicts which were to alter the status-quo in East Asia. In this period Japan emerged as 
the first non-Western and non-white imperial power, altering the status quo and planting the 
seeds of cautiousness and fretfulness amongst groups of Westerners where a belief that the 
vast number of Eastern hordes with the potential to upset their way of life had been 
awakened, possessing the intent to expand in an era where colonialism was all the rage, and 
overseas territory to establish an empire the trending fashion. 
Owing to the constraints which inhibit this work it is worth bringing to the reader’s 
attention a range of themes and topics which transcend the period of study presented here, as 
well as the years preceding and following it as they provide a more encapsulating view of 
Western perceptions of Japan. One such topic is the notion of bushidō which put simply is the 
way and life of the samurai comparable to the chivalry attributed of Medieval Europe, 
permeating all areas of society. When one looks at how Japanese scholars have defined it this 
is understandable. Inazo Nitobé for one describes it as ‘the code of moral principles which the 
knights were required or instructed to observe. It is not a written code; at best it consists of a 
few maxims handed down from mouth to mouth or coming from the pen of some well-known 
warrior or savant. More frequently it is a code unuttered and unwritten, possessing all the 
more the powerful sanction of veritable deed, and of a law written on the fleshly tablets of the 
heart. It was founded not on the creating of one brain, however able, or on the life of a single 
personage, however renowned. It was a single organic growth of decades and centuries of 
military career’.272 With this, observers in England began to urge the need of the British to 
adopt and emulate Japanese attitudes as a means to help maintain Britain’s position in the 
world.273 The same attitude was shared amongst the British populous who by the turn of the 
century began to believe that this philosophy stood as a means of guaranteeing an efficient 
and sustainable empire, able to counter problems such as Britain’s decline as the global 
economic power, which were blossoming from the heart of the empire.274 By the time of the 
Russo-Japanese War it becomes more obvious that the British military were looking to learn 
this ideal. Up to this point the British army had vast experience fighting only colonial wars, 
and its navy had not been tested in modern warfare for near a century meaning the Admiralty 
and War Office sought to learn what they could from this conflict as a means of keeping 
updated. Furthermore with regards to the navy, the British were facing increasingly greater 
threats from other growing navies which included the French, Russian, American, Italian, 
German, and Japanese fleets.275 Equally so there were views amongst some who opposed 
Japan’s blatant non-gentlemanly methods following its attack on Port Arthur in 1905 with the 
use of stealth, deception and surprise. Many historians have drawn parallels with this attack 
and their attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, both of which demonstrated these characteristics. 
This initiative went against the gentlemanly and cordial manner and the rules of fair play, 
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which the British had known and held in their modes of warfare.276 The bushidō philosophy 
did have an influence on British perceptions of Japan showing how certain elements of the 
Japanese mind-set alongside its patriotism appealed to the British military as well as society 
more generally. Although the works of Patrick Porter have been used which focus on military 
observations in the Russo-Japanese War, as well as Colin Holmes’ and Amish Ion’s article 
‘Bushidō and the Samurai’, a detailed examination would permit for a different approach and 
angle on British perception of Japan in its early imperialist years to take shape. 
Beyond the inherent features which made the Japanese military a distinct entity from 
the rest of society were its societal traditions and cultures which became a fad in Britain 
especially where this trend, generally referred to as Japonisme, became a growing trade from 
the late nineteenth century onwards.277 From 1875 to the turn of the century the British were 
keen and enthusiastic buyers of things Japanese from old and valuable pieces of art to the 
cheap factory-produced knick-knacks. The demand for cheaply produced Japanese fancy 
goods had risen steadily in this period. Whereas many of these novelty items were made in 
Japan, bulky pieces of bamboo furniture as well as cheap stamped-out metal ware including 
trays and tea caddies were made in Britain at places like Birmingham.278 Furnishings and arts 
became of great interest but its prevalence went further than this and can be seen in works of 
fiction. The most successful profiteer from publishing on Japonisme in Britain was Mortimer 
Menpes. His book, Japan. A Record in Colour published in December 1901, was lapped up 
by the eager public who were reeled in by the lure of one hundred coloured plates which were 
painted by Mortimer Menpes himself, all of which were covered with a tissue noting the title 
of the picture.279 Japanese culture was part of the fashionable trend in Britain, the aesthetic 
movement which contributed to the establishment of a unique culture and surroundings, 
playing a part in the middle-class and affluent homes of the Victorian era. This stemmed from 
the Great Exhibition at Crystal Palace in 1851 where Orientalism had been promoted as ‘a 
fresh well of art’ with the belief that it was from the East where the most impressive lessons 
could and would be learnt.280 Indeed Japanese art was met with great levels of enthusiasm 
with artists such as James McNeil Whistler, Menpes, George Henry, Edward Hornel, as well 
others being influenced by its style and composition, their works minting the term.281 Of 
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these artists most historians have regarded Whistler as the most influential who has been 
regarded as the pioneer of introducing Japanese art into European circles and linking it to the 
current British movement. Specifically focusing on Whistler’s work we can see the level of 
influence which Japanese art was beginning to acquire. We can see in Whistlers impressions 
of the River Thames of 1861 which show a clear response to Japanese art with the use of 
Japanese compositional devices, used as the basis of pictorial experiments.282 The influence 
of other artists however, cannot be overlooked. Menpes for one travelled to Japan twice so to 
learn artistic methods from Japanese painters, and to place orders for interior decorations for 
his house in London. Furthermore he held exhibitions in London where his works were all 
very Japanese in subject and by the 1880s he began to create a novel form of realistic 
expression. Henry and Hornel also travelled to Japan and used mass-produced photographs 
known as Yokohama Shashin which provided foreign visitors ideal images of Japan. They did 
not use photographs to make an accurate, acute and detailed record of Japan, but simply 
selected figures and settings from photographs and ended up shaping their depictions from an 
amalgamation of first-hand experience and stock images. Although Henry showed some signs 
of understanding Japanese colour and its subtlety their primary target audience remained 
foreign tourists.283 Although this began in the mid nineteenth century it continued into the 
1890s and beyond as kimonos, fans, screens, blue and white porcelain and furniture in line 
with the aesthetic dialogue described here decorated ordinary English households. 
Furthermore whilst Britain's view of Japan was supported by the art brought back by British 
painters, as well as furnishings brought to decorate houses, the real Japan was changing 
rapidly towards what it saw as a Western way of life.284 With the works of these artists as 
well as others the British public were provided with an opportunity to experience Japanese 
style and everyday living through visual images, something hitherto inaccessible to them. 
One further topic worth bringing to light which has been touched on in this works but 
warrants greater attention than can be provided here is the role of Japan in international 
exhibitions and expositions. As industrialisation took shape in the Western world they 
became of far greater significance, a chance to showcase progress and innovation – a prime 
opportunity for Japan to display the depth and rapidity of its change brought about following 
the Meiji Restoration. They came to be regarded as a means by which people defined culture 
and in the way in which they identified culture with a society.285 ‘International exhibitions’, 
acknowledges Paul Greenhalgh, ‘grew and matured in a way which in retrospect seems at 
once tentative but inevitable. The conditions allowing them to come into existence fell 
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haphazardly into place, but once there they grew with startling rapidity. Between the two of 
them, the Great Exhibition of 1851 and the Exposition Universelle of 1855 established a form 
that was to go on unbelievable heights of embellishment. As cultural manifestations, they 
revealed an expansive West in its most flamboyant and bombastic state; baroque, overblown 
expressions of societies that felt they ruled the material world absolutely’.286 This was an 
opportunity which Japan would not pass up. In the period from the International Exhibition 
held in London in 1862 to the Japan-British Exhibition in 1910, irrespective of the enormous 
strain which they imposed on the nation, they participated in thirty-six of the eighty-eight 
events held worldwide. They provided Japan with a convenient means of acquiring the most 
diverse and up-to-date information needed to further their industrial, technological and 
military development, while at the same time affording them the opportunity to display their 
artistic and technical attainments and to foster their trade, heightening their sense of national 
identity garnering international prestige.287 In the 1900s there were no less than twelve 
international of these events hosted across the Western world where Japan spared no expense. 
Its expenditure in this decade on exhibitions alone totalled ¥4,316,626, the most significant of 
these being the Exposition Universaille held in Paris in 1900, the 1904 Louisiana Purchase 
Exposition, and the Japan-British Exhibition of 1910, where expenditure for these three alone 
totaled ¥4,019,000.288 Specifically to Britain and the United States however, it was the 
Louisiana Purchase and the Japan-British Exhibitions which contributed to a greater change 
in the perceptions of Japan. 
The former of these and its display of ethnological exhibits were addressed in the 
previous chapter, so I will briefly mention the former of these. The year 1910 saw the British 
fall in love with things Japanese all over again as they were educated about these things on a 
level similar if not greater than in the years of the Japonisme craze. Indeed the exhibition 
exists as the most significant event in relations between the two since the signing of the 
alliance in 1902 as it profoundly influenced British perceptions of Japan, the Japanese and 
almost all things Japanese related. The work of Ayako Hotta-Lister is amongst the most 
detailed of studies of any exhibition held in this period. In it she emphasises the anticipation 
amongst Britons, the Japanese aim of educating the British in things Japanese from their 
traditions to modern existence and the desire amongst them to be educated on such matters, 
as well as providing a detailed look the exhibits themselves. With this it would be somewhat 
futile to attempt at trumping such a study.289 It is well worthwhile noting how this event 
contributed to the 1902 agreement with some labelling it as establishing a willingness 
amongst private financiers to invest in Japan. Furthermore it was seen to have transformed 
the alliance from one of governments into a broad alliance of peoples, providing a cultural 
and racial justification for its inception by demonstrating the appropriateness of Japan’s 
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appearance as a commercial, naval and imperial power.290 This significance is shown in a 
variety of sources. The Daily Telegraph has expressed how it helped cement cordial relations, 
as has the Pall Mall Gazzette which described its inaugural banquet and how the Japanese 
ambassador commended the strength in depth of relations and the alliance, and the Daily 
Mail.291 Some have even stressed that the Exhibition further strengthened their positive view 
of Japan which emerged out of the war with Russia, and believed that Britain could learn 
from Japan’s attitude, approach and way of life.292 With the Japanese now on Britain’s 
doorsteps in what can be seen as an extension of the Japonisme movement, the Japan-British 
Exhibition stands as a cornerstone of their relations, a key facilitator in the changing face of 
British perceptions. 
This is not to forget the presence of the United States however, who following the 
conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War experienced increased political as well as social 
tensions. On the former of these points Theodore Roosevelt’s launching of the Great White 
Fleet in 1908 expresses how there was resentment towards the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
which encouraged Japan’s naval building in the Pacific, as well as a means of asserting their 
power.293 Consisting of sixteen battleships and a number of escorting vessels it was 
welcomed in Japan to rapturous applause and cheerful hospitality. In spite of this the 
American naval administration henceforth began to regard the Imperial Japanese Navy as its 
principle enemy and vice versa.294 This was mixed with the ever increasing immigration 
crisis on the West Coast. As we have seen in the previous chapter this decade experienced 
peak numbers of emigrants from the East, the seriousness of the situation beginning to take 
its toll as the San Francisco Board of Education adopted an order which enforced a 
segregation of all Oriental school children in 1906.295 Roosevelt’s negotiation with those in 
San Francisco as well as the Japanese who were appalled at such an act led to the formulation 
of the Gentleman’s Agreement in 1907. With this the United States agreed not to pass 
discriminatory legislation against the Japanese as well as seek to prevent states from being 
prejudice. In return the issuing of passports for Japanese labourers bound for America would 
cease. Both parties mutually agreed that all Japanese workers who had already travelled to 
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and settled in America with their wife and children would be permitted to stay and receive 
passports to the affirmative. In reality however, this agreement failed to protect or put an end 
to anti-Japanese prejudice as they remained under federal law “aliens ineligible to 
citizenship”.296 Following the defeat of Russia estrangement in the Pacific expressed itself on 
far greater magnitude whilst on the West Coast immigration simultaneously became a key 
political issue.297  
In the space of a decade Meiji Japan experienced two defining moments which 
defined its progress, establishing an empire and a sphere of influence in East Asia with the 
Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese standing as watershed moments, marking the culmination 
of its progress. Although both had a different effect they brought Japan on par with other 
powers who regarded empire building as the norm in an age when imperialism was being 
redefined. It had been a long time in the past where East Asia had been accustomed to 
displays of such expressive might as demonstrated by Japan here, and it is with this that 
Western states started to become more aware of their existence, and its presence in world 
affairs becoming the subject of discussion in social as well as political circles. As the 
development of Japan took place in such a short space of time there emerged concerns that 
this revelation had the potential to move westwards, conjuring images in some circles of 
Oriental hordes upsetting the status quo and the way of life to which they had become so 
accustomed. Although this did not happen in the ways which works of fiction portrayed, 
Japanese emigration can be regarded as a sort of invasion. The prejudices on the West Coast 
of America certainly emphasise this point with legislation and the establishment of groups 
with the intent to upset Japanese labourers there, showing how they were increasingly 
becoming more unwelcome. As the United States was the main recipient of Japanese 
emigrants, predispositions can be seen to be most vociferous there. As we have seen it is not 
a misinterpretation of the facts when one states how the British were far less cautious of 
Japanese immigrants. Owing to Britain’s position in the world however, it would be ignorant 
to not address the views of their dominions as Australia, Canada and New Zealand 
experienced higher levels of Japanese immigration. In both countries however, propaganda 
personified them as the yellow peril and was existent across magazines, periodicals, 
newspapers, fiction and monographs as well as other materials which were being distributed 
equally as much as the travel and globetrotting accounts which preceded them. Japan’s 
progression had gained them access to the forecourt of world affairs as the establishment of 
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its empire made them the leading power in East Asia and the catalyst for changing the 
existing state of affairs in international. Victory over China ignited the spark of imperialism 
which Japan had sought to adopt through its emulation of those states who had opened them 
to the outside world, whilst victory over Russia witnessed the combustion of imperialistic 
endeavours as Japan stood on the shoulders of a Western giant, a nation with a reputation 
long established as a prominent and powerful state seemingly made somewhat insignificant. 
A prime example of David striking down Goliath, it was this which characterised Japan’s 
early imperialism and its emergence on the world stage in a blaze of fiery glory which would 
see them branded the epitome of the yellow peril. Changes had taken place where East Asia 
would thenceforth play a pivotal part in global affairs with Japan at its helm, driving forward 
change. 
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